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This thesis seeks to examine the roles of investor sentiment and cognitive 
dissonance on investor behaviour. The objectives of this thesis are: first, to 
investigate the impact of the interaction of investor sentiment with culture on 
momentum and post-earnings-announcement-drift by way of cognitive 
dissonance in international markets; second, using investor sentiment and 
analyst recommendations to examine how cognitive dissonance affects 
institutional herding in the U.S. financial market. 
 
The effect of investor sentiment, culture as well as cognitive dissonance is 
examined for the two anomalies, momentum and post-earnings-
announcement-drift. The investigation is carried out both across a wide range 
of countries and in two distinct culture groups. We investigate these issues 
by building on a specific behavioural model and by bringing together 
arguments from psychology and the cross-culture literature in relation to 
investor sentiment, culture and the notion of cognitive dissonance. We 
propose that cognitive dissonance will be evident when private or public 
news contradicts investors’ sentiment. This will cause a slow diffusion of such 
news being incorporated into stock prices, resulting in return continuation 
and people in different cultures experiencing different degrees of cognitive 
dissonance and in different situations. The empirical findings suggest that 
cognitive dissonance is a key driver in explaining these two anomalies across 
countries and in the two distinct cultures. 
 
The interaction of investor sentiment and analyst recommendations on 
institutional herding is investigated by using two commonly used herding 
measures in the micro-level in the U.S. It suggests that cognitive dissonance 
is an important driver for institutional herding by taking account of the 
interaction between the two factors. Cognitive dissonance will be evident 
when analyst recommendation revisions conflict with sentiment, causing 
institutions to herd differently in the current and subsequent periods. The two 
herding measures allow us to capture different aspects of herding in the two 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Under traditional finance theories, market participants are assumed to be 
rational and markets are informationally efficient (Fama, 1970). Stock prices 
should be unpredictable since the market should reflect all available 
information. If stock prices deviate from their fundamental values, rational 
arbitrageurs should be able to eliminate such a mispricing very quickly. In 
past decades, numerous anomalies and puzzles have been raised by 
empirical studies, which contradict the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
1970) and traditional finance theories are difficult to explain such phenomena. 
Examples include post-earnings-announcement-drift (Bernard and Thomas, 
1990), stock price momentum in the medium horizon (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993), mean reversion in the long run (Debondt and Thaler, 1985) and 
institutional herding (Lakonishok et al., 1992). In order to explain various 
financial market anomalies and puzzles, researchers have extended their 
research domain to market participants’ behaviour based on psychology and 
sociology and attribute variations of asset prices to the extent of investors’ 
non-rational behaviour. This research is known as Behavioural Finance, 
involving theoretical modelling of investor psychological biases and empirical 
investigation of investor decision making system. Investor sentiment, which 
is one of the pillars of behavioural finance, refers to erroneous beliefs or 
psychological biases such as overconfidence, self-attrition bias and 
conservatism. The sentiment may be treated as the non-rational evaluation 
of asset characteristics (Shleifer, 2000; Baker et al., 2008). In general, 
investor sentiment can be described as waves of optimistic and pessimistic 
sentiment- at least from time to time (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). 
 
This thesis contributes to the behavioural stream using investor sentiment in 
explaining financial market phenomena through its interaction on cognitive 
dissonance. In particular, the first two empirical chapters investigate the 
effect of investor sentiment and cognitive dissonance on two anomalies, 
momentum and post-earnings- announcement-drift in different cultures using 
data across a wide range of countries. The study is first motivated by the fact 
that those anomalies appear to provide the biggest challenge to the efficient 
market hypothesis (Fama, 1998) and although the evidence for these 
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anomalies is extensive, it is not found for all international markets. While 
cultural individualism has been shown to be of relevance to these anomalies, 
to date it is not clear why cultural factors might influence the level of returns. 
Invest sentiment has been offered to explain momentum and post-earnings-
announcement-drift (e.g. Antoniou et al., 2013; Livnat and Petrovits, 2009). 
Based on the premise that culture serves as an informal institution to regulate 
investor behaviour (e.g. investor sentiment), we expect culture to influence 
investor trading decisions and, in turn, momentum and post-earnings-
announcement-drift anomalies. We seek to address these issues by bringing 
together arguments from the psychology and cross-culture literature 
regarding the difference in relation to sentiment and its impact on cognitive 
dissonance since sentiment might interact with other market features 
differently across cultures. In addition to examining the impact of cognitive 
dissonance on momentum (PEAD) in 40 (34) countries with differing levels 
of individualism, we pay particular attention to the impact of the difference in 
cultures between the east and west, allowing us to gain better insights into 
the impact of cognitive dissonance on how investors process information in 
the two distinct cultures. Building on Hong and Stein (1999) and recognising 
Westerners’ (Easterners’) belief in continuation (reversal), we propose 
cognitive dissonance arises in different circumstances and to differing 
degrees in the two cultures, resulting in it being a key driver of the anomalies. 
Results support our hypotheses, suggesting sentiment and culture interact 
to impact cognitive dissonance, explaining differences in the anomalies 
across countries. 
 
In the third empirical chapter, we proceed to investigate the joint effect of 
investor sentiment and analyst recommendations on another financial 
phenomenon, institutional herding. The study is motivated by the fact that the 
two factors, investor sentiment and analyst recommendations, have been 
shown to be prominent in affecting institutional herding. We propose that 
institutional investors may experience cognitive bias (e.g. cognitive 
dissonance) when processing analyst information (e.g. analyst 
recommendations) and sentiment related indicators. In particular, cognitive 
dissonance may be evident when the two factors do not suggest similar price 
movements. In turn, in a same period, institutional investors may herd 
strongly in response to the arrival of information strongly in the absence of 
cognitive dissonance, resulting in stronger within-period herding. On the 
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other hand, when cognitive dissonance is evident, in order to resolve such 
uncertainty, institutional investors may be more likely to follow the trades of 
others in the subsequent period, resulting in stronger adjacent-period 
herding. Two micro-level herding measures are employed in the study to help 
us capture within- and adjacent-period herding and different aspects of 
institutional herd behaviour, allowing us to gain better insights into intentional 
and spurious herding.  
1.2 Thesis Contribution 
The main contribution of this thesis is that it provides the first investigation of 
the interaction between investor sentiment and another prominent factor in 
financial market anomalies by way of cognitive dissonance. In the first two 
empirical chapters, we address the importance of investor sentiment in 
affecting the level of stock returns in different cultures. A number of studies 
show that people’s behaviour depends to a large extent on their cultural 
background (e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Guiso et al. 2006). People 
are not able to change their ethnicity, race or family history, and only can alter 
their country or religion with difficulty (Becker, 1996). Due to such difficulties, 
culture will have a significant impact on their behaviour throughout their 
lifetimes.  
 
Chui et al. (2010) first link the cultural effect to momentum profits and a 
subsequent study by Dou et al. (2015) show the effect of culture on post-
earnings-announcement-drift. However, to date it is not clear why cultural 
factors might influence the level of returns and both studies do not link 
sentiment to culture. We believe that research on culture and sentiment is 
promising since an individual response to sentiment may be influenced by 
their cultural background. We tackle these issues by examining the 
interaction of investor sentiment and culture on two anomalies, bringing 
together arguments from psychology and cross-culture literature in relation 
to sentiment, culture and the notion of cognitive dissonance. We propose that 
cognitive dissonance may be a major driver of the two anomalies, with the 
interaction of sentiment and culture causing this phenomenon to arise in 
different circumstances and to differing degrees in the west and the east. 
While previous studies of the two anomalies have examined the roles of 
sentiment and culture independently, to date no study has examined their 
joint impact or considered the implications of their interaction on cognitive 
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dissonance and momentum and PEAD. Results suggest that cultural 
differences relating to individualism impact on the level and extent of the two 
anomalies, while cultural biases concerning continuation and reversal drive 
the differences in relation to the two anomalies across western and ESEA 
markets. Thus, our analysis suggests that cognitive dissonance is a major 
determinant of prior empirical findings relating to both momentum profits and 
PEAD. 
 
The third chapter focuses on the effect of investor sentiment, analyst 
recommendations and cognitive dissonance on institutional herding. The 
study contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, while previous 
studies have examined the impact of analyst recommendations and 
sentiment on mutual fund herding separately, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to investigate the individual and joint effects of the two 
factors on institutional herding. Second, we examine the effect of both factors 
on institutional herding over multi-periods using both within-period 
(Lakonishok et al., 1992) and adjacent-period (Sias, 2004). This allows us to 
capture different aspects of institutional herd behaviour. Our results from 
using two herding measures allow us to gain greater insights into intentional 
and spurious herding. Using the LSV measure, we find institutional investors 
tend to herding strongly in the presence of optimistic sentiment and for stocks 
with downgrades, which are consistent with prior literature (Brown et al., 
2013; Liao et al., 2013). However, using the Sias measure, we find adjacent 
period herding is stronger following pessimistic periods and such herding is 
mainly driven by institutions following the trades of others. In examining the 
interaction between investor sentiment and analyst recommendations on 
institutional herding, we propose that in the presence of cognitive dissonance, 
within-period herding will be dampened but adjacent-period herding arising 
from institutions following the trades of others will be prominent since when 
investors experience cognitive dissonance, they are more likely to trade with 
delay and to resolve such uncertainty and, hence they are more likely to 
follow the trades of others in the subsequent period. Overall, the results are 
consistent with our expectations. At last, the results of subsequent stock 
returns following institutional herding using both herding measures show that 
there is only weak evidence of return reversals, suggesting that information-
based herding plays a key role in driving institutional herding by considering 
the interaction of analyst recommendations and investor sentiment. 
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis  
The remainder of the thesis consists of 5 chapters organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on five central research themes, 
including investor sentiment, cognitive dissonance, momentum, post-
earnings-announcement- drift and institutional herding. Investor sentiment is 
introduced first, including the role of psychology and behavioural based 
models, empirical evidence of the effect of investor sentiment on investor 
behaviours and stock markets, and is followed by the introduction to cognitive 
dissonance, which is a central theme throughout all three empirical chapters. 
The last three themes start with empirical evidence, construction and 
measurement of each anomaly, followed by possible explanations. 
 
Chapter 3 empirically studies the interaction of investor sentiment and culture 
on cognitive dissonance and the extent of momentum profits. The study uses 
a framework in the spirit of the behavioural model of Hong and Stein (1999). 
It is undertaken in an international setting, allowing us to gain better insights 
into the extent of how psychological biases of investors (e.g. cognitive 
dissonance) impact on momentum profits across cultures.  
 
Chapter 4 studies the interaction of investor sentiment and culture as well as 
the impact of cognitive dissonance in relation to post-earnings-
announcement-drift. The study also uses the same framework as the 
previous empirical chapter.   
 
Chapter 5 investigates the interaction of analyst recommendations and 
investor sentiment on institutional herding. The examination of institutional 
herding is conducted using two different micro-level herding measures. 
Institutional herd behaviour is analysed under different levels of analyst 
recommendations and under different sentiment states as well as the impact 
of the interaction of the two factors by way of cognitive dissonance. 
 
All three empirical chapters develop previously untested hypotheses, 
undertake detailed empirical analyses and several robustness tests. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusion, which provides a summary of the thesis, 
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter presents reviews of the five central themes of the thesis. The 
first two sections, 2.1 and 2.2, introduce investor sentiment and the theory of 
cognitive dissonance. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 document the evidence and 
causes of momentum profits and post-earnings-announcement-drift, 
respectively, and are followed by a discussion of institutional herding.  
2.1 Investor Sentiment 
2.1.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
An efficient market is defined as a market in which asset prices always fully 
reflect all available information (Fama, 1970). When information related to 
the fundamental value of an asset arrives, the asset price should react 
instantaneously and move to a new fundamental value. In an efficient market, 
it should be impossible for investors to generate consistent profits in a 
systematic way. There are three arguments for the EMH. The first argument 
is associated with investor rationality. In an efficient market, investors are 
assumed to be fully rational where they value each asset based on its 
fundamental value. This implies that the asset price is adjusted to a new 
value when new information about fundamentals arrives. The second 
argument of the EMH presents that even if there are some irrational investors 
in the market, the market still can be efficient because their trades are 
independent and random and cancel each other out without affecting prices. 
The third argument of the EMH refers to arbitrage. The arbitrage argument 
shows that even if there are some mispriced assets in the market due to 
correlated trades, such mispricing will be corrected by the arbitrageurs who 
will short overpriced assets and buy underpriced assets (Shleifer, 2000). 
Such an arbitrage opportunity will be exploited very quickly.   
 
The challenge to the first EMH assumption concerns the rationality of 
economic agents. In traditional finance theories, market participants are 
assumed to be fully rational in processing information. Sentiment is not 
considered in rational behaviour of economic agents. Hayek (1952) argues 
that no one can be fully knowledgeable, and the limitation of knowledge may 
unavoidably lead to mistakes when investors make trading decisions 
regardless their rationality. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) state that when 
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investor make decisions under uncertainty, they may deviate from the 
Bayesian updating system in updating information. In behavioural finance 
studies, bounded rationality has been introduced. Sentiment such as mood 
and emotion has been considered in the process of the decision making 
system. Thus, market participants cannot always behave fully rationally.    
 
The challenge to the second EHM assumption concerns the direction of 
trades of irrational investors. Some studies suggest that irrational investors 
may trade in the same direction rather than independently and randomly 
because people are subject to the same psychological biases (e.g. 
overconfidence and conservatism) and show the same “irrational” 
preferences (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Therefore, 
investors may form their beliefs and make trading decisions in a way which 
is subject to the same cognitive bias, resulting in highly correlated investment 
decisions. In such a case, their trades would impact stock prices in the same 
direction instead of cancelling each other out. In the literature, irrational 
investors are typically referred to as individual/retail/unsophisticated 
investors and rational investors are referred to as institutional/sophisticated 
investors. However, institutional investors have an incentive to herd due to 
reputational reasons, which may destabilise the market. Under such a 
premise, the second EMH argument would be violated.  
 
The challenge to the third EHM assumption concerns the effectiveness of 
arbitrage. First, arbitrageurs are assumed to be fully rational and not 
subjective to cognitive biases. DeLong et al. (1990a) suggest that 
arbitrageurs face noise trader risk to eliminate stock mispricing. Noise trader 
risk refers to the view that irrational investors will cause prices to deviate 
even further after the arbitrageurs place their position. This would bring 
losses to arbitrageurs who will not be able to maintain their position. 
Consequently, arbitrageurs will take this into account and will not take the 
position. Hence, arbitrage is limited under such a case. Second, Delong et 
al. (1990b) point out that rational investors, such as feedback traders, will 
strengthen the effect of sentiment traders instead of eliminating the effect. 
For example, feedback traders will make profits by trading in the same 
direction as sentiment traders. Third, Delong et al. (1991) suggest that 
irrational traders can exist and dominate the market in the long run so that 
rational arbitrageurs face great risk in arbitraging mispricing over a long 
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horizon. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that such long-term arbitrage will 
force them to liquidate their position before prices revert to the fundamental 
value. Thus, the arbitrage is also limited. The empirical evidence of the 
challenge is further discussed in section 2.3.4.1.  
2.1.2 Empirical Challenges to EMH  
The benchmark null hypothesis of the EMH is that investors cannot forecast 
asset returns with any measures of risk (e.g. beta). This implies it is 
impossible to make consistent profits using fundamental risk factors. Hong 
and Stein (2007, p109) state that “any other form of predictability would 
represent a profitable trading rule and hence a free lunch to investors”. There 
are many empirical studies that challenge EMH and are difficult to rationalise 
by risk factor models e.g. post-earnings announcement-drift (Ball and Brown, 
1968), the contrarian strategy (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985), momentum 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and the value-glamour phenomenon (e.g. 
Fama and French, 1992; Lakonishok et al., 1994). Almost all these studies 
have been explained by using behavioural explanations involving short-run 
underreaction and long-run overreaction by less rational investors. 
Underreaction may be due to a gradual information flow (Hong and Stein, 
1999), conservatism and anchoring biases (Edwards, 1968; Barberis et al. 
1998) and the disposition effect (Frazzini, 2006). Overreaction may result 
from positive feedback trading (Hong and Stein, 1999), overconfidence and 
self-attrition bias (Daniel et al., 1998), representative heuristics (Barberis et 
al., 1998) and herding behaviour due to information cascades (Bikhchandani 
et al., 1998). However, Fama (1998) argues the EMH still holds since 
overreaction is as common as underreaction. The argument seems to be 
unconvincing because underreaction and overreaction occur under different 
circumstance (Sewell, 2010) and appear to allow investors to make 
consistent excess returns.  
2.1.3 Investor Sentiment and Behavioural Finance  
Behavioural finance is a research stream which studies the impact of 
psychology on the behaviour of investors and how such behaviour 
subsequently influences the market. A key argument in behavioural finance 
is that the existence of behavioural biases (investor sentiment) among 
individual/irrational investors will affect stock prices only if limits to arbitrage 
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hold which prohibit rational investors from exploiting any mispricing. Thus, 
investor sentiment is one of the most important foundations of behavioural 
finance. In reality, investors, especially individual investors, make trading 
decisions not only based on relevant information, but also based on their 
psychological biases, emotions and the opinions of others. Thus, it is 
important to learn which, and how, psychological biases have a significant 
influence on investors’ decision-making. The role of investor sentiment may 
be the key to answering this question. 
 Sentiment: How Investors Form Their Beliefs 
Rational agents are efficient and unbiased and update information through a 
Bayesian updating system. However, irrational investors are behaviourally 
biased and have erroneous beliefs.1 McDougall (1926, p. 164) argues that 
“According to social psychology, sentiment is an organized system of 
emotional dispositions centered about the idea of some object. The 
organization of the sentiment in the developing mind is determined by the 
course of experience; that is to say, the sentiment is a growth in the structure 
of the mind that is not natively given in the inherited constitution. The growth 
of the sentiments is of the utmost importance for the character and conduct 
of individuals and of societies”. Thus, sentiment refers to the emotion and 
cognitive bias of an individual.  
 
In the perspective of behavioural finance, individuals’ emotion affects and 
biases their decisions. Emotional bias is a mental state originated 
spontaneously instead of through conscious effort, for example, 
overconfidence/overoptimism. Cognitive bias refers to the conscious 
reasoning process, and thus cognitive bias can be originated from faulty 
reasoning, hence better information and suggestion can often correct it. 
Cognitive biases include overconfidence, representativeness, availability, 
anchoring and adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). There are some 
theoretical models incorporating psychological biases to examine the 
relationship between investor sentiment and asset returns. Three main 
models have attracted widespread attention in the literature.  
                                               
1 Extensive studies in the literature classify professional traders and institutional investors as 
rational agents and retail/individual investors as irrational investors. However, a number of 
articles document that professionals are far from bias free (Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Shefrin, 




First, Barberis et al. (1998) propose a model of investor sentiment i.e. how 
investors form their beliefs. They show that conservatism bias in isolation 
might lead to underreaction, causing investors to underweight new 
information, which will be slowly incorporated into prices, but once the 
information is fully reflected in the prices there is no further predictability 
about stock returns. Further, they present a model that combines the 
“conservatism bias” with the “representative heuristic” (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) to show how investors form their beliefs. The 
“representative heuristic” refers to people being likely to justify an uncertain 
event or sample due to it being similar to the parent population and ignoring 
the laws of probability in the process. They discuss that the “representative 
heuristic” may lead investors to mistakenly predict that firms with current 
extraordinary growth will continue to persist in the future. The combined 
theory can lead stock prices to deviate from their fundamental value and 
cause long horizon negative returns for stocks with consistently high returns 
in the past. Their model is in line with delayed overreaction, consistent with 
positive feedback trading causing market prices to deviate from fundamental 
values.  
 
Daniel et al. (1998) present an alternative model which is consistent with 
short-term momentum and long-term reversal effects. They argue that 
investors are characterised by “overconfidence” and “self-attribution” biases. 
When subsequent public information arrives, investors will asymmetrically 
update confirming and disconfirming news. The informed traders attribute the 
performance of the ex-post winners to their selection skills and that of the ex-
post losers to bad luck. Thus, investors overestimate the precision of their 
signals for these stocks, suggesting that the arrival of confirming news 
increases their overconfidence and disconfirming news dampens it. Based 
on their increased overconfidence due to “self-attribution” bias, investors 
push up the price of winner stocks above fundamental values. The delayed 
overreaction leads to momentum profits followed by subsequent reversals to 
the fundamentals, since the overreaction would be realised eventually. 
 
Finally, Hong and Stein (1999) propose an alternative model which is also in 
line with short-term momentum and long-term reversals effects. The model 
is based on initial underreaction to information, followed by a subsequent 
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overreaction. It assumes that private information diffuses slowly over time, 
resulting in positive serial correlation in returns. There are two types of 
investors in their model, newswatchers and momentum traders, who trade 
on different sets of information. The newswatchers only have private 
information, but ignore past price changes, while momentum traders ignore 
the private information and only trade on the past price changes. The 
underreaction caused by news watchers and subsequent positive serial 
correlation in returns attracts the attention of momentum traders who will 
overreact to the positive serial correlation in returns, thus resulting in 
momentum profits. Lower risk aversion on the part of the momentum traders 
leads to greater delayed overreaction. Stock prices finally revert to 
fundamental values, resulting in returns reversals.   
 Empirical Evidence of Investor Sentiment and the Stock 
Market 
Investor sentiment has received much attention by researchers since 1990 
and has been regarded as “controversial” because it contradicts the 
traditional finance theory. Keynes (1936, p. 154) mentions that “market is 
subject to waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are 
unreasoning and yet in a sense legitimate where no solid basis exists for a 
sound calculation.” 
 
Sentiment generally refers to the mood of investors. To date, there is no 
single universal definition for investor sentiment. The existing definitions of 
investor sentiment in the literature range from investors erroneous beliefs to 
model-specific psychological biases. In early studies, sentiment has been 
linked to speculative bubbles (Smidt, 1968), biased expectations about stock 
prices (Zweig, 1973) and noise (Black, 1986). Since 1990, investor sentiment 
has become more and more popular since the pioneering study of 
behavioural finance by De Bondt and Thaler (1985): two supported the 
cognitive bias of overreaction to unexpected and dramatic news, which 
results in predictable mispricing of stocks. DeLong et al. (1990a) refer to 
sentiment as people’s formation about expected cash flows and risks that are 
not rationalised by existing explanations. Shleifer (2000) states that 
sentiment reflects the common investors’ judgment mistakes by a large 
number of investors, instead of uncorrelated random mistakes. Baker and 
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Wurgler (2006) refer to it as the propensity of investors to speculate which 
describes waves of optimism and pessimism. Brown and Cliff (2004, p2) 
argue that “sentiment represents the expectations of market participants to a 
norm: a bullish (bearish) investor expects returns to be above (below) 
average”. In Lee et al. (1991) it represents the difference in asset valuation 
between rational and irrational investors. 
 
In addition, investor sentiment refers to the view that investors form 
erroneous beliefs. That can happen due to two reasons: (1) individuals 
update their beliefs based on information about fundamentals in an 
unsystematic way. (2) they update their beliefs in a systematic way but use 
noisy signals which are not related to fundamentals. For example, people 
who are overconfident in picking stocks and will update information in a 
different way from Bayesian updating. They would underreact to public 
information and overreact to private information (Daniel et al. 1999).  
 
The role of investor sentiment has been examined in a wide range of areas 
within finance and a number of key studies are discussed as follows. Solt 
and Statman (1988) first use the Bearish sentiment index to proxy investor 
sentiment. The proxy, which is published by Investor Intelligence, is the ratio 
of the number of bearish advisors to the total number of advisors and is used 
as a contrary indicator. Advisors become more bullish after a DJIA increases 
over the past four weeks and vice versa. They show that the bearish 
sentiment index has no predictive power in forecasting future stock prices. 
 
Clarke and Statman (1998) show that the sentiment of newsletter writers has 
no predictive power for future returns but past returns and volatility of these 
returns do influence sentiment. High returns in the short run of four weeks 
are correlated with a movement of newsletter writers from bearishness to 
bullishness. High returns in the long run up to 52 weeks are related to 
“nervous bullishness”- a movement of newsletter writers from bearish to both 
bullish and the correction. Lee et al. (2002) confirm their findings and show 
that using the sentiment index by Investor Intelligence, the change in 
sentiment is positively correlated with excess returns. The bullish (bearish) 
shifts in sentiment result in downward (upward) revisions in volatility and 




Brown and Cliff (2004) use both institutional and individual investor sentiment. 
Individual sentiment is proxied by the sentiment survey run by the American 
Association of Individual Investors (AAII) and institutional sentiment is 
measured by the survey of Investor Intelligence (II). They find that investor 
sentiment and market contemporaneous returns are highly correlated and 
market returns can predict future sentiment, but sentiment does not predict 
future market returns. In addition, they show that institutional sentiment is 
more strongly correlated with large stock returns, suggesting that sentiment 
is not only limited to individuals. 
 
A subsequent study by Brown and Cliff (2005) uses Investor Intelligence to 
forecast market returns over the next 1-3 years. They find investor sentiment 
is negatively correlated with long term returns, suggesting that optimism is 
related to stock overvaluation and low subsequent returns as the price 
adjusts to its intrinsic value. They suggest that institutional investors tend to 
adjust their sentiment by considering the sentiment of individual investors. 
 
Schmeling (2007) uses institutional and individual sentiment in his study to 
proxy for smart money and noise trader risk, respectively. He finds that 
institutional sentiment positively predicts future market returns over 
intermediate horizons but individual sentiment negatively forecasts future 
stock market returns. The finding relating to individual sentiment is consistent 
with the argument that overoptimism of individual investors pushes the 
market far away from its fundamental value and eventually it is corrected, 
resulting in market return reversals. He also shows that institutional investors 
take into account the expected level and changes of individual sentiment 
which is a proxy for noise trader risk. Specifically, when institutional investors 
recognise market prices have been driven far away from fundamental value, 
such deviation has to be corrected eventually. Thus, expected returns of 
institutional investors should be decreased (increased) with a higher level of 
optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment of individual investors. On the other hand, 
in the short run, when institutional investors recognise that individual 
investors may drive market prices even further above (below) the intrinsic 
value, institutional investors become more optimistic (pessimistic) as the 
sentiment of individual investors becomes even more optimistic (pessimistic) 




Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct a composite sentiment 
measure by extracting the common factors of the sentiment proxies and 
examine investor sentiment in the stock market. They use six sentiment 
proxies: trading volume, the divided premium, the closed-end fund discount, 
the number of IPOs, the first-day returns on IPOs and the equity share in new 
issues. To mitigate the effect of macroeconomic conditions from each of the 
variables, they regress each variable on six macroeconomic indicators: 
growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, nondurable and 
service consumptions, growth in employment and an NBER recession 
indicator. They find that the sentiment effect is more pronounced for stocks 
that are difficult to value and hard to arbitrage.  
 
In a study that examines post-earnings-announcement drift and accruals in 
relation to investor sentiment, Livnat and Petrovits (2009) find that good news 
(bad news) earns significantly higher (lower) abnormal returns following 
pessimistic (optimistic) sentiment periods and low (high) accruals earns 
significantly higher (lower) abnormal returns following optimistic (pessimistic) 
sentiment periods. This suggests that if news contradict sentiment, investors 
underreact to the conflicting information. In the same spirit, Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012) examine the relation between investor sentiment 
and the sensitivity of stock prices to earnings announcements and find that 
investors react strongly to good news (bad news) during optimistic 
(pessimistic) periods, in particular the reaction is much stronger for bad news 
during pessimistic periods, consistent with the argument that the incremental 
cash flows embedded in bad news are more uncertain, risky and difficult to 
value than those embedded in good news. In addition, the effect of sentiment 
is more pronounced for the earnings announcement of small stocks, young 
stocks, high volatility stocks and the stocks which are difficult to arbitrage. 
 
McLean and Zhao (2009) link investor sentiment with real investment and 
find that investor sentiment has a positive effect on both investment and 
external finance and show that operational efficiency decreases in high 
sentiment periods, but rises in low sentiment periods.  
  
A study by Schmeling (2009) uses the Consumer Confidence Index and 
examines the relation between investor sentiment and cross-sectional stock 
returns in 18 industrialised countries and shows that future stock returns are 
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lower in the majority of countries during high sentiment periods. The 
sentiment negatively forecasts future stock market returns. They also show 
that the sentiment effect is more pronounced for small and growth stocks and 
for countries with less market integrity. 
 
There is also evidence of investor sentiment in relation to different financial 
anomalies. Stambaugh et al. (2012) examine the effect of investor sentiment 
on a number of anomalies. They find that long-short strategies of these 
anomalies are much more profitable in high sentiment periods, since during 
optimistic periods mispricing is more prevalent as stocks become overall 
overpriced and it is costly to short sell due to limits to arbitrage. The profits 
are mainly attributed to the short legs and sentiment has no impact on the 
long legs of the strategies. This is because during high sentiment periods, 
short-legs become more overpriced than long legs, since an anomaly itself 
represents mispricing and due to limits to arbitrage, short leg results in 
underperformance. During pessimistic periods, long legs will be unlikely to 
become underpriced due to it not being costly to buy stocks.  
 
Yu and Yuan (2011) show that there is a positive relation between market 
expected returns and conditional volatility during pessimistic periods 
whereas the relation disappears during optimistic periods suggesting that the 
market is less rational during optimistic periods because of higher 
participation by noise traders during such periods. Antoniou et al. (2013) 
confirm the findings of Yu and Yuan (2011) and find that the CAPM model is 
effective in pricing covariance risk during pessimistic periods but not effective 
during optimistic periods, which is consistent with the notion that noise 
traders tend to be active during optimistic periods and inactive during 
pessimistic periods.   
 
A recent study by Antoniou et al. (2013) investigates the role of sentiment 
and cognitive dissonance in explaining momentum profits. They find that 
momentum profits arise only under optimism and that news that contradicts 
investors’ sentiment causes cognitive dissonance, resulting in slow diffusion 
of such news being incorporated into stock prices and momentum profits. 
Individual investors rather than institutional investors are reluctant to sell 
loser stocks under optimism. Momentum profits are only significant during 
optimism since losers are underpriced, which is due to short-selling 
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constraints impeding arbitraging of loser stocks. They also show that long 
run reversal also only occurs under optimism. This is consistent with Hong 
and Stein (1999) that momentum traders strengthen the price continuation, 
and subsequently prices revert to fundamental value. 
2.1.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, in the last two decades, numerous anomalies and puzzles have 
proved difficult to explain by traditional finance theories. In order to explain 
the various market anomalies, scholars have extended their research to the 
perspective of the behavioural domain – studying the market participant from 
psychology and sociology. Investor sentiment is one of its important 
foundations, providing an alternative theory of how investors behave in 
financial markets and the impact on stocks prices and has been shown to be 
important in many areas of finance. We will therefore consider it more fully in 
this thesis. However, unlike most prior studies, we will consider sentiment 
within the extent of cognitive dissonance on market anomalies. Thus, we pay 
special attention to investor sentiment in all three empirical chapters. 
2.2 Cognitive Dissonance 
2.2.1 Introduction of Cognitive Dissonance 
Festinger (1957) first introduced the concept of cognitive dissonance, which 
refers to individuals holding two or more contradictory cognitions at the same 
time. The cognitions include beliefs, individual behaviour and information. It 
occurs many areas in our life. For example, consider a scenario in which a 
man who has a strong value on being environmentally responsible just 
bought a new car that he late finds does not get great gas mileage. Thus, 
there are two conflicting beliefs. The first belief is that it is important for the 
man to take care of the environment and the second belief is that he is driving 
a car which is not environmentally-friendly. When dissonance is evident, to 
resolve such discomfort, investors may avoid any information likely to 
generate dissonance and become reluctant to react to such information. 
 
Festinger (1957) defines cognitive dissonance using the mathematical 
equation as  
M=D/(D+C)      (2.1) 
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Where M is the magnitude of dissonance experienced by investors; 
D is total cognitions which are dissonant from a referent cognition; 
C is the sum of cognitions that are consonant with the same referent 
cognition. 
 
Festinger (1957) argues that when people experience cognitive dissonance, 
they seek to find a way to reduce it by means of seeking new information. 
The framework of cognitive dissonance involves a four-step process of 
dissonance arousal and reduction. The first step is that a cognitive 
discrepancy occurs. Second, people experience dissonance and feel 
discomfort. Third, they are motivated to seek to reduce cognitive dissonance. 
Fourth, cognitive dissonance may be reduced by means of seeking new 
information.  
 
Goetzmann and Peles (1997) examine the role of cognitive dissonance in 
mutual fund investors. They suggest that individual investors may experience 
cognitive dissonance in making a mutual fund purchase decision. Some 
researches document that investor dollars are invested more rapidly in 
winning funds (mutual funds with good performance) than outflows from 
losing funds (mutual funds with poor performance). Goetzmann and Peles 
suggest that investors are slow to quit past losing funds since they are 
reluctant to recognise they made a bad investment decision. 
 
Darrat et al. (2002) examine the role of index futures trading in spot market 
volatility. They find that index future trading cannot attribute to the observed 
volatility in the spot markets. Instead, they find strong evidence that volatility 
in the future markets is itself an outgrowth of a turbulent spot market. Their 
findings are consistent with cognitive dissonance theory. This is because as 
the spot market itself becomes more volatile, investors are more likely to try 
to reduce cognitive dissonance in which they made wrong investment 
decisions. Thus, investors increasing engage in more hedging activities, not 
only to reduce perceived risk from spot market, but also to avoid future pain 
of regret.  
 
Prast and Vor (2005) argue that due to cognitive dissonance, information 
filtering by investors provides a plausible explanation in which the exchange 
rate of the euro against US dollar fell although there is a convergence in the 
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growth rates of the two regions. Specifically, due to cognitive dissonance, 
investors react differently to good and bad news. In euro area, they don’t 
much attention to favourable euro news compared to the bad news. However, 
they pay great attention to good US news compared to the bad news. Such 
an asymmetric pattern may explain why the convergence of economic growth 
differential between two areas did not cause the appreciation of the euro.  
 
According to Kindlegerger (2000), cognitive dissonance is a significant factor 
in affecting herding in financial markets. Argentesi and Lutkepohl (2009) find 
the evidence of cognitive dissonance in relation between stock market 
performance and acquiring information. They argue that when investors 
experience cognitive dissonance, in order to reduce it, they prefer to ignore 
the information that contradicts to the market performance. They find that 
when stock market performs well, investors purchase more newspapers 
whereas when market performs bad, the sale of newspapers decreases. 
Their findings are consistent with the argument of cognitive dissonance. 
 
Antoniou et al. (2013) have linked cognitive dissonance to the momentum 
puzzle. They argue that newswatchers experience cognitive dissonance in 
processing the arrival of new information when the news contradicts their 
sentiment states. This implies that bad (good) news diffuses slowly during 
optimistic (pessimistic) periods. In other words, investors are reluctant to 
trade such stocks when the sentiment is optimistic, resulting in stronger 
momentum profits.  
 
A recent study by Chang et al. (2016) use brokerage data and experiment to 
examine cognitive dissonance in the disposition effect both within and across 
asset classes. They find evidence that cognitive dissonance is a driver of the 
disposition effect. They argue that, in the case of stocks, investors 
experience cognitive dissonance when faced with losses and the belief that 
they made good decisions. Cognitive dissonance provides the basis for an 
overall reluctance to realize losses and more willing to realize gains where 
no cognitive dissonance experienced. However, in case of funds, investors 
can resolve such cognitive dissonance by blaming fund managers. Thus, 
delegated stocks will exhibit a weaker disposition effect or reverse disposition 




To conclude, cognitive dissonance has been shown to be of importance in 
other disciplines. To date, there are only a few studies examining cognitive 
dissonance in the finance discipline. Thus, we will bring together investor 
sentiment interacting with other factors and the theory of cognitive 
dissonance to examine financial anomalies. In the first two empirical chapters, 
we examine the effect of cognitive dissonance and culture on momentum 
profits and post-earnings-announcement-drift. Cognitive dissonance is 
expected to be evident when private or public information contradicts 
investors’ sentiment and such phenomena may be different across different 
cultures. In the third empirical chapter, we examine cognitive dissonance in 
relation to institutional herding, since cognitive dissonance may be evident 
when the two factors (sentiment and analyst recommendation revisions) 
conflict with each other and in turn influence institutional herd behaviour.  
2.3 Momentum Profits 
2.3.1 Introduction 
A substantial literature documents and examines the profitability of 
momentum strategies, since the seminal work of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) - simply buying asset winners with high recent returns and selling 
asset losers with low recent returns during past 3 to 12 months and holding 
a zero-cost portfolio for the subsequent 3 to 12 months results in an 
especially profitable investment strategy which is robust to sub-sample 
periods. A number of subsequent studies find that momentum strategies are 
consistently profitable throughout many countries worldwide beyond the U.S 
(e.g. Chui et al., 2010) and across different asset classes including bonds, 
currencies, and commodities (Menkhoff et al. 2012; Asness et al. 2013). 
 
While equity momentum is an established empirical fact, there are numerous 
explanations that have been documented in the literature to explain 
momentum profits and various factors have been examined to be important 
in determining momentum profits, but the sources of momentum profits are 
still unresolved. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) argue that the 
momentum effect is difficult to explain by standard asset pricing models (e.g. 
Fama-French three-factor and CAPM models). Consequently, researchers 
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have proposed various explanations for momentum profits which can be 
classified as (i) additional systematic risk explanations, (ii) cognitive biases 
or behavioural explanations and limits to arbitrage. However, researchers 
have not reached a consensus of a generally accepted explanation for 
momentum profits yet, and Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) suggest that risk 
is insufficient to explain the phenomenon.  
2.3.2 The Momentum Evidence around the World 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) focus on the performance of medium-term 
trading strategies that buy past winners and sell past losers in the U.S equity 
markets with formation and holding periods between three and 12 months. 
Specifically, the strategy selects stocks on the basis of stock returns over the 
past J months and holds them for K months. At the beginning of each month 
t, stocks are sorted into portfolio deciles based on their past J-month 
cumulative returns in ascending order. The portfolio with the highest returns 
is called the “winner” decile and the portfolio with the lowest returns is called 
the “loser” decile. The strategy takes a long position in the winner portfolio 
and a short position in the loser portfolio, held for K months. To increase the 
power of the test, overlapping portfolios are constructed. Specifically, a new 
position at time t is initiated and the position for both winners and losers that 
are initiated at time t-K is closed. Thus, every month, 1/K of stocks are 
revised in the winner and loser portfolios. Momentum returns for a given 
month are the equally weighted average returns on K portfolios in that month. 
To mitigate bid-ask spread and lead-lag effects, they skip a formation period 
month t since both bid-ask spread (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995) and lead-
lag effects (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990) can contribute to short-term contrarian 
profits. The zero investment strategies that buy and sell the same amount of 
securities in winner and loser deciles earn abnormal returns.  
 
Numerous studies have showed evidence of momentum (Galariotis, 2014). 
Subsequent studies have examined momentum strategies in different 
countries around the world. Rouwenhorst (1998) finds that momentum 
strategies are profitable in European stock markets and the returns on 
momentum portfolios across European countries are highly correlated with 
the returns on the U.S momentum portfolios, suggesting that momentum 
profits are subject to a common factor across countries. Griffin et al. (2003) 
further extend the sample to 39 countries in examining the momentum effect 
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and find momentum profits are significantly positive in most of the countries. 
Chui et al. (2010) find that momentum strategies are profitable throughout 
the world except in Asia (e.g. Japan). In addition, the profitability of 
momentum strategies on the basis of stock market indices across countries 
are examined by Chan et al. (2000) and their results show that momentum 
profits are both statistically and economically significant.  
2.3.3 Rational Explanations for Momentum Profits  
Numerous risk-based explanations have been put forward to explain 
momentum profits after Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) first discovered the 
momentum effect. However, the existing risk-based theories are still 
unconvincing, since none of the risk factors can fully explain momentum 
profits.  
 
Earlier evidence suggested that momentum profits are difficult to explain by 
either the CAPM or the Fama-French 3-factor model (Fama and French, 
1996; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). Researchers may attribute momentum 
profits to delayed reaction of stock prices to some common factors, including 
both systematic- and unsystematic risk factors. Intuitively, if stock prices 
react to common information with some delay, investors should be able to 
use the current common information to predict future stock prices and create 
a profitable trading strategy. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) suggest that 
momentum profits are unlikely to arise from delayed reaction of stock prices 
to a market component. If momentum profits are attributed to market 
realisations, the realisations should be positively serial correlated. They find 
that serial covariance of 6-month returns of an equally weighted index is 
negative, suggesting that the market component does not contribute to 
momentum profits. Second, they examine whether momentum profits are 
due to lead-lag effects of the market component. If momentum profits do 
arise from the lead-lag effects of the market component, then larger market 
component realisations imply larger momentum profits. They regress 
momentum profits on the square of 6-month value weighted market returns 
in the previous period and find that the coefficient is negative, indicating that 
the lead-lag effects of the market component do not contribute to momentum 
profits. Thus, the evidence indicates that stock prices may react to non-




The evidence above has shown that the market component cannot be used 
to explain momentum profits. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) suggest that 
non-market factors do contribute to momentum profits. Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999) analyse industry momentum, which can be used to fully 
capture the performance of traditional momentum strategies. In their portfolio 
formation, they rank stocks on the basis of past 6-month industry returns and 
form value weighted industry portfolios. They show that high momentum 
industry portfolios earn higher returns than low momentum industry portfolios. 
To examine whether industry momentum can explain traditional momentum, 
they use the random industry strategy to perform the test. Specifically, each 
firm in the winner and loser industry portfolios is substituted by other random 
firms that are not in the same industry, but have the same ranking in another 
industry. Thus, the stocks in the new portfolios have a similar level of past 
returns to that in the initial industry portfolios. They find that the random 
industry momentum strategy earns almost zero profits, suggesting that the 
industry factors can sufficiently explain traditional momentum returns. 
However, Grundy and Martin (2001) re-examine the performance of the 
industry momentum strategy (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) by skipping a 
month to avoid microstructure issues and find that both the industry strategy 
and the random industry strategy earn insignificant profits.  
 
Some researchers also link momentum profits to macroeconomic factors, but 
evidence has proved to be rather challenging. To examine whether 
momentum profits depend on the state of the economy, some economic 
variables have been used to predict time-series momentum profits. These 
findings estimate monthly time-series regressions of the momentum profits 
(MOMt) on conditional state variables as follows: 
MOMt =γ0+β1 *STATEt-1 + εt     (2.2) 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Cooper et al. (2004) show that 
momentum premiums are related to macroeconomic state variables. Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002) first find that commonly used macroeconomic 
variables for measuring market conditions can predict time-series 
momentum profits. However, Cooper et al. (2004) find that the lagged 3-year 
market returns can serve as a good predictor in forecasting momentum 
profits and the macroeconomic variables used by Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) fail to explain momentum profits in the presence of either standard 
price screens or skipping a month return. The macroeconomic variables also 
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cannot explain the fact that momentum profits are positive and significant 
following positive market returns (UP market) in the findings of Cooper et al. 
(2004).   
 
Momentum profits are likely to be procyclical and cross-sectional dispersion 
in stock returns can explain momentum profits where a higher return 
dispersion implies lower momentum profits according to Stiver and Sun 
(2010). Return dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of 100-
disaggregate-portfolio returns formed on size and BM equity ratios over the 
previous three months. They find that the cross-sectional dispersion in stock 
returns that can serve as a market state variable contains incremental 
information of the current state of the economy and the countercyclical nature 
of aggregate return volatility and the dispersion in conditional market betas. 
Their regression results indicate that the return dispersion effect subsumes 
the predictive power of macroeconomic factors in Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) and that of market state variables in Cooper et.al. (2004). Furthermore, 
Wang and Xu (2010) find that market volatility combined with market states 
can predict momentum profits. In their regression analysis, they show that 
market volatility subsumes the predictive power of market returns and 
macroeconomic factors, with the predictive power of market volatility centring 
on losers. In particular, momentum profits are especially low during negative 
market and high volatility states. 
 
The growth rate of industrial production (MP) is a priced risk factor in 
standard pricing models, which can explain more than half of momentum 
profits (Liu and Zhang, 2008). They document that MP loads temporarily 
more heavily on winners than losers and the duration of the expected growth 
spread roughly matches the duration of momentum profits, suggesting that 
MP plays an important role in driving momentum profits. The liquidity risk is 
also shown to be important in explaining momentum profits (Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003). Recently, Asness et al. (2013) examine value and 
momentum premiums jointly and find a strong correlation between value and 
momentum profits across different asset classes. They find that exposure to 
funding liquidity risk can be only identifiable when examining value and 





In addition, earnings momentum strategies earn sizable profits where they 
construct a zero-investment portfolio that is long the highest earnings 
surprise portfolio and short the lowest earnings surprise portfolio (Chordia 
and Shivakumar, 2006). Not surprisingly, price momentum and earnings 
momentum are positively correlated. The Fama-French three-factor model is 
extended to include earnings (price) momentum-based zero investment 
portfolios as a systematic factor to explain the payoff of the price (earnings) 
momentum strategies. They find that earnings momentum cannot be 
explained by the systematic factor of price momentum, whereas price 
momentum is primarily driven by the systematic component of earnings 
momentum. Since earning momentum portfolios, which are well diversified, 
are unlikely to contain any firm-specific news, such as earnings surprises, 
the source of price momentum is unlikely to be due to firm-specific factors. 
They also find that earnings momentum is correlated with macroeconomic 
variables even after controlling for the Fama-French three factors, 
suggesting that it contains fundamental macroeconomic information, which 
possibly explains why it captures price momentum (see Chordia and 
Shivakumar, 2002).   
 
Moskowitz et al. (2012) find that the time-series of momentum strategies 
across different asset classes earn significant abnormal returns and the time-
series momentum profits across different classes are highly correlated, 
suggesting that time-series momentum strategies are affected by a common 
component that does not exist in the underlying assets themselves. They 
also find that the time-series momentum profits are significantly correlated 
with cross-sectional momentum profits across different asset classes. Both 
findings are consistent with the findings of Asness et al. (2013) who also 
suggest a common component among traditional momentum strategies 
across different asset classes.  
 
To conclude, evidence from the above studies suggests that momentum 
profits are not generally rationalised by rational explanations, since none of 
the macroeconomic risk factors or non-market components can fully explain 
momentum profits. The findings are consistent with the findings of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) that momentum profits cannot be fully 
explained by risk factors.   
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2.3.4 Behavioural Finance  
Since the momentum effect is difficult to rationalise by standard asset pricing 
models, researchers have moved the research into behavioural domains to 
explain the phenomenon. Shleifer (2000) argues that financial markets may 
not be efficient and the momentum effect is a strong phenomenon that 
contradicts the efficient market hypothesis. According to Shleifer (2000), 
irrational investors with different cognitive biases matter in determining 
momentum profits i.e. investor sentiment is important in explaining the 
momentum effect. In the previous section 2.1.3, it is argued that the 
existence of behavioural biases (investor sentiment) among individual 
investors will affect stock prices only if limits to arbitrage holds, which 
prohibits rational investors from exploiting the mispricing. Limits to arbitrage 
and investor sentiment are two main foundations of behavioural finance, 
which are discussed in detail as follows. 
 Limits to Arbitrage 
Arbitrage refers to the fact that arbitrageurs buy underpriced stocks and sell 
overpriced stocks to earn risk-free returns. The stock prices consequently 
revert to their fundamental values. However, due to limits to arbitrage, 
rational investors are not able to exploit anomalies in the market, such as the 
momentum anomaly. Barberis and Thaler (2003) show there are several 
issues that formalise the possibilities of limits to arbitrage.  
 
First, transaction impediments, including short-selling constraints and high 
implementation costs, affect limits to arbitrage. Large mutual fund managers 
find it difficult to short sell stocks and in some extreme cases, shares that are 
mispriced are not available to borrow. Transaction costs have been used to 
explain momentum profits (Lesmond et al. 2004; Li et al. 2009). Lesmond et 
al. (2004) show that momentum profits can be fully explained by transaction 
costs, suggesting that transaction costs impede investors to arbitrage. 
However, Li et al. (2009) find that six out of the nine momentum strategies 
produce positive and significant profits even after accounting for transaction 
costs, which is inconsistent with the findings of Lesmond et al. (2004). Their 
findings suggest that the results of Lesmond et al. (2004) are subject to a 
specific sample and a particular momentum strategy. A study by Badreddine 
et al. (2012) tests momentum strategies on optioned stocks which are 
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classified as highly liquid and lower short sell stocks. The momentum 
strategies on such stocks are profitable, which is consistent with the findings 
of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), suggesting that short sell constraints are 
not the main driver for momentum profits.  
 
The role of idiosyncratic risk is also documented in the literature to explain 
the momentum and long-term reversal effects. Arena et al. (2008) find that 
with the exclusion of stocks in the lowest NYSE size decile and stocks with 
prices under $5, higher idiosyncratic volatility stocks imply higher momentum 
profits and the momentum loser effect is the strongest in the highest 
idiosyncratic risk tercile whereas the momentum winner effect is not different 
across portfolio terciles. Brav et al. (2010) also use idiosyncratic risk to 
explain momentum profits and sort firms into idiosyncratic risk quintiles and 
value weight their returns. They find that losers have especially low returns 
and do not find evidence of higher returns for high idiosyncratic winners, 
which is consistent with the findings of Arena et al. (2008). McLean (2010) 
obtains similar results to those of Arena et al. (2008) in excluding such stocks 
that have high idiosyncratic risk from the sample and suggests that Brav et 
al.’s (2010) empirical design asymmetrically undervalues the influence of 
high idiosyncratic risk momentum firms that may contribute to momentum 
profits. He shows that idiosyncratic risk plays an important role in preventing 
arbitrage in the long-term reversal effect, whereas the momentum effect is 
not related to idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that transaction costs are enough 
to prevent arbitrageurs from wiping out momentum profits. The possible 
explanation for Mclean (2010) is that arbitrageurs with longer investments 
horizons of 1 year or more have a better chance of recovering their 
transaction costs in reversal portfolios than in momentum portfolios.  
 
Second, it is impossible to find a close substitute for mispriced assets. 
Arbitrageurs cannot hedge their position in the mispriced asset if there is an 
adverse change in fundamental value of the asset. Lastly, De Long (1990a) 
shows that noise trader risk is also an important factor for limits to arbitrage. 
Arbitrageurs face noise trader risk, which causes the mispricing to become 
even worse before it corrects. The arbitrageurs cannot maintain their position 
and receive margin calls so they have to liquidate a part of their position. The 




To sum up, limits to arbitrage have been seen to be important in preventing 
rational investors from exploiting momentum profits. This would prevent 
rational investors from exploiting the mispricing. In the next section, empirical 
evidence of behavioural biases of individual investors is discussed in relation 
to momentum profits.  
 Behavioural Explanations 
Numerous behavioural arguments have been put forward to try to explain the 
momentum puzzle, both from a theoretical perspective and in terms of 
empirical analysis. For example, behavioural based theoretical models have 
been developed by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999) based on either psychological biases (e.g. overconfidence, 
representativeness and self-attribution bias) or bounded rationality within a 
heterogeneous trader model. These models were discussed in details in 
section 2.1.3.1.1. However, other possible behavioural explanations have 
been examined. 
 
Firm-specific characteristics have been linked to momentum profits. 
Intuitively, if the momentum anomaly arises due to stock prices inefficiently 
reacting to information that relates to the firm, the firm-specific characteristics, 
which are used as proxies of various types or the quality of firm information, 
are related to momentum profits. Hong et al. (2000) find that momentum 
strategies are much more profitable among stocks with small market 
capitalization and low analyst coverage, which is consistent with the 
behavioural model of Hong and Stein (1999). Since stocks with low analyst 
coverage refer to the stocks that have less public information, investors may 
react more slowly to such information. Further, there is always more private 
information associated with stocks that have less public information. 
Investors may overreact more strongly to more private information as 
suggested by Daniel et al. (1998). Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that 
momentum profits are larger for stocks with higher trading volume. Intuitively, 
stocks with higher trading volume have lower transaction costs and can be 
traded more easily than stocks with lower trading volume. Such stocks are 
also associated with more public information, resulting in larger differences 
in investor opinions for these stocks. It indicates that analysing the 
fundamental value of these stocks by investors would be difficult. 
Psychological biases suggest that people are likely to be more overconfident 
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about their ability to choose the stocks that are hard to value. Thus, 
overconfidence suggested by Daniel et al. (1998) can contribute to 
momentum profits. Another possible explanation is that stocks with higher 
trading volume attract more attention and thus are likely to be involved in 
positive feedback trading strategies (buy past winners and sell past losers) 
introduced by De Long et al. (1990b).  
 
Zhang (2006) explores the role of information uncertainty in the momentum 
anomaly. He hypothesises that investors only underreact to public 
information and will underreact more strongly when the information is more 
uncertain due to the psychological bias of overconfidence. He finds that 
greater information uncertainty implies relatively lower future stock returns 
following bad news and comparably higher future stock returns following 
good news, suggesting that information uncertainty delays information 
incorporation into stock prices. In his study, analyst forecast revisions and 
accumulated returns in the past 11 months are used to distinguish good news 
from bad news, firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, dispersion in analyst 
earnings forecasts, stock volatility and cash flow volatility are used as proxies 
for information uncertainty. The evidence indicates that market reaction is 
incomplete, since good news predicts relatively higher future returns and bad 
news predicts relatively lower future returns. The stronger information 
uncertainty implies larger market inefficiency, suggesting that investors will 
underreact more strongly to the new information in the case of greater 
information uncertainty.  
 
According to Avaramov et al. (2007), the momentum effect is more prominent 
for low-grade firms and is insignificant for stocks with a credit rating from AAA 
to BB, suggesting that the momentum effect persists only among firms with 
high credit risk regardless of firm size. They also find that momentum payoffs 
should be higher during the recession when credit risk is a major concern. 
Further, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) point out that Avaramov et al. (2007) do 
not examine whether credit rating can fully capture the performance of 
momentum strategies. They show that distress risk factors can explain a 
large part of momentum profits, which is consistent with the findings of 
Avaramov et al. (2007). Sagi and Seascholes (2007) show that momentum 
strategies are more profitable among firms with higher revenue growth 
volatility, lower cost and more valuable growth options than the traditional 
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momentum strategies.  
 
A study by Verardo (2009) shows similar results to the findings of Zhang 
(2006) by using only one factor from Zhang (2006), which is dispersions in 
analyst forecasts, but interprets her results differently by emphasising that 
investors’ heterogeneity of beliefs is an important driver of momentum profits. 
Her study tests an empirical relation between differences in investor opinions 
and stock return continuations in the cross-section of U.S. stocks to 
disentangle the effect of disagreement from the effects of prior uncertainty 
and information uncertainty. The predictive cross-sectional regressions show 
that heterogeneity of beliefs has a significantly positive impact on stock return 
continuations after controlling for a stock's visibility, the speed of information 
diffusion, uncertainty about fundamentals, information precision, and stock 
volatility. 
 
Furthermore, there are other behavioural theories that have been linked to 
the momentum effect. The disposition effect has been documented to explain 
momentum profits by many researchers due to underreaction to market 
information. Grinblatt and Han (2005) show that prospect theory combined 
with mental accounting can explain a large part of momentum profits. 
Prospect theory (PT) refers to the concave function (risk averse) in the 
domain of capital gains and convex function (risk loving) in the domain of 
capital losses and both gains and losses are separated by a reference point. 
Mental accounting (MA) provides a basis for decision makers to set the 
reference point to determine capital gains and losses. The intuition behind 
PT/MA is that the demand function is different from a standard utility function 
in the way that winners are less desirable than losers, other things staying 
the same. They use average cost basis as a proxy for the reference point 
and use the gap between current stock market price and the reference price 
as a proxy for the capital gains (losses), which is a good indicator of future 
returns. The model is in line with the empirical evidence of the disposition 
effect. 
 
George and Hwang (2004) show that the “anchoring effect” can explain a 
significant part of momentum profits. Specifically, the 52-week high price 
level is a good indicator for predicting future returns. Intuitively, when good 
news has pushed stock prices to exceed or near the 52-week high, investors 
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are reluctant to buy such stocks even if new information confirms stock prices 
to increase. The information eventually spreads, and the prices increase, 
resulting in stock return continuations. Similarly, when bad news has pushed 
stock prices far away from the 52-week high price level, traders are reluctant 
to sell such stocks even if negative shocks imply a price fall. The information 
eventually prevails, and the stock prices decline. Thus, traders’ unwillingness 
to revise their portfolios depends on the 52-week high price level and the 
greatest reluctance is at the price level which is nearest and farthest from the 
52-week high. Their argument confirms the disposition effect. There are 
notable similarities between the two different explanations for momentum 
profits above. Taken together, both are consistent with the disposition effect 
and confirm that momentum profits are due to underreaction to market 
information.  
 
There are other factors that are important in determining momentum profits. 
For example, Cooper et al. (2004) which is discussed earlier find that 
momentum profits only exist in the UP market, which is consistent with the 
behavioural models of Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999). 
Intuitively, Daniel et al.’s (1998) model suggests that the aggregate 
confidence level should increase following an UP market since investors 
would attribute good performance of stocks to their stock selection skills due 
to “self-attribution” bias and Hong and Stein’s (1999) model suggests that 
risk aversion would decrease following market gains, resulting in a stronger 
delayed overreaction.  
 
Asem and Tian (2010) extend the findings of Cooper et.al. (2004) to analyse 
the market continuation in the same state versus transition to a different state. 
Their finding is consistent with the behavioural model of Daniel et al. (1998) 
who show that confirming information will strengthen investors’ 
overconfidence and disconfirming information will dampen it due to the “self-
attribution” bias. Specifically, momentum profits will be higher when the 
market continues in the same state than when market transitions to a 
different state.  
 
In addition, Kelsey et al (2010) examine the role of market uncertainty 
measured by Knightian uncertainty to explain momentum profits and find that 
momentum profits are more likely to arise during high market uncertainty, 
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which is consistent with the findings of Zhang (2006). In their study, Knightian 
uncertainty refers to the circumstances in which the objective probabilities 
are unknown or imperfectly unknown and it occurs when the quality of the 
information is bad or when the market is characterized by a lack of 
information or when there is a high disagreement of investor opinions. 
Furthermore, Hameed et al. (2008) show that informed trading is an 
important factor in determining momentum profits and Bloomfield et al. (2009) 
find that momentum profits only arise when there are only informed traders 
in the markets. 
 
There is also evidence to indicate that culture is an important factor in 
determining momentum profits across countries. Chui et al. (2010) first link 
the cultural effect to momentum profits worldwide and find that the 
individualism index which is related to overconfidence and self-attribution 
biases can explain momentum profits across countries. Their findings 
suggest that individuals in different cultures process information differently 
and are subject to different psychological biases.  
 
Recently, Antoniou et al. (2013) investigate the role of investor sentiment on 
momentum profits. They find momentum profits only arise under optimism 
and show that news that contradicts investor sentiment cause cognitive 
dissonance that slows the diffusion of such news being incorporated into 
stock prices, resulting in momentum profits. They also find that retail 
investors rather than institutional investors are reluctant to sell loser stocks 
under optimism. Momentum profits are only significant during optimism, 
since losers are under-priced, which is due to the short-selling constraint 
impeding arbitrage of loser stocks. They also show that long-run reversals 
also only occur under optimism. The evidence is consistent with Hong and 
Stein (1999) where momentum traders would strength the price continuation 
and subsequently, prices revert to its fundamental value. 
 
Antoniou et al. also state “This raises the question of whether the asymmetric 
momentum pattern we have documented for the United States, where 
individualistic attitudes are considered to be higher than in other cultures, 
gains support in countries characterized by less individualism. Exploration of 
this issue would seem to be an interesting area for future research.” 
(Antoniou et al. 2013, pages 273-4). We believe that research on the 
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interaction of culture and sentiment on cognitive dissonance will be promising, 
since individual proneness to sentiment may be influenced by investors’ 
cultural background. A cross-cultural psychology literature suggests that 
people experience cognitive dissonance across cultures. Miller (1984) was 
the first to argue that cultural differences may lead to different expression of 
psychological biases. She examines the difference between holistic (Asian 
and Indian) and agentic (Western European and North American) cultures. 
In holistic cultures, people view the self in relation to others and emphasise 
more on harmonious social relationships. People from agentic cultures 
emphasise more on their own decisions and actions.  
 
In a subsequent seminal paper, Markus and Kitayama (1991) analyse the 
cultural differences between collectivist and individualistic cultures. 
Individualistic cultures are concerned with self-integrity and emphasise more 
on their own attitudes and behaviours. In contrast, collectivist cultures are 
concerned with group-relationship and social harmony. Markus and 
Kitayama argue that cognitive dissonance is a strong phenomenon in 
western or individualistic cultures. In such cultures, people express their 
opinions purely based on their own judgment whereas the expression of 
opinions in collectivist cultures is only a part of self-judgement but also 
includes expressions that influence the degree of harmony within a group.2 
Given such evidence, we argue that investors in individualistic cultures will 
experience much stronger cognitive dissonance than in collectivist cultures 
and test such a hypothesis in relation to momentum profits in the first 
empirical chapter.  
2.3.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, under the efficient market hypothesis, momentum profits should 
be fully exploited because there is so much “smart money”. The momentum 
effect has existed for many years and both rational and behavioural theories 
have been proposed to explain it. However, none of the theories can fully 
explain momentum profits. As suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman (2011), 
risk factors are insufficient to capture the full performance of momentum 
strategies and behavioural explanations seem to be promising for further 
research. The evidence of behavioural models and empirical findings show 
                                               
2 Other experimental studies include Heine and Lehman (1997), Spencer-Rodgers et al. 
(2010) and references in these papers. 
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that investor sentiment (Shleifer, 2000) which refers to people having 
different cognitive biases plays a crucial role in determining momentum 
profits. Recently, investor sentiment (Antoniou et al., 2013), specifically 
whether individuals are optimistic or pessimistic (different beliefs) about the 
current situation, and cultural effects have attracted much attention in the 
behavioural domain. Chui et al. (2010) first link cultural effect to momentum 
profits. However, to date it is not clear why cultural factors might influence 
the level of returns and their study does not link sentiment to culture. None 
of the researchers has examined the interaction between investor sentiment 
and other factors in determining momentum profits. Thus, our first empirical 
chapter will focus on the interaction between sentiment and cultural effects 
to examine the momentum effect. 
2.4 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift 
A substantial literature documents the effect of post-earnings-
announcement-drift (hereafter, PEAD) since the work of Ball and Brown 
(1968) – stocks with high positive earnings surprises tend to have high 
abnormal returns and stocks with large negative surprises continue to earn 
low returns. According to the semi-strong version of the efficient market 
hypothesis, available information should be incorporated into stock prices 
immediately when news is announced. However, PEAD is an anomaly that 
is not in line with market efficiency. Fama (1998, page 304) states that “Which 
anomalies are above suspicion? The post-earnings-announcement drift… 
has survived robustness checks, including an extension to more recent 
data…” The efficient market hypothesis proposes that all available 
information to the market should be reflected in stock prices. Once new 
information is available, stocks prices should be adjusted to the information 
immediately. However, evidence suggests stocks prices following good news 
continue to drift upwards and those following bad news continue to drift 
downwards and the drift lasts up to several months. The phenomenon is not 
only confirmed in the U.S but also found in the UK (see e.g. Hew et al., 1999; 
Liu and Strong, 2003), in Finland (Booth et al., 2005), in China (Truong, 2011) 
and in international markets (Dou et al., 2015; Griffin et al, 2005; Hong et al., 
2001; Hung et al., 2014). There are two main measures of earnings surprises 
to quantify new information about earnings including the standardised 
unexpected earnings and the analyst forecast based measure. The 
standardised unexpected earnings model is based on a univariate time-
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series earnings forecasting model, which may ignore other potential 
variables that could matter in affecting expected earnings. Many studies such 
as Brown and Rozeff (1978), Collin and Hopwood (1980) and O’Brien (1988) 
have compared the measurement of analyst forecasts based models with the 
unexpected earnings model, suggesting that the analyst forecasts based 
model is superior to the other because analysts use different information in 
their forecasts. Thus, the analyst forecasts based measure is employed in 
the second empirical chapter. 
2.4.1 Evidence of PEAD 
The PEAD effect has survived for decades and has been found both in 
developed and emerging markets. Stocks with positive earnings will drift 
upwards after the announcement up to several months and stocks with 
negative earnings surprise will drift downwards. Ball and Brown (1968) first 
documented PEAD of good and bad news firms and the drifts lasted up to 
two months. Their sample covers the period 1957 to 1965, including 261 
firms but the sample does not include young stocks or firms that do not report 
on December 31 and that do not have data availability on Compustat, the 
CRSP tapes and the Wall Street Journal. They construct two models for 
expectation of income and test market reaction when the forecasts prove to 
be incorrect. They measure residual of net income and earnings per share 
using a time-series regression model and earnings per share using a naïve 
model. The residuals of net income and earnings per share exhibit drift 
behaviour. A subsequent study by Jones and Litzenberger (1970) examines 
two samples from Compustat. The first sample covers 510 firms from 1962 
to 1965 and the second one includes 618 firms from 1964 to 1967. They only 
observe drift for positive surprises, but not for negative surprises, suggesting 
that unfavourable earnings would cause investors to sell stocks more rapidly 
than favourable earnings. A subsequent study by Latane et al. (1977) 
examines 975 standardised unexpected earnings and the drift is observed 
for both positive and negative earnings surprises.  
 
A review paper by Ball (1978) shows not only evidence of PEAD, but also 
explains PEAD due to a systematic experimental error, market inefficiency 
and private costs of information processing, and failure of the two-parameter 
model. While most of the early studies on PEAD have suffered from several 
limitations including small sample, sample selection biases and risk 
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measurement error, there are a number of subsequent studies on PEAD, 
confirming its profitability.  
 
Foster et al. (1984) carry out a study using 56000 observations from 2,053 
firms spanning from 1974 to 1981 on Compustat. They find the drift of 
positive and negative earnings surprises is persistent over the sample period 
and show that firm size is negatively correlated with the drift, but is positively 
correlated with the sign and magnitude of the earnings surprise. In addition, 
they find that earnings forecast error and firm size alone explain 81% and 
61% of the variation in PEAD, respectively and there are no drifts when 
earnings are scaled by the absolute value of earnings and scaled by the 
standard deviation of the forecast error. Bernard and Thomas (1990) use 
quarterly data over the period from 1974 to 1986 including 84,792 firms from 
NYSE/AMEX and 15,475 firms from NASDAQ. They find the drift is 
prominent in the first three months and almost disappears beyond three 
months. The drift is positively correlated with the magnitude of the 
unexpected earnings and the absolute value of the drift is negatively 
correlated with firm size. A subsequent study by them uses a new 
methodology to examine PEAD in which they transform the earnings surprise 
into coded quintiles based on their ranking in each accounting period and 
scale the coded scores from 0 to 1 to eliminate outliers and potential non-
linearities. They conclude that PEAD is due to underreaction to earnings 
information.  
 
The extensive studies of PEAD in the following period in the U.S markets are: 
Albarbanell and Bernard (1992); Ball (1992); Bhushan (1994); Mendenhall 
(2004) and Battalio and Mendenhall (2007). All of these studies confirm the 
existence of PEAD. Hew et al. (1996) examine PEAD in the UK stock market. 
Their results are consistent with the findings from the U.S., but the drift lasts 
for a longer period after the earnings announcement. Evidence of PEAD can 
also be found in international markets. Dou et al. (2015) find significant 
positive earnings momentum profits for 30 out of the 41 countries examined, 
including for Canada, the U.S and most of the major western European 
markets and all ESEA markets except Singapore. In contrast, Hong et al. 
(2003) examine 11 markets around the world and find significant profits from 
exploiting earnings momentum profits for all of the western markets in their 
sample and only one (Hong Kong) of six ESEA markets. Griffin et al. (2003) 
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find that earnings momentum strategies are on average profitable in all 
countries but one American market, one Asian market, and one European 
market.  
2.4.2 Explanations for PEAD 
A number of studies have been documented to explain PEAD. There two 
main streams in the existing explanations of PEAD: 1) behavioural 
explanations: investor underreaction, analyst underreaction and biased 
information processing; 2) Misspecification of risk. 
 Behavioural Explanations 
The most frequent and accepted explanation of PEAD in the literature is 
underreation to earnings surprises. This argues that investors and analysts 
underreact to new information, resulting in such news incorporating slowly 
into stock prices. These behavioural explanations include analyst 
underreaction, investor underreaction and biased information processing.  
 
2.4.2.1.1 Analyst Underreaction 
A number of studies suggest that analyst earnings forecasts are not efficient 
(see e.g. Lys and Sohn, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; Ali et al., 1992). Abarbanell 
and Bernard (1992) examine whether analysts are biased in forecasting 
earnings. They show that forecast errors are positively correlated with 
previous earnings change. The intuition behind the finding is that analysts 
forecast earnings with caution and are unlikely to believe the earnings will 
continue to rise. If earnings continue to rise, the forecast will be smaller than 
the actual earnings. Thus, this results in analysts’ underreaction to the 
earnings change in the previous time period. However, the underreaction of 
analyst forecasts can only explain at most half of PEAD and the authors 
conclude that analyst behaviour is only a partial explanation for PEAD. 
 
2.4.2.1.2 Investor Underreaction 
Investors are participants in stock markets and are influenced by analysts’ 
forecasts. PEAD may be due to investors’ overdependence on analysts. In a 
review paper, Lev and Ohlson (1982) describe PEAD as an unwavering belief 
in market efficiency. Bernard and Thomas (1989) agree with the hypothesis 
that markets adjust slowly to earnings information and conclude that risk 
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factors are insufficient to explain PEAD. Bernard and Thomas (1990), Wiggin 
(1991), Bartov (1992) and Rangan and Sloan (1998) also support this 
hypothesis. However, Hirshleifer et al. (2003) find that investor underreaction 
is not sufficient to explain PEAD. They examine how investors respond to 
extreme quarterly earnings surprise and the relation between trades from 
individuals and subsequent abnormal returns. They find there is no relation 
between individual behaviour and PEAD.  
 
2.4.2.1.3 Biased Information Processing 
Another possible explanation of PEAD is biased information processing. 
PEAD may be due to biased research model design, bias in sample selection 
and bias in estimating abnormal returns (see e.g. Ball, 1992; Bushan, 1994; 
Rangan and Sloan, 1998; Jacob et al., 1999). In a review paper by Ball 
(1992), he discussed two possible explanations for PEAD:1) the market is 
inefficient; 2) the market is truly efficient but measurements of PEAD are 
incorrect. This may be due to bias estimating returns, expected returns, 
quarterly earnings information, transaction costs, liquidity, overestimated t-
statistics or market inefficiency. Bhushan (1994) also states that transaction 
costs with heterogeneity of investors in processing information would result 
in PEAD. Rangan and Sloan (1999) show that the findings of PEAD in 
Bernard and Thomas (1989) may be due to research design biases. Jacob 
et al. (2000) provide further support in which PEAD results in Bernard and 
Thomas (1989) could be because of the models they used.  
 Misspecification of Risk  
Risk attracted much attention from researchers in an early stage in 
misspecification of asset pricing models as explanations for PEAD. For 
example, Ball (1978) and Foster et al. (1984) suggest that PEAD is due to 
unspecific risk besides systematic risk from CAPM and reject the possibility 
of a specific time period or inefficient market explanation. Chordia et al. (2009) 
and other researchers (see e.g. Ball, 1992; Battalio and Mendenhall, 2006) 
suggest that PEAD is due to other risk premia besides beta risk, which are 
measured inaccurately or fail to be identified. Bhushan (1994) suggest there 
is a positive relationship between transaction costs and the magnitude of 
PEAD. Sadka (2006) and Ng et al. (2008) examine transaction costs proxied 




To conclude, the PEAD effect has existed for many years and both rational 
and behavioural theories have been put forward to explain it. However, none 
of the theories can sufficiently explain PEAD. Recently, investor sentiment 
(e.g. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012) has attracted much attention in 
the behavioural domain. Dou et al. (2015) show that the cultural effect seems 
to be an important driver for PEAD across countries, but they did not link 
culture to investor sentiment. We believe that research on culture and 
sentiment will be promising, since culture has a significant impact in investors’ 
behaviour. Given the difference in behaviour between individualism and 
collectivism, Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that cognitive dissonance is 
a unique phenomenon in western or individualistic cultures, which is 
discussed in Section 2.3.4. If cognitive dissonance is a major driver in 
affecting investors processing public information (resulting in PEAD), it is 
expected that investors in individualistic and collectivist cultures experience 
different degrees of cognitive dissonance. To date, no researcher has 
examined the interaction between investor sentiment and the cultural effect 
on cognitive dissonance and the extent of the variation of PEAD. Thus, our 
research will focus on the interaction between sentiment and cultural effects 
to explain PEAD by way of cognitive dissonance in the second empirical 
chapter. 
2.5 Institutional Herding  
A number of studies in the literature document that investors are influenced 
by other investors’ trading actions, thus resulting in herding. Banerjee (1992) 
suggests that herding occurs when individuals may ignore their own private 
information and imitate the actions of others by following the decisions of 
other individuals. Devenow and Welch (1996) and Sciubba (2002) suggest 
that herding behaviour is a series of correlated behaviours among individuals. 
Chang et al. (2000) suggest that herding is a process by which market 
participants make their investment decisions based on collective actions, 
suppressing their own beliefs. Patterson and Sharma (2007) suggest that 
such behaviour is due to the fact that investors trade the same securities 
over the same period of time or when investors trade as other investors do 
and ignore their private information. 
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2.5.1 Herding Measures in Financial Markets 
To understand the empirical literature, it is necessary to be aware of the 
different measures of herding. Herding measures are classified into two main 
streams: micro-level herding measures and aggregate price and market 
activity herding measures. There are two commonly used herding measures 
in micro-level studies. The first micro-level herding measure is from the 
model of Lakonishok et al. (1992; thereafter, LSV).3 According to the LSV 
metrics, herding is measured as the tendency of institutional investors to buy 
or sell a particular security relative to what they would do if they trade 
randomly over the same period of time. The intuition behind the LSV 
measure is that if herding takes place, there is a tendency of investors to 
disproportionally buy or sell a single stock. The second micro-level herding 
measure is Sias (2004; hereafter, Sias) model. He argues that if herding 
takes place, there is a positive correlation between the proportion of 
institutions buying in the current quarter and the proportion of institutions 
buying in the last quarter. The Sias herding consists of two components, 
institutional investors following their own trades and institutional investors 
following other institutional investors’ trades. The key difference between the 
LSV and Sias herding measures is that while the former examines indirectly 
cross-sectional temporal dependence within a period, the latter tests directly 
whether institutional investors follow each others’ trades in the subsequent 
period. Two measures may allow us to capture different aspects of herding 
since the LSV measure captures institutional herding within a period whereas 
the Sias measure captures how institutional investors following each others’ 
trades in the subsequent period. By using both measures, we will be able to 
gain better insights into the extent to which herding is intentional or spurious.  
 
In addition, the two most commonly used measures in return-based work are 
by Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000). Christie and Huang 
(1995) argue that investors tend to suppress their own beliefs and join the 
crowd during the periods of extreme market movements, indicating that 
herding is more likely to occur during periods of extreme market movements. 
Therefore, in the presence of herding, average stock returns would not 
deviate far away from market returns and thus, return dispersions should be 
                                               
3 The LSV model (1992) has been widely used in the herding literature. (e.g. Grinblatt et al., 
1992, Wermers, 1999)  
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relatively low. In the spirit of Christie and Huang (1995), Change et al. (2000) 
argue that if investors are likely to follow market behaviour during periods of 
large price movements, then the increase and linear relation between return 
dispersions and the market return will no longer hold, i.e. there is a non-linear 
relation between return dispersions and the market return. In other words, if 
investors are likely to herd during periods of extreme market movements, 
there should be a negative non-linear relation between stock return 
dispersions and the market return.  
 
Thus, two different types of herding (the micro-level and return-based models) 
investigate different aspects of herd behaviour in financial markets. The 
micro-level herding measures employ proprietary data to directly measure 
herding of a specific investor type (i.e. institutional investors or individual 
investors) whereas return-based herding using stock market data cannot 
distinguish herding of specific investor types. Thus, the two micro-level 
herding measures are employed in our study in examining institutional 
herding. 
2.5.2 Evidence of Institutional Herding 
In an early study, Lakonishok et al. (1992) do not find strong evidence of 
pension fund managers’ herding and positive feedback trading. Grinblatt et 
al. (1995) examine momentum trading and herding behaviour in the mutual 
fund industry, using the LSV herding measure, and find strong evidence of 
momentum trading, but not herding. Wermers (1999) finds weak evidence of 
mutual fund herding in the average stock level, using the LSV herding 
measure, but finds strong herding in trades of small stocks and in trading by 
growth-oriented funds. 
 
Sias (2004) finds strong evidence of institutional trading by examining the 
tendency of institutional investors to follow each others’ trades in the same 
securities over adjacent periods and shows that institutional investors tend 
to engage in momentum trading but little of the herding is contributed by the 
momentum trading. Sias also finds that institutional herding does not drive 
prices away from fundamental values and suggests that the findings are 
consistent with information cascades. Institutional herding is also found in 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs): Li and Yung (2004) show that there 
is a significantly positive relationship between changes in institutional 
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ownership and ADR returns even after controlling for momentum. A more 
recent study by Choi and Sias (2009) uses the Sias herding measure in 
examining institutional industry herding and documents that institutional 
investors herd in industries. Celiker et al. (2015) find strong evidence of 
mutual funds herding within an industry by using both LSV and Sias 
measures and argue that herding is related to industry momentum trading. 
 
There are also numerous studies examining institutional herding in non-US 
markets. The studies in a single market include: Germany (Walter and Weber, 
2006; Kremer and Nautz, 2013); Hong Kong (Zhou and Lai, 2009); Japan 
(Kim and Nofsinger, 2005); Korea (Choe et al, 1999; Kim and Wei, 2002); UK 
(Wylie, 2005). All of these studies except for Japan (Kim and Nofsinger, 2005) 
and Korea (Choe et al, 1999) use the LSV herding measure, with the 
exceptions using their own designed herding measure. Results suggest that 
herding is more pronounced in smaller stock markets. For example, Wylie 
(2005) shows the evidence of fund manager herding in the smallest- and 
largest-capitalisation stocks aggregated by industry and the level of herding 
is similar to that of U.S mutual fund managers. Kim and Nofsinger (2005) find 
institutional herding is weaker in Japan than in the U.S but when herding 
occurs, it has a significant impact on price movements in both markets. They 
argue that the phenomenon depends on economic conditions. Walter and 
Weber (2006) find strong evidence of mutual fund manager herding and 
positive feedback trading and suggest that herding is driven by unintentional 
herding as a consequence of changes in benchmark index compositions. 
Recently, Holmes et al. (2013) use the Sias (2004) herding measure and 
monthly institutional holding data for the Portuguese stock market and 
examine herding under different market conditions, suggesting that herding 
is intentional, due to reputational reasons. Choi and Skiba (2015) examine 
institutional herding in 41 countries, using the Sias herding measure, and find 
that herding is more prevalent in more information transparent markets, 
suggesting that such herding behaviour tends to be driven by investigative 
herding. They also find that price adjustment is faster in markets with less 
information asymmetry. 
2.5.3 Causes of Herding  
Recent studies note that even institutional investors exhibit herding 
behavriour (Grinblatt et al., 1995; Lakonishok et al., 1992; Holmes et al., 
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2013; Sias, 2004; Wermers, 1999; Wylie, 2005). There are four theoretical 
explanations for herding behaviour among institutional investors: (1) 
information cascades. Investors may infer private information from prior 
trades of better-informed investors and mimic their actions, ignoring their own 
private information (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992); (2) 
reputational herding. Managers ignore their own private information and 
decide to herd in order to retain or build their reputation (Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1990). Trueman (1994) investigates whether herding of analysts is due 
to reputational reasons and analysts tending to release forecasts that are 
similar to others’ forecast instead of revealing their privation information; (3) 
investigative herding. Investors may herd together because they receive 
correlated private information from analysing the same indicators, such as 
analyst recommendations (Froot et al., 1992; Hirshleifer et al., 1994); (4) 
institutional investors may herd into stocks with specific characteristics 
(Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001;). 
 
A review study by Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) documents that herding 
behaviour can be either spurious or intentional. Spurious herding takes place 
when institutional investors trade stocks based on their specific 
characteristics such as higher liquidity (Falkenstein, 1996) or when 
institutional investors face similar information sets or analyse the same 
indicators (Hishleifer et al., 1994) or when investment professionals who 
have similar education backgrounds and professional qualifications interpret 
informational signals similarly. In contrast, intentional herding results from 
imitating the trading actions of other investors, because they infer information 
from the prior trading activities. The explanations for intentional herding can 
be attributed to informational and reputational herding which are discussed 
above.  
 
Theoretical models of intentional herding typically assume that there is not 
enough reliable information in the market so that investors are less certain 
about their own beliefs or trading decisions and tend to follow the trades of 
others, resulting in herding. In contrast, in the case of spurious herding, 
investors face similar public information and react to the information and end 
up with similar trading decisions.  
 
Kremer and Nautz (2013) find that the type of herding in the stock market in 
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Germany is spurious herding i.e. caused by similar reactions to public 
information and trading signals. They use high-frequency data from the 
period 2006-2009 and find that herding is more pronounced in the largest 
and most liquid stocks. Holmes et al. (2013) examine institutional herding in 
the Portuguese stock market and investigate whether such herding is 
intentional by analysing the herding under different market conditions, 
suggesting that herding is primarily driven by reputational reasons.   
 
It is important to distinguish among different causes and types of herding 
behaviour to investigate whether such behaviour leads to market inefficiency 
or not. This is not an easy task since there is a large number of factors which 
may affect investors’ trading behaviour and decision-making system. 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Sias (2004) examine institutional herding on 
stocks by size. Therefore, one would expect that strong herding in small-
capitalization stocks would result from intentional herding where investors 
infer information from each others’ trades (e.g. information cascades) and 
spurious herding tends to be evident in large capitalization stocks, since 
information is more reliable and available for large stocks (e.g. investigative 
herding). They find information cascades herding is more pronounced for 
small stocks. Choi and Sias (2009) show similar findings in small stocks.  
 
If herding is driven by positive feedback trading, such behaviour is defined 
as spurious herding (Froot et al. 1992; Wermers et al., 1999; Sias, 2004). 
The evidence of feedback trading on institutional herding is quite mixed. 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) find little evidence of herding and feedback trading 
in large stocks and strong evidence in small stocks. Sias (2004) find that little 
of the herding is attributed to positive feedback trading. In contrast, Grinblatt 
et al. (1995) document that momentum trading contributes to herding.   
 
There are some external factors in determining institutional herding. For 
example, Brown et al. (2013) find that analyst recommendation is an 
important driver for mutual fund herding in the US. Specifically, mutual funds 
tend to herd into stocks with consensus upgrades and herd out of stocks with 
consensus downgrades. The effect of analyst recommendation revisions on 
mutual fund herding is much stronger for downgrades than for upgrades. 
They also find that such herding is due to reputational reasons. Liao, Huang 
and Wu (2011) show that individual investor sentiment is a key determinant 
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in explaining subsequent mutual fund herding behaviour which is consistent 
with the sentiment countering hypothesis, suggesting that investors tend to 
sell stocks following optimistic sentiment periods.  
2.5.4 Herding and Subsequent Stock Returns 
A number of studies document the relation between institutional demand and 
stock returns. Spurious herding can be an efficient outcome if it is caused by 
the response to fundamental values which speeds up price adjustments and 
stabilises the market (Lakonishok et al., 1992). If herding is intentional, it may 
also stabilise stock prices if the type of herding is informational cascades 
(Sias, 2004). The herding due to informational cascades will not result in 
subsequent return reversals. However, herding can be inefficient if it is not 
based on fundamentals. The herding which includes reputational herding, 
characteristic herding, and fads isbelieved to increase market inefficiencies 
and thus may market prices deviate far from fundamentals. The subsequent 
return reversals can be observed by the impact of such herding. For example, 
spurious herding resulting from momentum trading can drive prices away 
from fundamental values and prices should be reversed subsequently. There 
is mixed empirical evidence on the relation between institutional herding and 
subsequent stock returns. Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Sias (2004), who use 
quarterly data, do not find return reversals following institutional herding. 
However, Puckett and Yan (2008) and Brown et al. (2014), who use high-
frequency data, find that return reversals follow herding.  
2.5.5 Conclusion 
Herd behaviour generally refers to a group of investors trading in the same 
direction or tending to follow the trades of others into or out of securities over 
the same period of time. Numerous studies suggest that analyst 
recommendations are valuable to institutional investors and Brown et al. 
(2013) suggest that they are more likely to herd in (out of) analyst upgrades 
(downgrades). Given the importance of investor sentiment as discussed in 
section 2.1, to date, none of the researchers has examined the interaction of 
investor sentiment and analyst recommendations in determining institutional 
herding. It is important to understand how analyst recommendations and 
individual sentiment interact in affecting institutional herding. We propose 
that cognitive dissonance may be a key driver in affecting institutional herding 
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by taking account of the two prominent factors. it will be evident when the 
two factors do not suggest similar price movements. Both the LSV and Sias 
measures will be employed in the study to capture different aspects of 
institutional herd behaviour in the presence or absence of cognitive 
dissonance, since the LSV measure allows us to examine institutional 
herding based on the two factors within a period, whereas the Sias measure 
captures how institutional investors herd by following each others’ trades in 
the subsequent period.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Numerous studies have shown that traditional finance theories have limited 
power in explaining market puzzles. Researchers have extended their 
research to develop behavioural studies of how market participants actually 
behave in financial markets. In order to explain market anomalies, 
psychological biases are incorporated in modelling investor behaviour.  
 
Given the importance of investor sentiment as discussed in the section 2.1, 
the heart of the thesis focuses on the interaction of investor sentiment and 
cognitive dissonance in explaining market anomalies. Specifically, none of 
the previous research examines the interaction between culture and 
sentiment. Thus, in the first two empirical chapters, we examine the effect of 
investor sentiment on momentum profits and PEAD in different cultures, 
since investors’ proneness to sentiment is affected by their cultural 
backgrounds. Investors with distinct cultural backgrounds will be expected to 
interpret information differently (Otoo, 1999). The interaction is expected to 
impact on cognitive dissonance which will be evident when private 
(momentum) or public information (PEAD) contradicts investors’ sentiment, 
resulting in a slower diffusion of the news incorporating into stock prices. In 
other words, investors’ cultural background might influence the investor 
proneness to cognitive dissonance, resulting in the distinct effect of 
momentum and PEAD in different cultures. In the third empirical chapter, the 
interaction between investor sentiment and analyst recommendation 
revisions on institutional herding is investigated. We consider that 
institutional investors analyse analyst recommendations and individual 
sentiment in making their trading decisions. It is argued that cognitive 
dissonance may impact on institutional herding if the two factors (analyst 
recommendations and investor sentiment) conflict with each other.  
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3 Culture and Investor Sentiment: The Impact of 
Cognitive Dissonance on Momentum Profits 
3.1 Introduction 
A substantial literature documents and examines the profitability of 
momentum strategies since the seminal work of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). Numerous arguments have been put forward to try to explain the 
anomaly, both from a theoretical perspective and in terms of empirical 
analysis. The explanations have been discussed in detail in Section 2.3. For 
example, behavioural based theoretical models have been developed by 
Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) based 
on either psychological biases (e.g. overconfidence, representativeness, 
self-attribution bias) or bounded rationality within a heterogeneous trader 
model. In terms of empirical evidence, examples include the role of market 
state (Cooper et al., 2004), macroeconomic risk (Chordia and Shivakumar, 
2002, Liu and Zhang, 2008), international rather than national risk (Fama and 
French, 2012, Asness et al., 2013), culture (Chiu et al., 2010), sentiment 
(Antoniou et al., 2013), and arbitrage risk (Mendenhall, 2002), among others. 
However, despite this work, the reasons for the existence of momentum 
profits are still not clear. In this chapter, we seek to examine whether culture, 
sentiment and cognitive dissonance can explain this anomaly using data 
across a wide range of countries. We pay particular attention to the impact 
of differences between western and East and South East Asian (henceforth 
ESEA) cultures.4 
 
Our work is motivated by the fact that while the evidence for momentum 
profits is extensive, it is not found for all international markets. There is 
general agreement that price momentum strategies are profitable in many 
western markets (see for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
Antoniou et al. (2013) for the U.S., Rouwenhorst (1998) for 12 European 
countries and Griffin et al. (2005) and Chui et al. (2010) for 40 and 41 markets 
worldwide respectively, with both including the U.S., Canada and a wide 
range of western European markets. However, the same is not true for ESEA 
markets. For example, Griffin et al. (2005) find that momentum “profits are 
                                               
4 For simplicity, we will use the terms ESEA, east and eastern interchangeably when referring 
to these countries. 
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highly significant in all regions except for Asia… It is interesting to note that 
momentum profits for Asia are decidedly weaker than those around the world, 
particularly for Europe.” (2005, page 2522). Insignificant momentum profits 
are found for all ESEA countries in the sample. Similarly, Chui et al. (2010) 
find momentum returns to be insignificantly different from zero for China, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand, although they are significant for Hong Kong, in contrast to the 
findings of Griffin et al. (2005). Chui et al. (2010) also show that culture as 
measured by Hofstede’s individualism index, is positively related to 
momentum profits.  
 
While cultural factors have been shown to be relevant to momentum profits, 
to date it is not clear why cultural factors might influence the level of returns, 
particularly in relation to the differences between western and ESEA 
countries. It is this issue, which we seek to address by bringing together 
arguments from the psychology literature regarding differences in relation to 
views of change between eastern and western cultures, sentiment and the 
notion of cognitive dissonance. Spencer-Rodgers et al. (2010, pages 297-8) 
state “The culture and cognition literature… has characterized East Asian 
thought as emphasizing holistic thinking and Western thought as 
emphasizing analytical thinking… holistic thinkers predict… greater change 
and more cyclical patterns of change, rather than stability or gradual linear 
change… [and are] more comfortable with and accepting of contradiction”. 
In contrast, analytical thinkers are more likely to predict that current patterns 
will persist and will be less comfortable with contradiction. As Ji et al. (2001, 
page 450) state “The view that things change from one extreme to the other 
extreme has long been popular in the East, whereas notions of linearity and 
irreversibility continue to be dominant in the West.” These differences 
suggest that people from the two cultures will have different expectations 
about continuation or reversal in stock prices.  
 
Furthermore, while sentiment has been shown to be of relevance to 
anomalies (see for example, Antoniou et al., 2013; Stambaugh et al., 2012), 
to date its interaction with culture has not been investigated. This is important 
since during optimistic or pessimistic periods, cultural expectations will cause 
investors to experience cognitive dissonance in different cases, affecting 
their responses to news. For example, in relation to winner stocks, an 
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investor from ESEA who believes in reversal will experience cognitive 
dissonance in the presence of optimistic sentiment, whereas investors from 
the west will not, given their belief in continuation. Using a framework in the 
spirit of Hong and Stein’s (1999) heterogeneous trader model, we take 
account of the differences in views of cognition between the west and the 
east and examine how these interact with investor sentiment and develop 
specific hypotheses in relation to difference in momentum profits between 
the two cultures.  
 
The hypotheses are examined in relation to culture, sentiment and 
momentum using data from 40 countries worldwide. The consumer 
confidence index is employed as a proxy for investor sentiment and the 
individualism index is used as a proxy for culture. We first perform a portfolio 
analysis and find that momentum profits are only prominent in high 
individualistic cultures during optimistic periods, which provides clear 
evidence of the interaction between sentiment and culture on momentum 
profits. The interaction on momentum profits are examined in a multivariate 
regression setting while controlling for other determinants that can potentially 
explain differences in momentum profits across countries. First, we control 
for variables measuring the effect of speed of information flow and 
information uncertainty since Zhang (2006) suggests that these variables are 
able to capture momentum profits. We also control for information efficiency 
proxies which measure the development of financial markets and institutional 
quality, because a more highly integrated market facilitates the flow of 
information and reduces trading costs (see e.g. Chui et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, macroeconomic factors are also controlled for since previous 
studies show the effect of macroeconomic factors on momentum profits (see 
e.g. Cooper et al., 2004 and Griffin et al., 2003). The regression results show 
that sentiment and, culture as well as their interaction are all highly significant 
even after controlling for the above explanatory variables. In the robustness 
tests, we also consider an alternative measure for the individualism index 
which comes from GLOBE. The regression analysis is re-estimated using the 
alternative measure and we find that the relationship between the interaction 
(between sentiment and individualism) and momentum profits still holds.  
 
The analysis is then focused in relation to the argument of cognitive 
dissonance on the five largest markets in each of the east and west and we 
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find that momentum profits are only significant in western culture countries 
during periods when sentiment is optimistic. In all five western countries, 
momentum profits under optimism are primarily driven by the 
underperformance of loser stocks, whereas the insignificant momentum 
profits during pessimistic periods are due to the returns to loser stocks not 
being of the sign consistent with momentum, suggesting that cognitive 
dissonance for loser stocks is a key driver of momentum profits in the 
presence of optimistic sentiment. In contrast, there is no clear difference in 
momentum profits between sentiment states for ESEA markets. Overall, the 
results are consistent with our specific hypotheses and provide strong 
support to the importance of cognitive dissonance in explaining differences 
in momentum profits across cultures.  
 
To consider the possibility that the results may be driven by economic risk 
factors, we re-estimate Fama-French 5-factor adjusted momentum returns 
(Fama and French, 2015) across different sentiment states in both western 
and ESEA countries and find that the results are robust. To ensure that the 
results are not driven by a particular sentiment index, we consider an 
alternative index of investor sentiment (Baker et al., 2012). We construct the 
alternative sentiment index for each of the ten countries and re-estimate the 
portfolio analysis for momentum returns in western and ESEA markets 
across different sentiment states. The findings are qualitatively similar to the 
previous findings. Furthermore, the basic results in the chapter also survive 
a number of sensitivity tests, including using an alternative momentum 
strategy, different cut-offs for investor sentiment using 40% instead of 30%, 
and an alternative methodology of defining optimistic and pessimistic states 
from Stambaugh et al. (2012). 
 
The study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the study provides 
the first examination of the interaction between sentiment and culture on 
momentum profits in markets around the world. Second, while Chui et al. 
(2010) show that culture is relevant to momentum profits, to date it is not 
clear why cultural factors might influence the level of returns. We tackle this 
issue by bringing together arguments from the psychology literature 
regarding the differences in relation to views of change between western and 
ESEA cultures, sentiment and the notion of cognitive dissonance and find 
that the resulting difference of cognitive dissonance across western and 
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ESEA cultures can provide a better understanding of differences in 
momentum profits between the two cultures. Third, we advance the 
momentum literature by showing that the momentum effect is different across 
sentiment states in international markets and re-address the fundamental 
question of whether momentum profits still exist in markets around the world, 
while using recent data.    
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 discusses 
issues relating to culture, sentiment and cognitive dissonance and develops 
testable predictions concerning momentum and how the phenomenon differs 
between western and ESEA markets. Section 3.3 presents the data and 
methodology and is followed by section 3.4 the main empirical analysis. 
Robustness tests are undertaken in section 3.5, which is followed by a 
conclusion. 
3.2 Cultural Bias, Information-Based Traders and Feedback Traders: 
Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Individualism, Sentiment and Momentum  
Antoniou et al. (2013) examine the impact of cognitive dissonance on 
momentum by considering the role of investor sentiment. For the U.S. market 
they show that momentum profits are evident only in the presence of 
optimistic sentiment and attribute this to cognitive dissonance. In discussing 
Chui et al.’s (2010) findings that momentum profits are more marked in 
countries where individualism is more prevalent they state “This raises the 
question of whether the asymmetric momentum pattern we have 
documented for the United States, where individualistic attitudes are 
considered to be higher than in other cultures, gains support in countries 
characterized by less individualism. Exploration of this issue would seem to 
be an interesting area for future research.” (Antoniou et al. 2013, pages 273-
4). In the first part of our analysis, we seek to address this issue by 
considering the interaction of sentiment and culture on momentum profits. 
 
While previous studies have examined separately the impact of cultural 
variables and sentiment on momentum profits, to date no study has 
investigated the joint impact of these factors and the way they impact 
cognitive dissonance. Therefore, before we go on to consider arguments 
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relating to specific differences between investors from the west and the east, 
we consider more general arguments relating to cognitive dissonance and 
concepts of individualism versus collectivism. In the psychology literature, 
individualism and collectivism have been related to the concepts of 
independent and interdependent self-construal. As Cross et al. (2011, page 
143) point out “Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that Europeans and 
Americans construe the self as fundamentally individual and separate from 
others, and they labeled this the independent self-construal… In contrast, 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) pointed out that the Japanese tend to construe 
the self as fundamentally connected to others and defined by relationships 
with others, which they labeled the interdependent self-construal”. 
Subsequent to the work of Markus and Kitayama (1991), these concepts 
have been strongly associated with the notions of individualism and 
collectivism (particularly in relation to considering differences between 
people from western and East Asian cultures).5  
 
The concept of self-construal is important for considering cultural differences 
and how individuals from different cultural backgrounds will view a particular 
situation. Individuals with strong independent self-construal place great value 
on self-integrity and are likely to be strongly affected by cognitive dissonance. 
Markus and Kitayama point out that cognitive dissonance is a strong 
phenomenon in western or individualistic cultures. For example, given their 
belief in continuation, westerners with their tendency for independent self-
construal will experience, and be affected by, cognitive dissonance when 
faced with winner (loser) stocks and a pessimistic (optimistic) state of 
sentiment. In contrast people with a sense of interdependent self-construal 
place greater weight on the obligations and responsibilities within a group 
and will be less concerned with self-consistency. As such they are likely to 
experience weak cognitive dissonance.6 
 
Using a framework in the spirit of Hong and Stein (1999), we consider 
differences between individualistic and collectivist cultures. Hong and Stein 
(1999) propose a heterogeneous trader model in which there are two types 
of trader, both of which are characterized by bounded rationality: 
newswatchers and momentum (or positive feedback) traders. The former 
                                               
5 While Cross et al. (2011) argue that self-construal is only one aspect of individualism-
collectivism, they are often treated as if they are the same. 
6 The argument of cognitive dissonance is discussed in detail in section 2.2.  
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base their decisions on private signals, without taking account of past or 
current prices. However, bounded rationality means that they cannot infer 
information that other newswatchers hold from movements in prices. As a 
result, information diffuses slowly through the newswatcher population. In 
contrast, momentum traders’ decisions are based on past prices only. The 
model leads to underreaction in the short-run and long-term overreaction in 
relation to private news.  
 
While culture plays no part in the Hong and Stein model, they argue “our 
results are attributable to the assumption that momentum traders make 
“simple” forecasts—i.e., they can only run univariate regressions. But even if 
one accepts this restriction at face value, it begs the following question: Why 
do all traders have to use the same single forecasting variable? Why not 
allow for some heterogeneity in trading styles, with different groups focusing 
on different predictive variables?” (Hong and Stein, 1999, page 2159). They 
extend their analysis to consider the possibility of contrarian traders. 
However, recognising that there may be “heterogeneity in trading styles” 
raises the question of whether cultural biases may impact on trading 
behaviour. We propose that cultural biases impact on both information-based 
investors and feedback traders.7 Allowing for such biases for both types of 
investors will lead to different predictions for investors in different cultures. 
We argue that information-based traders are affected by sentiment and 
behave differently in different cultures.  
 
In relation to cognitive dissonance, they form their trading decision on the 
basis of private information and are affected by sentiment. On the basis that 
recent price movements reflect private information diffusing slowly through 
this group of traders, private news being positive or negative is proxied by 
whether stocks are recent winners or losers. If two factors (private news and 
sentiment) both impact in the same direction, then there is no cognitive 
dissonance and investors are expected to respond to the private information 
without delay. However, cognitive dissonance will be evident when the two 
                                               
7 While these arguments are developed in a manner consistent with the spirit of Hong and 
Stein (1999), we recognise that in their model newswatchers pay no attention to past or current 
prices. The notion that newswatchers may trade on the basis of something in addition to 
private information is also presented in Antoniou et al. who “hypothesize that “newswatchers” 
will underreact more strongly when they receive information that contradicts their sentiment 
due to cognitive dissonance” (2013, page 246). Nonetheless, given the differences from Hong 




factors do not indicate similar future price movements. In such situations, 
private information will, therefore, be underweighted as investors adjust their 
expectations in a non-Bayesian manner and continue to hold their beliefs 
regarding sentiment. This will result in underreaction to private information 
by investors. In turn, this implies that the news will diffuse slowly in the 
presence of cognitive dissonance, resulting in larger momentum profits.  
 
This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: the effect of investor sentiment on momentum profits will be more 
pronounced in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures, since 
people in high individualistic cultures will experience stronger cognitive 
dissonance than those in low individualistic cultures. 
3.2.2 Cognitive Dissonance and Momentum Profits: Western 
and ESEA Cultures 
Again, using a framework in the spirit of Hong and Stein (1999), we now 
consider differences between western and eastern cultures As stated in the 
introduction, the cross-cultural psychology literature argues that people from 
western and ESEA cultures are characterized by different cognitive biases, 
which impacts on beliefs of change and continuity. Numerous studies show 
that people in East Asian and Western cultures have different beliefs that 
may affect their trading behaviour.  
 
Ritsema and Karcher (1994) find that East Asian and Western European 
cultures have distinct views on change. The view that things change from 
one extreme to the other extreme has been long popular in the East whereas 
theories or cognitions of linearity and irreversibility have been dominant in 
the West (Gurevich, 1969). Peng and Nisbett (1999) show that individuals 
with dialectical lay beliefs, who are more often found in Japan, China, Korea 
and other Confucian-influenced cultures than Western European or North 
American cultures, are more likely to expect change and tolerate and even 
embrace contradiction. In the culture and cognition psychology literature, 
East Asians emphasise holistic thinking, while Westerners emphasise 
analytic thinking. Holistic thinkers are more likely to predict greater changes, 
and more cyclical patterns of change, rather than stability or gradual linear 
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change, and are more comfortable with accepting contradiction. On the 
contrary, analytic thinkers emphasise coherence, stability and reconciliation 
through integration and synthesis, and are more likely to predict the current 
patterns to persist (Spencer-Rodgers et al. 2010).  
 
Experimental studies support these arguments. For example, Ji et al. (2001) 
undertake experimental studies using Chinese and American participants 
and find that “Americans were more likely than Chinese to make predictions 
consistent with suggested trends, whereas Chinese were more likely than 
Americans to predict a reversal in trends.” (Page 452). Similarly, Ji et al. 
(2008) examine stock buy-sell decisions of North American and Chinese 
university students and investors within an experimental setting and find 
those from the west (east) had a greater tendency to predict that price trends 
would continue (reverse), although the differences were more marked for 
university students than for experienced investors.  
 
These cultural differences appear to be deep-rooted and wide-ranging. For 
example, Ji (2008) examines Chinese and Canadian children aged 7-11 and 
again finds that the Canadians were less likely to predict change than were 
the Chinese. Similarly, Spina et al. (2010) find evidence that predictions of 
regression towards the mean are more common among Chinese participants 
than their Canadian counterparts in a wide range of scenarios in relation to 
gymnastic competition, health and weather. Given this evidence, we argue 
that both information-based and feedback traders are likely to be influenced 
by their culture. Specifically, cultural bias will make it more likely that traders 
from the west will have a cultural belief in continuation of price, whereas 
those from the east will tend to expect reversal. Furthermore, consistent with 
the earlier arguments about independent and interdependent self-construal, 
Spencer-Rodgers et al. (2010) argue investors from the east are expected to 
be less disturbed by, and more accepting of, contradiction than those from 
the west. We explore these issues by considering cognitive dissonance and 
examine the phenomena in relation to momentum profits.  
 
We first consider information-based traders and the impact of cultural bias. 
In Hong and Stein (1999), it is assumed that information-based traders only 
forecast on the basis of private signals about fundamentals and news 
diffuses slowly through the information-based trading population. However, 
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we argue that such traders may also be influenced by sentiment (as Antoniou 
et al., 2013) and by cultural bias. Specifically, based on the above arguments, 
western investors are assumed to believe in continuation, while ESEA 
investors are assumed to believe in reversal. If three factors (private news, 
sentiment and cultural beliefs) all impact in the same direction, then there is 
no cognitive dissonance and we expect traders to respond without delay to 
news. However, cognitive dissonance will be evident when the three factors 
do not suggest similar future price movements. In such situations, investors 
will underreact more slowly to the private information they receive. This 
implies that news will diffuse slowly when investors experience cognitive 
dissonance, resulting in larger momentum profits. Given their belief in 
continuation, western investors will experience no cognitive dissonance 
when the positive (negative) news arrives in optimistic (pessimistic) 
sentiment periods, but will experience cognitive dissonance otherwise. In 
contrast, ESEA investors expect good or bad news to mean revert, but are 
more comfortable with contradiction. If they experience cognitive dissonance, 
the cognitive dissonance will be less strong. As such these investors will 
experience weak cognitive dissonance in optimistic and pessimistic states 
for both winner and loser stocks, since the nature of the private news always 
contradicts their belief in mean reversion, whatever the sentiment. Exhibit 1 
summarises situations in which cognitive dissonance will be experienced by 
the two cultural groups of information-based traders. 
 
Exhibit 3.1: Cognitive dissonance, Private news and Sentiment 
This table summarises the cognitive dissonance (CD) of winner and loser 
stocks experienced by the two cultural groups of investors, westerners and 
ESEA in optimistic and pessimistic periods. 
 Westerners – belief in 
continuation 









Sentiment     
Optimistic No CD CD Weak CD Weak CD 
Pessimistic CD No CD Weak CD Weak CD 
 
Now consider the impact of feedback traders. In Hong and Stein (1999), such 
traders are momentum or positive feedback traders. Such a view is 
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consistent with the cultural beliefs of westerners. However, the same cannot 
be applied for ESEA investors. Rather, given their belief in reversal, it 
appears more appropriate to consider (at least some of) such investors to be 
negative feedback (or contrarian) traders. In other words, they will trade 
counter to the trades of information-based traders. In sum, this implies that 
any momentum effect arising from the actions of information-based traders 
will be accentuated in western markets by positive feedback traders, but 
dampened in ESEA markets by negative feedback traders.8  
 
The above arguments lead to the following additional hypotheses: 
 
H2: momentum profits will be significantly greater in western markets than in 
ESEA markets. 
 
H3: For western markets, momentum returns will be driven by loser stocks 
in optimistic periods and by winner stocks in pessimistic periods due to 
cognitive dissonance. Due to it being costly to sell loser stocks, the 
momentum effect will be stronger during optimistic periods.9 
 
H4: For ESEA markets, there will be no significant difference in momentum 
profits between optimistic and pessimistic states since information-based 
traders in each circumstance will experience weak cognitive dissonance. 
 
In addition, given the expectation of a strong momentum effect during 
optimistic periods for western markets (H3), but weak effects for ESEA 
markets across both sentiment states: 
 
H5: momentum profits will be greater during optimistic periods for western 
markets than for ESEA markets. 
 
We examine hypotheses 2-5 for the five largest western and five largest 
ESEA markets for which all relevant data is available for our sample period.  
                                               
8 As noted above, Hong and Stein (1999) find that contrarian traders have a moderate 
stabilising effect. 




3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Hofstede’s Individualism Index 
The Hofstede individualism index is obtained from the psychological surveys 
of value scores from IBM employees from Hofstede’s website. The original 
surveys were conducted between 1967 and 1973 and covered more than 70 
countries, with data being collected for the 40 countries since these countries 
have the largest group of respondents. In a later stage, ten new countries 
were added to the sample by Hofstede and the statistical method conducted 
in the new data sample is consistent with the data of the previous 40 
countries. In 2010, Hofstede further extended his survey to 76 countries. The 
individualism index is derived based on the country mean scores on 14 
questions about employees’ attitudes toward private lives and their own work. 
As seen from Table 3.1, for the individualism index, the U.S has the highest 
level (91), followed by Australia (90) and the United Kingdom (89), while 
Colombia has the lowest level (13) followed by Indonesia (14) and China (20). 
Thus, it is clear that the sample used in this study covers a wide range of 
cultural attributes. Notably, only one Hofstede cultural dimension proxied by 
the individualism index is used in this study. This is due to two reasons: (1) it 
is natural to employ the individualism index in relation to cognitive 
dissonance, sentiment and momentum profits since the cross-cultural 
psychology literature suggests that cognitive dissonance is a stronger 
phenomenon is individualistic cultures (see e.g. Markus and Kitayama, 1991); 
(2) Chui et al. (2010) and Dou et al. (2015) show that there is a significant 
relationship between the individualism index and momentum profits and 
other cultural dimensions have been shown not to have such a significant 
relationship.   
3.3.2 Stock Market Data 
For the U.S market, all common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) listed in the 
NYSE and AMEX from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
are used and for the other stock markets, we use all common stocks from 
Datastream International. We select our sample countries and stocks by 
applying a number of selection criteria. In the first part of the analysis we are 
interested in examining the joint impact of investor sentiment and culture on 
momentum profits. Therefore, each country in our sample is required to have  
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Table 3.1 Sample Stock Market Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the 40 stock markets in the sample along 
with scores on the individualism index. It also reports the number of firms for each 
country at the start and end date of the sample period. If a country has more than 
one major stock exchange, the name of the stock exchanges are listed in brackets. 
Data for the U.S market are from CRSP, while that for all other countries in the 
sample are from Datastream International. The stock markets in our sample are 
subject to the following selection criteria. (1) Each country is required to have a value 
for Hofstede’s individualism index (IDV)) (2) Each country is required to have both 
stock market data and consumer confidence index data for at least five years (3) 
Stocks with market capitalization which are below 5% of all stocks are excluded in 
each month (4) Each country is required to have at least 30 stocks with available 












Argentina 46  1998M7 2013M12 83 64 
Australia 90  1991M1 2013M12 612 1560 
Austria 55  1996M7 2013M12 107 75 
Belgium 75  1991M1 2013M12 208 102 
Brazil 38  2006M5 2013M12 250 242 
Bulgaria 30  2007M4 2013M12 256 146 
Canada 80  2002M10 2013M12 1108 906 




20  1998M6 2013M12 866 2422 
Colombia 13  2004M8 2013M12 71 47 
Czech Republic 58  1995M10 2006M8 257 31 
Denmark 74  1991M1 2013M12 218 159 
Finland 63  1996M8 2013M12 123 120 
France 71  1991M1 2013M12 827 563 
Germany 67  1991M1 2013M12 407 682 
Greece 35  1991M1 2013M12 137 144 
Hong Kong 25  2000M10 2013M12 665 1231 
Hungary 80  1995M07 2013M12 34 45 
Indonesia 14  2002M1 2013M12 292 395 
Ireland 70  1991M1 2013M12 75 30 








18  1999M9 2013M11 998 1655 
Lithuania 60  2002M1 2013M12 45 30 
Mexico 30  1991M1 2013M12 105 85 
Netherlands 80  1991M1 2013M12 205 92 
New Zealand 79  1991M1 2013M12 90 113 
Norway 69  1993M4 2013M12 129 183 
Poland 60  2003M2 2013M12 69 650 





39  1999M7 2013M12 184 218 
Slovenia 27  1998M7 2013M12 47 39 
South Africa 65  1991M1 2013M12 398 289 
Spain 51  1991M1 2013M12 142 141 
Sweden 71  1996M7 2013M12 266 434 
Switzerland 68  1991M2 2013M12 361 240 
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Thailand 20  2000M4 2013M12 366 537 
Turkey 37  1991M1 2013M12 65 358 
United 
Kingdom 




91  1991M1 2013M12 2126 1480 
 
both stock market data and sentiment data measured by a consumer 
confidence index for a period of at least five years, and each country is also 
required to have an individualism index measure. Both domestic and foreign 
stocks that are listed on the major stock exchange in each country are 
included in the sample, but cross-listed stocks are only accounted for in the 
sample of their home country. Both suspended and dead stocks are included 
to mitigate survivorship bias.  
 
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by small, thin-traded and 
illiquid stocks, several stock selection criteria are applied to our sample as 
follows. First, a stock with market capitalization that is below the fifth 
percentile in its market is excluded in any month in order to remove small 
and illiquid stocks (Hong et al. 2003; Chui et al. 2010). Second, if stock 
returns are larger (less) than 100% (-95%), the returns are set equal to 100% 
(-95%) to filter out stock return outliers.10 Such a stock selection filter not 
only eliminate suspicious stock returns, but it also ensures that momentum 
profits are not driven mainly by small or illiquid stocks (Chui et al., 2010) Third, 
in order to have a reasonable number of stocks to form momentum portfolios, 
we follow Chui et al. (2010) and each country is required to have at least 30 
stocks with available market capitalization data in any month. Finally, since 
K-month holding period returns (K=6) and past J-month cumulative returns 
(J=6) on each individual stock are required,11 each stock must have a return 
history of a minimum of 8 months if it is delisted during the sample period.12 
Based on the above stock selection criteria, our sample consists of 40 
countries. 
 
The analysis covers the period January 1991 to December 2013 to ensure 
enough observations in each stock market, while using recent data. However, 
                                               
10 The stock outliers are mainly from small capitalization stocks (Ince and Porter, 2006).  
11  We use the 6-month/6-month momentum strategy in our study since it is commonly 
examined in momentum studies. 
12 A return history of 8 months includes 6-month formation period, one skipping month and a 
holding period of 1 month. 
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the sample period for each country is different due to data availability, as 
shown in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of stock markets 
and the individualism index for each country. It can be seen from Table 3.1 
that the average sample period for all countries is approximately 15 years 
and the sample period varies across countries. For example, most of the 
developed countries have long sample periods (e.g. 23 years for the United 
Kingdom), whereas Bulgaria and Brazil have the shortest sample periods 
(approximately 6-7 years) due to data availability for their investor sentiment 
index. There is also considerable variation in the number of stocks across 
countries. For instance, at the start of the sample period, the U.S has the 
highest number of firms (2126) whereas Hungary has the least (34). 
Furthermore, the last two columns of Table 3.1 reveal that the number of 
firms in 16 out of the 40 stock markets has expanded over the sample period, 
with the number of firms listed in the stock markets of China, Hong Kong and 
Korea having grown the most.13 
3.3.3 Sentiment Data 
Consumer confidence indices are used as measures of sentiment in our 
analysis. Such indices have been discussed in detail by Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006)14 and have been widely used for the U.S market (Fisher 
and Statman, 2003, Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006, Antoniou et al., 2013) 
and international stock markets (Schmeling, 2009) as the proxy for investor 
sentiment. In addition, there are other reasons to employ this measure. First, 
the consumer confidence index is available for all countries in the sample 
and spans a reasonably long period of time. Second, although the sample 
period and frequency of the consumer confidence indices vary across 
countries, they are the only consistent measure of investor sentiment that 
can be comparable across countries and that are not constructed by using 
trading data itself (Baker and Wurgler, 2006).15 Trading data used by Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) are not available for all countries in the sample. 
                                               
13 We use the term Korea for the country of South Korea. 
14 Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) use the consumer confidence index as a proxy for 
sentiment to examine the relation between small stock premiums and investor sentiment and 
find that consumer confidence is not strongly related to the close end fund discount which is 
used as a component for the investor sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2006).  
15 Baker and Wugler (2006) constructed a sentiment measure using six proxies which consist 
of trading volume, the premium for dividend-paying stocks, the closed-end fund discount, the 
number of IPOs, the first day return of IPOs and the share of equity in new issues. The 




Table 3.2 Sentiment Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the consumer confidence index as a proxy for investor 
sentiment for each country, along with the source, frequency of the consumer confidence index 
and whether the index is seasonal adjusted or not. It also reports the number of observations 
(N), mean (u), minimum (Min) and Maximum (Max) for the consumer confidence index. If a series 
of the consumer confidence index is not seasonally adjusted, the X-12-ARIMA method is used 
to adjust the series, and if a series of the consumer confidence does not have in monthly 
frequency, it is transformed into a monthly frequency by using the last available values for months 
that have no data. The figures of all statistics in the table are seasonally adjusted. 








N Mean(u) SD(σ) Min Max 
Argentina Datastream Monthly Non-SA 186 46.0 6.8 29.5 58.6 
Australia DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 114.1 10.4 78.5 133.2 
Austria DG ECFIN Monthly SA 219 -1.19 8.0 -23 16 
Belgium DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -7.3 9.0 -26 16 
Brazil Datastream Monthly SA 100 112.5 7.6 94.9 128.7 
Bulgaria DG ECFIN Monthly SA 152 -33.8 7.7 -50.1 -13 
Canada Datastream Monthly SA 144 105.6 15.3 61.3 127.7 
Chile Datastream Monthly Non-SA 104 121.1 15.9 77.7 144.1 
China Datastream Monthly Non-SA 276 109.9 5.7 97 124.6 
Colombia Datastream Monthly Non-SA 122 20.1 9.6 -10.6 38.3 
Czech 
Republic 
DG ECFIN Monthly SA 228 -13.9 10.4 -35.8 3.9 
Denmark DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 8.1 6.6 -8.2 19 
Finland DG ECFIN Monthly SA 218 13.39 5.8 -6.4 23.8 
France DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -18.7 8.9 -37 3.3 
Germany DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -9.3 9.5 -32.9 10.9 
Greece DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -38.6 16.7 -83.8 -5.8 
Hong Kong Bloomberg Quarterly Non-SA 168 88.9 17.1 49.7 116.4 
Hungary DG ECFIN Monthly SA 251 -35.35 15.1 -72.3 0.5 
Indonesia 
 
Bloomberg Monthly Non-SA 153 99.9 0.4 99.0 100.6 
Ireland DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -7.4 13.4 -33.1 19.1 
Italy DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -16.9 9.2 -41.5 2.5 
Japan Datastream Monthly SA 276 41.3 4.8 27.5 50.1 
Korea Datastream Monthly SA 181 99.9 1.4 96.6 102.9 
Lithuania DG ECFIN Monthly SA 152 -16.42 15.3 -56.1 9.2 
Mexico Datastream Monthly SA 153 96.7 8.6 78.6 116.3 
Netherlands DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 0.8 14.2 -30.2 30.8 
New 
Zealand 
Datastream Quarterly Non-SA 276 100.1 1.3 96.1 102.2 
Norway Datastream Quarterly SA 258 19.6 12.8 -20.7 35.6 
Poland DG ECFIN Monthly SA 152 -22.52 10.2 -40.1 -0.5 
Portugal DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -27.8 14.7 -60.1 -0.5 
Russia Datastream Quarterly Non-SA 183 -13.9 12.9 -59.2 2.3 
Slovenia DG ECFIN Monthly SA 214 -20.92 7.3 -41.6 -4.1 
South Africa Datastream Quarterly SA 276 100.3 1.3 97.2 102.9 
Spain DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -14.8 11.4 -47.6 5.3 
Sweden DG ECFIN Monthly SA 219 9.56 8.5 -10 28 
Switzerland Datastream Quarterly SA 276 -13.8 20.2 -53.6 25.3 
Thailand Datastream Monthly SA 174 75.8 10.6 56.4 110.9 
Turkey Datastream Monthly SA 276 99.2 12.4 52 121.2 
United 
Kingdom 
DG ECFIN Monthly SA 276 -9.5 8.5 -35.2 7.1 
U. S Datastream Monthly SA 276 89.9 28.1 25.3 144.7 
 
Consumer confidence index data for each country are collected from different 
sources. For the U.S, the Conference Board (CB) consumer confidence 
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index is employed (Fisher and Statman, 2003; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 
2006; Antoniou et al., 2013). For all European countries that are in the 
European Union, the data used are from the “Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs” (DG ECFIN) (Schmelling, 2009). For the 
remaining countries, data are obtained from Datastream. Since the 
consumer confidence index is measured differently across countries, several 
criteria are applied to make them consistently comparable across countries. 
First, if a consumer confidence index series is not seasonally adjusted, the 
X-12-ARIMA technique is used to adjust the series, which is used by the 
Conference Board to seasonally adjust the U.S consumer confidence series. 
Second, if a series does not have a monthly frequency, it is transformed into 
such a frequency using the last available values for months that have no data 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Schmeling, 2009). The consumer confidence 
index for each country is not adjusted for macroeconomic variables, since 
previous work suggests that both adjusted and unadjusted indices yield 
similar results (Baker and Wurgler, 2006 and 2007; Livnat and Petrovits, 
2009) and the data required for the adjustment are not available for all 
countries. Table 3.2 reports summary statistics of the consumer confidence 
index for each country. As shown in the table, the mean (and other summary 
statistics) of consumer confidence for each country is different. Nonetheless, 
it can serve as a consistently comparable proxy across countries because 
cutoffs in percentages (e.g. top or bottom 30%) are used to define whether 
the state of the current month is optimistic, mild or pessimistic. For example, 
the sentiment state of a given month is optimistic if the score for the 
consumer confidence index of that month belongs to the top 30% of the time 
series values of the consumer confidence index. 
3.3.4 Momentum Portfolios 
Momentum portfolios are formed following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
The strategy selects stocks on the basis of stock returns over the past J 
months and holds them for K months. At the end of each month, securities 
are ranked into portfolio deciles in ascending order based on their past J-
month cumulative returns.16 The portfolio with the highest returns is in the 
top decile and is called the “winner” portfolio and the portfolio with the lowest 
returns is in the bottom decile and is called the “loser” portfolio. The strategy 
                                               
16 Ranking stocks into portfolio quintiles yields similar results that are not reported in the main 
body of the chapter for brevity. The results are reported in the appendix. 
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takes a long position in the winner portfolio and a short position in the loser 
portfolio, held for K months. We focus on the six-month ranking and holding 
period (J=K=6) momentum strategy which is commonly examined in 
momentum studies.17 
 
To increase the power of the tests, overlapping portfolios are constructed as 
documented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Specifically, in each month, a 
new position is initiated at time t and the position for both winner and loser 
portfolios that are initiated at time t-K is closed. Thus, we rebalance 1/K of 
stocks in both winner and loser portfolios, and the momentum returns for a 
given month is the equally weighted average return on K portfolios in that 
month. For example, the winner portfolio in January is equally weighted K 
portfolios (K=6) formed at different times, which includes the winner decile 
formed at the end of November based on the past returns over the previous 
June to November period and the winner decile formed at the end of October 
based on the past returns over the previous May to October period and so 
on up to the winner decile formed at the end of June based on the past 
returns over the previous January to June period. In February, the position 
for both winner and loser portfolios formed at the end of June is closed and 
the position for those formed at the end of December is initiated. Moreover, 
to mitigate microstructure bias issues, one month is skipped between the end 
of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period (Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 2001).  
 
The Country-average and the composite portfolios are also formed. The 
country-average portfolio consists of equally weighted portfolio deciles of all 
countries. For example, the average momentum returns for each country are 
first calculated individually, which are calculated as time-series averages of 
momentum profits for all time periods. Momentum profits to the country-
average portfolio are the equally weighted average of momentum profits for 
all countries. The composite portfolio is formed by putting equal weight on 
the portfolios of all available countries in each month. At least two countries 
are required in the composite portfolio at any point in time. Momentum profits 
to the composite portfolio in each month are calculated as the equally 
weighted average of momentum profits for all available countries in a given 
                                               
17 Momentum strategies with a different ranking and holding period are also examined in the 
robustness test. For example, J=K=12. The results are reported in the Appendix. 
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month. Thus, the momentum returns to the composite portfolio are calculated 
as the time-series average of momentum profits in the portfolio.  
 
In order to identify the sentiment state for a specific formation month,18 we 
follow Antoniou et al. (2013). First, the data of the monthly consumer 
confidence index for each country is collected. Second, the investor 
sentiment score for the specific formation month is calculated using a 
weighted-rolling average scheme. Specifically, portfolios are formed at the 
end of month t and the sentiment score for the formation month t is the sum 
of (3/6) multiplied by consumer confidence index score for month t, (2/6) 
multiplied by consumer confidence score for month t-1 and (1/6) multiplied 
by consumer confidence score for month t-2.19 Then the formation month is 
categorised as optimistic (pessimistic) if its 3-months rolling average 
sentiment score ending in month t belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the 3-
months rolling average sentiment time series values, with the rest being mild 
states. To make sure that our results are not sensitive to the definition of 
sentiment states, robustness tests are carried out by using different cutoffs 
(e.g. 40%)20. To determine whether each holding month of a momentum 
strategy for each country is optimistic or pessimistic, 21  it is required to 
identify whether its corresponding formation months are optimistic or 
pessimistic. Since each holding month is associated with six different 
formation months as six overlapping formation portfolios are formed in the 
momentum strategy, it is necessary to identify whether the formation months 
as a whole are optimistic or pessimistic. If all of the formation months are 
classified as optimistic (pessimistic), the corresponding holding month is 
denoted as optimistic (pessimistic) and the rest of the months are denoted 
as mild. For example, the sentiment state for the holding month of January 
depends on the sentiment states of its six corresponding formation months 
in November, October, September, August, July and June.22 If all the six 
formation months are optimistic (pessimistic), January is classified as 
optimistic (pessimistic) otherwise it is mild. Furthermore, an alternative 
                                               
18 The formation month is the month at which the formation portfolios are constructed based 
on its past six-month stock returns. 
19 The sentiment data is announced with n-month lags (n=1 or 2) across countries so the data 
of sentiment in t, t-1 and t-2 relates to the data in month t-n, t-n-1 and t-n-2. 
20 Our results remain similar by using different cut-offs (e.g. 40%). Results are shown in the 
appendix. 
21 The holding month is the month at which portfolios are being held. 
22 Since one month is allowed between the holding period and the formation period in the 
momentum strategy, December is treated as the skipping month. 
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definition of investor sentiment states is used to examine the sensitivity of 
the results (Stambaugh et al., 2012). A high-sentiment month (optimistic) is 
one in which the 3-month rolling average score of the consumer confidence 
index in the previous month is in the top 30% of the 3-month rolling average 
time series values and a low-sentiment month (pessimistic) is one in the 
bottom 30% of the 3-month rolling average time series values, with the rest 
being mild states. Using this alternative definition of sentiment states yields 
similar results.23 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Individualism, Sentiment and Momentum Profits 
 Portfolio Analysis 
We begin by analysing momentum profits and how these differ between 
optimistic and pessimistic states across 40 countries, with Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
presenting results for winner, loser and momentum (winner minus loser) 
portfolios unconditional and conditional on sentiment, respectively. Panel A 
of Table 3.3 shows results by country and Panel B presents results for the 
country-average and the composite portfolios. Despite the sample extending 
to more recent years, momentum returns are in line with prior research. The 
third column of Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that 29 out of the 40 countries 
exhibit positive momentum returns, with 18 out of the 29 countries exhibiting 
significant momentum returns: Hungary has the largest (1.823% per month), 
followed by Denmark (1.481% per month), Sweden (1.465% per month) and 
the Netherlands (1.429% per month). In all countries, the momentum returns 
appear to be driven by the winner stocks, with all countries showing positive 
returns to this group and 35 out of the 40 being significant at the 10% or 
higher. However, the returns to loser portfolios are insignificantly different 
from zero in 25 cases, with the returns in 15 out of the 40 countries being 
significantly positive. Furthermore, of the five western countries included in 
the later analysis, all show positive momentum returns with four being 
significantly different from zero.24 In contrast, only one (China) of the five  
 
                                               
23 Results are shown in the appendix. 
24 The exception is Canada. While this is in contrast to the findings of Chui et al. (2010), the 
sample periods are markedly different: Chui et al. use data for 1981-2003, whereas our 
sample only starts in month ten of 2002. 
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Table 3.3 International Momentum Profits 
This table reports the average monthly returns (%) of momentum portfolios for each 
of the 40 countries. Each country has a different sample period. Panel A shows 
momentum profits for each country, along with its standard deviation. For each 
country, stocks are ranked into deciles based on their past 6-month cumulative 
returns and the winner and lose portfolios are held for 6 months. In order to increase 
the power of the test, overlapping portfolios are formed. The winner (loser) portfolios 
consist of 6 overlapping winner (loser) portfolios formed in the previous 6 months. 
The returns on each of the 6 overlapping winner (loser) portfolios are the simple 
average of returns on stocks in the winner (loser) portfolio and the return on the 
winner or loser portfolio is the equally weighted average return of the 6 portfolios in 
that month. Momentum returns are the returns of the winner portfolio minus the 
returns of the loser portfolio. To mitigate microstructure issues, one month is allowed 
between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period and 
several stock selection criteria are applied, as discussed in detail in Table 3.1. Panel 
B reports momentum profits for the country-average and composite portfolios, along 
with their standard deviation. The country-average portfolio consists of equally 
weighted portfolio deciles of all countries. For example, the country-average winner 
portfolio is the equally weighted winner portfolios of all countries. The composite 
portfolios are formed by putting equal weight on the portfolios of the countries in each 
month. At least two countries are required in the composite portfolio at any point in 
time. For brevity, we only list results of winner, loser and momentum portfolios. 
Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to different 
significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits by country 
Country Winner (W) Loser (L) W Minus L Standard 
Deviation 
Americas     
Argentina 1.230(2.15)** 2.104(2.58)** -0.874(-1.59) 7.28% 
Brazil 1.094(1.83)* 1.294(1.48) -0.200(-0.29) 6.56% 
Canada 1.904(2.98)*** 1.532(1.95)* 0.372(0.66) 6.54% 
Chile 0.701(1.78)* 0.258(0.41) 0.443(0.80) 5.38% 
Colombia 1.684(3.27)*** 1.302(1.91)* 0.382(0.54) 7.46% 
Mexico 1.950(6.54)*** 1.262(2.97)*** 0.688(1.84)* 6.21% 
U.S. 1.530(4.16)*** 0.957(1.77)* 0.573(1.69)* 6.26% 
Europe     
Austria 0.712(2.17)** 0.024(0.05) 0.688(1.38) 7.21% 
Belgium 1.537(5.48)*** 0.805(2.02)** 0.732(1.97)** 5.89% 
Bulgaria 0.072(0.11) 1.290(1.50) -1.218(-1.46) 7.44% 
Czech Republic 0.649(1.46) 0.805(1.56) -0.156(-0.29) 6.22% 
Denmark 1.391(4.99)*** -0.090(-0.20) 1.481(4.57)*** 5.14% 
Finland 1.296(2.93)*** 0.071(0.13) 1.225(2.75)*** 6.39% 
France 1.163(4.12)*** 0.529 (1.25) 0.634(2.07)** 5.07% 
Germany 0.757(2.77)*** -0.372(-0.79) 1.129(3.13)*** 5.90% 
Greece 1.022(1.62) 0.722(0.97) 0.300(0.58) 8.58% 
Hungary 1.794(3.12)*** -0.0290(-0.03) 1.823(2.12)** 12.7% 
Ireland 1.162(2.65)*** 0.807(1.06) 0.355(0.50) 11.7% 
Italy 0.905(2.37)** -0.230(-0.43) 1.135(3.20)*** 5.89% 
Lithuania 1.873(2.55)** 1.573(1.68)* 0.301(0.33) 10.7% 
Netherlands 1.086(3.14)*** -0.343(-0.67) 1.429(3.63)*** 6.53% 
Norway 1.791(3.73)*** 0.955(1.58) 0.836(1.96)* 7.06% 
Poland 1.504(2.03)** 2.105(2.44)** -0.601(-0.95) 7.55% 
Portugal 0.781(2.43)** 1.153(2.20)** -0.319(-0.74) 8.27% 
Russia 2.408(3.77)*** 3.118(4.45)*** -0.710(-1.12) 7.61% 
Slovenia 0.668(1.55) 1.121(1.56) -0.453(-0.60) 10.2% 
South Africa 2.424(7.11)*** 1.226(3.54)*** 1.198(3.77)*** 5.28% 
Spain 0.984(3.01)*** 0.536(1.07) 0.448(1.77)* 6.36% 
Sweden 1.544(3.45)*** 0.079(0.27) 1.465(3.05)*** 6.90% 
Switzerland 1.324(4.58)*** 0.140(0.35) 1.184(3.89)*** 5.04% 
Turkey 3.397(3.93)*** 4.511(5.06)*** -1.114(-2.40)** 7.72% 
United Kingdom 1.272(4.21)*** 0.059(0.16) 1.213(4.19)*** 4.81% 
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Asia Pacific     
Australia 1.430(3.42)*** 1.173 (2.34)** 0.257(0.909) 4.69% 
China 2.125(2.53)** 1.204(1.28) 0.92(1.65)* 7.92% 
Hong Kong 1.051(1.65)* 0.851(1.01) 0.200(0.47) 5.44% 
Indonesia 1.769(3.21)*** 2.423(3.65)*** -0.656(-1.22) 8.62% 
Japan 0.223(0.55)* 0.424(0.83) -0.201(-0.64) 5.21% 
Korea 0.631(0.85) 0.053(0.06) 0.578(1.18) 6.41% 
New Zealand 1.834(5.13)*** 0.456(1.02) 1.378(3.22)*** 7.11% 
Thailand 1.597(2.65)*** 1.263(1.81)* 0.334(0.67) 6.34% 
Panel B. Country average and composite portfolios  
Country-
average  
1.371(13.27)*** 0.981(5.86)*** 0.390(3.27)*** 6.22% 
Composite  1.454(6.42)*** 0.895(2.86)*** 0.559(3.05)*** 3.05% 
 
ESEA countries have significant momentum returns.25 Panel B of Table 3.3 
reports momentum profits from implementing the momentum strategy 
around the world. The results in Panel B indicate momentum returns to the 
country-average portfolio are 0.390% per month, while those to the 
composite portfolio are 0.559% per month, with both being significant at the 
1% level.26  In sum, the results for the whole sample period demonstrate 
that momentum profits vary substantially across countries. 
 
We now consider the results in relation to momentum profits under different 
sentiment states. 27  Panel A of table 3.4 shows that there are marked 
differences in momentum returns between optimistic and pessimistic states. 
During optimistic periods, all but four countries (Argentina, Czech Republic, 
Portugal and Slovenia) exhibit positive momentum returns. Momentum 
profits in 20 out of the 36 countries are positive and statistically significant at 
the 10% level or higher. The largest momentum profits under such a state 
are in Germany (3.19% per month), Lithuania (2.94% per month), Colombia 
(2.29% per month) and Switzerland (2.17% per month). All of these are high 
for monthly returns compared to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who find 
about 1.5% per month when no split is based on sentiment.28 In contrast, 
during pessimistic periods, only two of the 40 countries exhibit significantly 
positive momentum returns (Hungary and Switzerland) and the returns in 25 
out of the 40 countries are negative, with 5 out of the 25 being significantly 
                                               
25 Again this is broadly in line with Chui et al. (2010). In their study four of these five had 
insignificant profits, the exception being Hong Kong. However, again there is limited overlap 
in sample periods. 
26 The results of momentum profits around the world are consistent with Chui et al. (2010). 
The significant momentum returns of the country-average portfolio is primarily driven by the 
significant returns of European countries and the U.S due to longer sample periods.  
27 We use the 30/40/30 split described in section 3.3. The 40/20/40 cut-off is also used in the 
robustness tests.  
28  The higher momentum monthly returns under optimism are primarily due to the 
performance of the loser portfolio. 
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negative. The lowest momentum returns are in Argentina (-4.301% per 
month), Bulgaria (-3.874% per month), Norway (-3.106% per month) and 
Australia (-2.506% per month). The negative or insignificant momentum 
profits under pessimism are primarily due to the returns to loser stocks not 
being of the sign consistent with momentum, with the returns being positive 
in 39 cases (the exception being Slovenia) and significant in 21 out of the 39 
countries. The differences in momentum returns between optimistic and 
pessimistic states are positive in 33 out of 40 cases and the difference is 
statistically significant in 13 cases, with 12 differences being positive and 
significant. Furthermore, it is worth noting the difference in results for the five 
western and five ESEA countries used in the later analysis. For western 
markets, the difference in momentum returns between optimistic and 
pessimistic states is positive and significant in four out of five countries, 
whereas for ESEA markets, such a difference is only significant in one out of 
five countries. Examination of Panel B shows that momentum returns are 
positive and significant at the 1% level for both the country-average and 
composite portfolios during optimistic states. In contrast, the returns are 
either insignificantly different from zero (composite) or negative and 
significant at the 10% level (country-average) under the pessimistic states. 
The difference in momentum profits between optimistic and pessimistic 
states is significant for both the country-average and composite portfolios. 
Taken together, the results in Table 3.4 clearly demonstrate differences in 
momentum profits between different sentiment states across countries. We 
now turn to consider the interaction between culture and sentiment and 
examine our first hypothesis. Table 3.5 presents results where we consider 
the roles of culture (as measured by the individualism index) and investor 
sentiment. Double sorts are undertaken on the basis of individualism and 
sentiment. Each country in the sample is categorised into one of three culture 
measure groups based on their score on the individualism index (IDV). 
Specifically, using the relevant index, we categorise countries into the top 
and bottom 30%, with the middle 40% being excluded from the analysis.29 
Results are reported for the composite portfolio based on these splits.30 The 
table is divided into three panels and in each panel returns are shown for 
winner, loser and the momentum portfolios. Before going on to consider 
                                               
29 For brevity, we don't report results under mild state. 
30 Results for country-average portfolios are qualitatively similar and are reported in table A3.2 
in the appendix. 
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Table 3.4 Investor Sentiment and Momentum Profits 
This table reports the average monthly returns (%) of winner, loser and momentum portfolios during two sentiment states (optimistic and 
pessimistic) for each of the 40 countries (Panel A) and the country-average and composite portfolios (Panel B). The stocks ranked in the top decile 
based on the past six month cumulative returns are winner “W” stocks and those in the bottom decile are loser “L” stocks. Each month is identified 
as optimistic, mild or pessimistic. To identify a particular formation period as optimistic or pessimistic; the corresponding sentiment score is 
calculated by using the weighted average scheme as follows. The weights 3, 2 and 1 are given to the month t, t-1 and t-2. If the weighted average 
score of the formation month belongs to the top 30% of the time series of rolling average sentiment scores, it is defined as optimistic, whereas if 
the weighted average score of the formation month belongs to the bottom 30% of the time series observations, it is defined as pessimistic, with 
the rest being mild states. To determine whether each holding month of the momentum strategy for each country is optimistic or pessimistic, it is 
required to identify whether its corresponding formation months are optimistic or pessimistic. Since each holding month is associated with six 
different formation months as six overlapping formation portfolios are formed in the momentum strategy, it is necessary to identify whether the 
formation months as a whole are optimistic or pessimistic. If all of the formation months are classified as optimistic (pessimistic), the corresponding 
holding month is denoted as optimistic (pessimistic) and the rest of the months are denoted as mild. Panel B reports momentum profits during the 
two sentiment periods for the country-average and composite portfolios. The formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is described 
in table 3.3. For brevity, we don’t list results under mild states. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to different 
significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A country momentum profits and sentiment states 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
  W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
Americas          
Argentina 0.938 2.332 -1.394 5.233 9.534 -4.301 -4.295 -7.202 2.907 
  (0.93) (1.51) (-1.27) (2.78)*** (2.78)*** (-1.83)* (-2.01)** (-1.91)* (1.12) 
Brazil 0.968 -0.871 1.839 3.948 6.414 -2.466 -2.980 -7.285 4.305 
  (1.77)* (-1.17) (1.97)* (2.53)** (3.92)*** (-1.41) (-1.80)* (-4.05)*** (2.18)** 
Canada 1.514 0.330 1.184 1.443 3.208 -1.765 0.071 -2.878 2.949 
  (0.81) (0.17) (0.78) (1.81)* (1.50) (-1.09) (0.04) (-0.98) (1.33) 
Chile -0.835 -0.944 0.109 1.973 3.207 -1.234 -2.808 -4.151 1.343 
  (-1.49) (-0.76) (0.12) (3.17)*** (1.51) (-0.62) (-3.35)*** (-1.69)* (0.62) 
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Colombia 1.733 -0.558 2.291 3.401 2.381 1.020 -1.672 -2.939 1.271 
  (2.27)** (-0.41) (2.05)** (3.53)*** (1.88)* (0.74) (-1.36) (-1.57) (0.72) 
Mexico 3.803 2.411 1.392 1.726 2.791 -1.065 2.077 -0.380 2.457 
  (4.22)*** (2.38)** (1.26) (3.41)*** (2.03)** (-0.80) (2.01)** (-0.22) (1.42) 
U.S. 1.525 -0.233 1.758 0.328 2.179 -1.851 1.197 -2.412 3.609 
  (1.86)* (-0.19) (1.83)* (0.25) (1.08) (-1.34) (0.78) (-1.02) (2.14)** 
Europe          
Austria -0.831 -1.462 0.631 1.474 0.494 0.980 -2.305 -1.956 -0.349 
  (-1.13) (-1.62) (0.83) (1.89)* (0.44) (0.93) (-2.15)** (-1.35) (-0.27) 
Belgium 0.303 -0.353 0.656 1.881 1.610 0.271 -1.578 -1.963 0.385 
  (0.38) (-0.37) (0.73) (3.54)*** (1.94)* (0.35) (-1.66)* (1.56) (0.33) 
Bulgaria 0.851 0.595 0.256 -0.718 3.156 -3.874 1.569 -2.561 4.130 
  (0.47) (0.36) (0.19) (-1.21) (1.85)* (-2.13)** (0.83) (-1.08) (1.82)* 
Czech Republic 0.113 0.675 -0.562 -0.390 0.154 -0.544 0.503 0.521 0.018 
  (0.15) (0.81) (-0.61) (-0.52) (0.12) (-0.41) (0.47) (0.34) (0.01) 
Denmark 1.895 0.166 1.729 2.514 4.051 -1.537 -0.619 -3.885 3.266 
  (3.13)*** (0.26) (3.81)*** (2.67)*** (2.38)** (-1.16) (-0.56) (-2.14)** (2.34)** 
Finland -1.976 -3.008 1.032 2.990 1.398 1.592 -4.966 -4.406 -0.561 
  (-1.59) (-2.62)*** (1.14) (3.31)*** (0.95) (1.38) (-3.26)*** (-2.37)** (-0.38) 
France 0.712 -1.357 2.069 1.906 2.340 -0.433 -1.194 -3.697 2.503 
  (0.78) (-1.26) (2.67)*** (3.58)*** (2.94)*** (-0.73) (-1.13) (-2.80)*** (2.56)** 
Germany -2.014 -5.207 3.193 2.673 1.854 0.819 -4.687 -7.061 2.374 
  (-2.67)*** (-3.03)*** (2.27)** (5.75)*** (2.95)*** (1.62) (-5.52)*** (-3.86)*** (1.96)** 
Greece -3.544 -4.320 0.776 -1.170 1.015 -2.185 -2.374 -5.335 2.961 
  (-1.03) (-1.18) (0.36) (-1.56) (0.71) (-1.99)** (-0.67) (-1.36) (1.22) 
Hungary 1.509 0.089 1.420 3.504 0.189 3.315 -1.989 -0.100 -1.889 
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  (1.01) (0.04) (0.72) (2.86)*** (0.12) (2.73)*** (-1.03) (-0.04) (-0.82) 
Ireland 1.225 0.541 0.684 1.262 3.143 -1.881 -0.037 -2.597 2.564 
  (1.47) (0.47) (0.61) (1.12) (1.08) (-0.61) (-0.03) (-0.83) (0.78) 
Italy -0.772 -2.648 1.876 0.421 -0.117 0.538 -1.193 -2.531 1.342 
  (-1.10) (-2.19)** (2.15)** (0.62) (-0.10) (0.64) (1.22) (-1.47) (1.11) 
Lithuania 2.162 -0.782 2.944 2.220 2.680 -0.460 -0.058 -3.462 3.404 
  (1.71)* (-0.67) (2.82)*** (1.50) (1.34) (-0.26) (-0.03) (-1.49) (1.69)* 
Netherland 0.879 -0.483 1.362 2.070 2.049 0.021 -1.191 -2.532 1.341 
  -1.06 (-0.55) (1.70)* (3.82)*** (2.11)** (0.03) (-1.20) (-1.93)* (1.19) 
Norway 3.019 0.903 2.116 3.234 6.340 -3.106 -0.215 -5.437 5.222 
  (2.31)** (0.84) (2.46)** (3.59)*** (3.36)*** (-1.99)** (-0.14) (-2.50)** (2.93)*** 
Poland -1.069 -2.335 1.266 4.653 5.146 -0.493 -5.722 -7.481 1.759 
  (-0.54) (-1.89)* (1.73)* (2.67)*** (2.35)** (-0.28) (-2.17)** (-2.71)*** (0.84) 
Portugal 0.107 0.969 -0.862 1.295 1.515 -0.220 -1.188 -0.546 -0.642 
  (0.14) (-0.69) (-0.83) (1.96)* (1.28) (-0.19) (-1.18) (-0.30) (-0.41) 
Russia -0.365 -1.498 1.133 5.109 5.423 -0.314 -5.474 -6.921 1.447 
  (-0.30) (-1.34) (2.04)** (2.49)** (3.50)*** (-0.20) (-2.30)** (-3.62)*** (0.85) 
Slovenia 2.477 5.903 -3.426 0.581 -1.149 1.730 1.896 7.052 -5.156 
  (2.41)** (4.34)*** (-2.57)** (0.38) (-0.43) (0.69) (1.02) (2.33)** (-1.82)* 
South Africa 3.342 1.334 2.008 3.616 3.426 0.190 -0.274 -2.092 1.818 
  (6.12)*** (2.18)** (3.76)*** (2.80)*** (3.07)*** (0.16) (-0.20) (-1.69)* (1.38) 
Spain 0.941 0.774 0.167 0.934 1.264 -0.330 0.007 -0.490 0.497 
  (1.30) (0.71) (0.23) (1.41) (1.12) (-0.34) (0.01) (-0.31) (0.41) 
Sweden -1.566 -3.692 2.126 3.312 3.487 -0.175 -4.878 -7.179 2.301 
  (-1.51) (-2.68)*** (1.97)** (3.08)*** (2.57)*** (-0.21) (-3.27)*** (-3.71)*** (1.56) 
Switzerland 0.798 -1.374 2.172 2.143 0.721 1.422 -1.345 -2.095 0.750 
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  (1.06) (-1.67)* (3.06)*** (4.02)*** (1.15) (3.11)*** (-1.49) (-2.02)** (0.89) 
Turkey 1.854 1.793 0.061 6.047 7.859 -1.812 -4.193 -6.066 1.873 
  (1.15) (1.07) (0.12) (2.79)*** (2.93)*** (-1.20) (-1.56) (-1.92)* (1.18) 
United Kingdom 0.201 -1.748 1.949 1.868 2.503 -0.635 -1.667 -4.251 2.584 
  (0.16) (-1.69)* (2.26)** (3.55)*** (1.99)** (-0.68) (1.25) (2.48)** (2.04)** 
Asia Pacific          
Australia 1.007 -0.035 1.042 4.366 6.872 -2.506 -3.359 -6.907 3.548 
  (1.00) (-0.04) (2.11)** (4.30)*** (4.39)*** (-2.11)** (-2.35)** (-3.81)*** (2.75)** 
China 3.977 2.708 1.269 1.454 2.005 -0.551 2.523 0.703 1.820 
  (2.26)** (1.12) (0.84) (1.01) (1.09) (-0.49) (1.14) (0.24) (0.96) 
Hong Kong 2.524 2.420 0.104 1.535 0.874 0.661 0.989 1.556 -0.557 
  (1.83)* (1.72)* (0.18) (1.13) (0.48) (0.74) (0.51) (0.68) (-0.52) 
Indonesia 1.792 0.762 1.030 0.195 1.499 -1.304 1.597 -0.737 2.334 
  (2.49)** (0.74) (2.36)** (0.14) (0.95) (-1.07) (0.85) (-0.39) (1.99)** 
Japan -0.249 -0.984 0.735 0.766 1.288 -0.522 -1.015 -2.272 1.287 
  (-0.26) (-0.78) (1.69)* (0.99) (1.26) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-1.60) (1.69)* 
Korea -1.195 -1.660 0.465 4.097 3.891 0.206 -5.292 -5.551 0.259 
  (-0.61) (-1.05) (0.31) (2.76)*** (1.89)** (0.17) (-2.16)** (-2.14)** (0.13) 
New Zealand 0.514 -0.680 1.194 4.347 2.180 2.167 -3.833 2.860 -0.973 
  (0.85) (-0.77) (1.72)* (3.62)*** (1.79)* (1.47) (-2.85)*** (-1.90)* (-0.59) 
Thailand 1.855 1.373 0.482 4.474 4.032 0.442 -2.619 -2.659 0.040 
  (1.73)* (1.00) (0.53) (4.65)*** (3.75)*** (0.52) (-1.82)* (-1.52) (0.03) 
Panel B: Country-average and Composite portfolios 
  Optimistic Pessimistic Opt. - Pess. 
  W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
Country-average 1.044 -0.010 1.054 2.333 2.775 -0.442 -1.289 -2.785 1.496 
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  (2.67)*** (-0.02) (5.51)*** (8.72)*** (7.71)*** (-1.85)* (-2.72)*** (-5.03)*** (4.89)*** 
Composite 0.809 -0.144 0.953 2.116 1.840 0.276 -1.307 -1.984 0.677 
  (2.50)** (-0.35) (3.72)*** (6.69)*** (4.31)*** (0.98) (-2.89)*** (-3.37)*** (1.78)* 
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the role of sentiment, Panel A of Table 3.5 provides results split by 
individualism, but not by sentiment. There is a marked difference in 
momentum returns between high and low individualism cultures: while 
returns to winner portfolio are positive and significant in both groups, with no 
significant difference between the two, the returns to loser portfolio are 
insignificantly different from zero for high individualism culture countries, but 
highly positive and significant for the low individualism culture group. The net 
result is that momentum returns are positive and significant at the 1% level 
in the high group, but are insignificant in the low group, with the difference 
between high and low being positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The key question is whether these findings apply under all sentiment 
states or are driven by differences across states. 
 
The results in Panels B and C allow examination of this issue and to test 
hypothesis H1. Returns during optimistic and pessimistic periods are shown 
for the high individualism culture group in Panel B and those during optimistic 
and pessimistic periods are shown for low individualism culture countries in 
Panel C. For the high group, momentum profits are positive and significant 
under optimism, but not under pessimism, suggesting that the returns in 
Panel A are primarily the result of the optimistic sentiment for this group. The 
difference in momentum returns between optimism and pessimism is positive 
and significant for the high group. In contrast, momentum returns in the low 
group as shown in Panel C are insignificantly different from zero under both 
sentiment states, with the difference between states also being statistically 
insignificant. The results in Panels B and C also allow an examination of the 
differences in momentum profits between the two culture groups across 
optimistic and pessimistic sentiment periods. The findings provide clear 
evidence in favour of our first hypothesis (H1): the effect of investor sentiment 
on momentum profits is more pronounced in individualistic cultures than in 
collectivist cultures. To illustrate, momentum profits during both sentiment 
periods in high individualistic cultures are significantly higher than those in 
low individualistic cultures.31 The higher momentum profits during optimistic 
(pessimistic) periods in high individualistic cultures is primarily driven by the 
loser (winner) stocks, suggesting investors in high individualistic cultures 
experience stronger cognitive dissonance than in low individualistic cultures, 
                                               
31 The difference in momentum profits across difference sentiment periods between the two 
culture groups are also tested. 
76 
 
Table 3.5 Investor sentiment, Individualism and Momentum 
This table presents the average monthly returns (%) of the momentum strategy for 
the composite portfolios sorted by investor sentiment and Individualism index. Panel 
A reports momentum profits sorted by individualism. Panels B and C present 
momentum profits for high and low individualism levels after controlling for the effect 
of sentiment. At the end of each month, momentum portfolios for each country are 
constructed and all countries in the sample are sorted into three groups by using top 
(bottom) 30% cutoffs based on their individualism index. Each month is identified as 
optimism, mild or pessimism. The definition of sentiment states of holding period is 
discussed in detail in Table 3.4. Both the country-average and composite portfolios 
are formed in each individualism - and investor sentiment-sorted category. The 
formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is described in table 3.3. 
For brevity, we only report results of the composite portfolio.32 The corresponding t-
statistics are shown in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: 
*** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Composite portfolios   
Momentum portfolios 
 
   Winner    Loser  W-L 
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism     




    (5.69) ***  (1.09) (4.83)*** 
Low IDV    1.933  1.862 0.071 
    (6.16)***  (5.12)*** (0.30) 
High. - Low.   -0.482  -1.483 1.001 
    (-1.24)  (-2.98)*** (3.13)*** 
Sentiment level 
 




Optimistic    0.659  -0.899 1.558 
    (1.45)  (-1.69)* (3.85)*** 
Pessimistic   1.819  1.282 0.537 
    (4.22)***  (1.77)* (1.67)* 
Opt. - Pes.    -1.160  -2.181 1.021 
    (-1.85)*  (-2.46)** (1.97)** 




Optimistic    0.650  0.377 0.273 
    (1.53)  (0.80) (0.12) 
Pessimistic   1.097  1.660 -0.563 
    (2.12)**  (1.99)** (-1.03) 
Opt.-Pes.    -0.447  -1.283 0.836 
        (-0.67)   (-1.29) (1.36) 
 
resulting in a slower diffusion of good (bad) news during pessimistic 
(optimistic) periods in high individualistic cultures.   
 Regression Analysis 
We next investigate the impact of sentiment, culture and their interaction on 
                                               
32 Results of the country-average portfolio are reported in the appendix.  
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momentum profits in a multivariate regression setting by taking account of 
other potential determinants of momentum that vary across countries. In 
particular, momentum profits are regressed on the sentiment index, 
individualism, the interaction variable between investor sentiment and 
individualism, and other control variables as in the following model: 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑗 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑉 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  (3.1) 
Where Momj,t  is the return on the momentum portfolio in country j in month 
t. IDVj is a categorical variable that equals  1 (-1) if the value of IDV belongs 
to the top (bottom) 30% of values of IDV of 40 countries, otherwise 0. Sent 
is a categorical variable which equals 1 (-1) if monthly sentiment of each 
country belongs to the optimistic (pessimistic) group with the rest being 0. 
IDV*Sent is the individualism and sentiment interaction variable. Standard 
errors are clustered by country and time. We follow Chui et al. (2010) to 
include other cross-country variables that may explain cross-country 
variations in momentum profits. The potential variables classified as firm 
characteristics, financial market development, and institutional quality and 
macroeconomic variables are set out below. 
 
A number of studies examine firm characteristics as proxies for the effect of 
the speed of information flow and information uncertainty and its effect on 
momentum profits. In prior research, for example, Zhang (2006) shows that 
firm characteristic variables are able to explain the variation in momentum 
profits and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that trading volume is 
important in explaining momentum profits. These firm characteristic variables 
are examined at the stock level (see e.g. Zhang, 2006 for U.S) and the 
country level (see e.g. Chui et al., 2010). The variables include the natural 
logarithm of market trading volume (LnTN), the natural logarithm of stock 
market volatility (LnV), the natural logarithm of analyst coverage (LnCov), the 
natural logarithm of the dispersion of analyst forecasts (LnDisp), the cash 
flows growth rate volatility (VolFCF), the logarithm of median firm size 
(LnSize) and the average price to book ratio (PB).33  
 
Chui et al. (2010) suggest that more developed stock markets and better 
institutional quality facilitate the efficiency of information flow and reduce 
                                               
33 The detailed construction for each control variable is explained in the appendix. In addition 
to the variables included by Chui et al. (2010) and Griffin et al. (2003) we also include the price 
to book ratio in the regression since Zhang (2006) shows this firm characteristic is important 
in capturing the variation in momentum profits 
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trading costs. These variables may potentially affect momentum profits. 
Therefore, we include proxies to capture these effects to examine whether 
the relation of sentiment, culture and momentum profits can be subsumed by 
the efficiency of the stock market. The financial market development 
variables used are total private credit expressed as a ratio of credit to GDP 
(CREDIT) as a measure of the financial market development; the average 
common language dummy variable (LANG) and an index on control of capital 
flows (CONTRL) suggested by Chan et al. (2005), the ratio between the 
monthly market value of the S&P-IFC market index and the monthly market 
value of the S&P-IFC investable index (OPEN) as a measure of stock market 
openness. The institutional quality variables include the insider index 
(INSIDER) (a high value suggests that insider trading is less prominent), the 
ICRG corruption index (CORRP) (a higher value indicates a lower level of 
corruption), the ICRG political risk index (POLITICAL), the natural logarithm 
of transaction costs index (LnTRAN), and the investor protection index 
(PROTECTION). Griffin et al. (2003) show that macroeconomic state 
variables such as GDP growth rate and inflation rate are able to explain the 
variation in momentum profits. Following Griffin et al. (2003), the GDP growth 
rate (GDP) and inflation rate (Inflation) are included in the regression to 
examine whether the effect of sentiment and individualism on momentum 
profits across countries can be subsumed by macroeconomic variables. 
 
Table 3.6 presents the results of equation (3.1). In model 1, the constant term 
is 0.0048, suggesting that the momentum strategy earns around 0.48% 
return per month when both of sent and IDV are equal to zero i.e. both sent 
and IDV are at a moderate level. The estimated coefficients on investor 
sentiment (sent) and individualism (IDV) are 0.005 and 0.0062 respectively, 
with both being significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the momentum 
effect is more pronounced during optimistic periods and in high individualistic 
culture countries. Specifically, momentum profits increase or decrease by 0.5% 
when individualism is high or low compared to moderate levels of 
individualism. Similarly, the momentum strategy earns more or less 0.62% 
returns per month when sentiment is optimistic or pessimistic compared to 
the mild sentiment state. In model 2, model 1 is extended by including the 
interaction term between sentiment and individualism and the results show 
that the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.0024, significant at the 10% 
level, suggesting that the effect of investor sentiment on momentum profits  
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 Table 3.6 Determinants of Momentum Profits across Countries 
Monthly momentum returns are regressed on the categorical individualism index (IDV), 
categorical sentiment (sent) variables and an interaction term between individualism and 
sentiment. Categorical variable of IDV index equals 1 (-1) if IDV score belongs to the top 
(bottom) 30% of their scores, otherwise 0. Sentiment is a categorical variable which equals 1 
(-1) if monthly sentiment of each country belongs to the optimistic (pessimistic) group with the 
rest being 0. IDV*SENT is the individualism and sentiment interaction variable. Model (3) 
reports the results with control variables, including firm characteristics, financial market 
development, and institutional quality variables. The firm characteristics variables include the 
natural logarithm of market trading volume (LnTV), the natural logarithm of stock market 
volatility (LnV), the natural logarithm of analyst coverage, the natural logarithm of the dispersion 
of analyst forecasts (LnDISP), the cash flows growth rate volatility (VolFCF), the logarithm of 
median firm size (LnSIZE) and the average price to book ratio (PB). The financial market 
development variables include the total private credit expressed as ratio of GDP (CREDIT), the 
average common language dummy variable (LANG), the ratio between the monthly market 
value of the S&P-IFC market index and the monthly market value of the S&P-IFC investable 
index (OPEN), and an index on control of capital flows (CONTRL). The institutional quality 
variables include the insider index (INSIDER, a high value suggests that insider trading is less 
prominent), the ICRG corruption index the ICRG (CORRP), political risk index (POLITICAL), 
the natural logarithm of transaction cost index (LnTRAN), and the investor protection index 
(PROTECTION). The macroeconomic variables include the GDP growth rate (GDP) and 
inflation rate (Inflation) Standard errors are clustered by country and time. The corresponding 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), 
** (5%), * (10%). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.0048(4.96)*** 0.0048(4.95)*** 0.0021(3.71)*** 0.0031(4.01)*** 
IDV 0.0050(3.88)*** 0.0050(3.82)*** 0.0043(3.62)*** 0.0044(3.77)*** 
SENT 0.0062(3.71)*** 0.0059(3.32)*** 0.0039(2.91)*** 0.0041(2.99)*** 
IDV*SENT  0.0024(1.81)* 0.0026(2.01)** 0.0025(2.00)*** 
Control variables 
LnTV   -0.0134(-1.98)** -0.0151(-2.01)** 
LnV   -0.0172(-3.91)*** -0.0191(-3.88)*** 
LnCov   0.0126(1.21)  
LnDISP   0.002(1.31)  
VolFCF   -0.0002(-0.61)  
LnSize   -0.0018(-2.81)*** -0.0015(2.93)*** 
PB   -0.0261(-1.03)  
CREDIT   -0.0563(-0.87)  
LANG   0.0182(2.03)** 0.0213(2.33)** 
OPEN   -0.0745(-0.93)  
CONTRL   -0.0085(-0.41)  
INSIDER   0.0534(0.61)  
CORRP   0.0001(0.43)  
LnTRAN   0.0806(2.33)** 0.0903(2.41)** 
POLITICAL   0.0010(0.21)  
PROTECTION   -0.0462(-0.58)  
GDP   -0.0001(-0.21)  
Inflation   0.0007(0.19)  
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
N 8231 8231 8231 8231 
R squared (%) 1.46 1.61 9.21 5.93 
 
is indeed stronger in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures. In 
other words, momentum profits are even higher with higher levels of both 
individualism and sentiment. The finding is consistent with our first 
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hypothesis. The coefficient of the interaction term is interpreted as the 
momentum strategy being more profitable in high individualism cultures 
when sentiment is optimistic. In model 3, we further consider whether the 
explanatory power of independent variables can be subsumed by the control 
variables. The results indicate that even after controlling for other explanatory 
variables, individualism, sentiment and the interaction term are significant at 
the 5% level or higher. We notice that momentum profits decrease in market 
trading volume, firm size (LnSize) (1% significance level), stock market 
volatility (LnV) (1% significance level) and increase in common language 
(LANG) (5% significance level), and transaction cost (LnTRAN). Consistent 
with Zhang (2006) and Chui et al. (2010), momentum profits decrease in firm 
size (LnSize), suggesting that the momentum effect is more prominent in 
small firms. In contrast to Lee and Swaminathan (2000), the estimated 
coefficient on stock market trading volume (LnV) is negative.34 The language 
variable measures the extent of the familiarity to foreign investors and the 
capital flow restrictions and higher value of LANG indicates that foreign 
investors will be able to invest more. The positive estimated coefficient of 
LANG suggests that the momentum effect is more prominent in less capital 
flow restricted countries. The positive estimated coefficient on transaction 
cost variables indicates that momentum profits will be higher in countries with 
higher costs of trading. It would be interesting to include all significant 
independent variables in model (4) instead of estimating all control variables 
to reduce collinearity. The results are qualitatively similar to those in model 
(3). 
 
Overall, the findings in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show clear support for the first 
hypothesis and provide evidence that sentiment and culture interact to affect 
momentum profits. Given such findings, we now proceed to focus the 
analysis on the five largest western and ESEA markets to test the remaining 
hypotheses and to gain a clearer and better understanding of the role of 
cognitive dissonance in explaining the momentum phenomenon.Cognitive 
Dissonance and Momentum Profits: Western and ESEA Cultures 
We now turn to examine hypotheses 2-5 in relation to differences in 
behaviour between western and ESEA countries and the impact of these 
differences on momentum profits. We first present results relating to the ten 
                                               
34 Lee and Swaminathan (2000) examine the relation between trading volume and momentum 
profits at the stock level. However, we examine such a relation at the country level. 
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markets analysed without any split by sentiment in Table 3.7.35 Returns to 
the winner, loser and momentum portfolios are shown for the ten countries 
separately in Panel A, while Panel B presents results for western and ESEA 
country-average and composite portfolios. It is clear from Panel A that all five 
western countries exhibit positive momentum, with the returns being 
significant at the 5% level or higher in four (the exception being Canada). In 
all cases, the momentum returns appear to be driven by the winner stocks, 
with all five countries showing significantly positive returns to this group. 
However, the returns to loser portfolio are positive in four out of the five 
countries, with the returns being  
Table 3.7 Momentum Profits for Western and ESEA Countries 
This table reports the average monthly returns (%) of winner, loser and momentum 
portfolios for each of the ten countries. Panel A shows the momentum profits for each 
country, along with its standard deviation. For each country, stocks are ranked into 
quintiles based on their past 6-month cumulative returns and held for 6 months and 
the past 6-month cumulative returns of each stock in the winner (loser) portfolios 
must be larger (less) than 0%. Stocks are ranked in quintiles in order to have a 
reasonable number of stocks. Other stock selection criteria and the formation of 
momentum portfolios are discussed in detail in Table 3.3. Panel B reports returns to 
the country-average and composite portfolios for Western and ESEA countries, 
along with their standard deviation. The construction of the country-average and 
composite portfolios is discussed in detail in Table 3.3. For brevity, we only list results 
of winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits by country 
Country Winner (W) Loser (L) W Minus L Standard 
Deviation 
West     
Canada 1.731(3.08)*** 1.303(1.89)* 0.428(0.97) 5.09% 
France 1.195(4.48)*** 0.564(1.25) 0.631(2.71)*** 4.27% 
Germany 0.749(3.09)*** -0.127(-0.35) 0.876(3.13)*** 4.59% 
United 
Kingdom 
1.204(4.29)*** 0.041(0.16) 1.163(4.19)*** 3.63% 
U.S. 1.357(4.40)*** 0.732(1.77)* 0.625(2.52)** 4.56% 
East     
China 1.143(1.72)* 0.973(1.32) 0.170(0.55) 4.21% 
Hong Kong 1.120(1.82)* 0.862(1.10) 0.258(0.47) 4.60% 
Japan 0.627(1.93)* 0.667(1.74)* -0.040(-0.18) 4.26% 
Korea 0.880(1.29) 0.312(0.40) 0.568(1.42) 5.22% 
Thailand 1.548(2.95)*** 1.264(1.81)* 0.284(0.69) 5.28% 
     
Panel B. Country-average and Composite portfolios  
Portfolio Formation Winner(W) Loser(L) W Minus L 
                                               
35 Comparing the results in table 3.7 for the ten countries with those in table 3.4, we see there 
are some minor differences. This is due to the additional filters applied for this section of only 
including in our sample winner stocks that have positive returns and loser stocks which have 
negative returns. In addition, since in the next chapter we examine the interaction between 
momentum and post earnings announcement drift, stocks are ranked in quintiles in order to 
have a reasonable number of stocks that have earnings announcements available. However, 




Panel B.1.Country-average Portfolio 
West  1.247(7.90)*** 0.503(1.96)** 0.744(5.89)*** 
East 1.064(6.95)*** 0.816(5.139)*** 0.248(2.53)** 
West-East 0.183(0.83) -0.313(-1.04) 0.496(3.10)*** 
Panel B.2. Composite Portfolio 
West  1.125(4.17)*** 0.314(0.93) 0.811(2.92)*** 
East 1.001(2.71)*** 0.825(1.72)* 0.176(0.21) 
West-East 0.124(0.34) -0.511(1.67)* 0.635(1.99)** 
 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level in two (Canada and the U.S). 
It is interesting to notice that for Canada, the returns to the winner portfolio 
are the highest but that the reason the momentum returns are insignificant is 
due to the high positive returns to the loser portfolio. In contrast, none of five 
ESEA countries show significant momentum returns. The findings in Panel A 
of significantly positive momentum profits in four out of the five western 
countries but insignificant returns for all five ESEA countries are consistent 
with H2 that momentum profits will be significantly greater in western markets. 
The hypothesis gains further support in Panel B, where momentum profits 
for the country-average and composite portfolios are shown for western and 
ESEA cultures. For the composite portfolio, while there is little and 
insignificant difference in returns to winner portfolio between western and 
ESEA markets, there is a substantial and significant difference in relation to 
loser returns. 36  Furthermore, for both portfolios in Panel B, momentum 
profits are significantly positive for the west and insignificantly different from 
zero for the east, with the difference between the two groups being 
statistically significant, providing clear support for hypothesis H2. 
 
We next consider the impact of sentiment, with Table 3.8 showing returns to 
winner, loser and momentum portfolios for optimistic and pessimistic states, 
together with the differences between the two sentiment states for all three 
portfolios. Again, Panel A of Table 3.8 shows results for individual countries 
and Panel B for the country-average and composite portfolios. As far as the 
western markets are concerned as shown in Panel A, momentum profits are 
positive and sizeable under optimism in all five countries, with all of them 
being significant at the 10% percent level or higher. In contrast to the results 
presented in Table 3.7, returns to winner portfolios under optimism are 
                                               
36 For the country-average portfolio, there is no significant difference in returns to both winner 
and loser portfolios between the two culture groups.  
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insignificantly different from zero in three out of the five cases, with the 
exception (Canada and the U.S) being significant at the 10% level. The 
returns to the loser portfolio are negative in four out of five countries, with two 
out of the four being significant at the 5% level or higher, again in contrast to 
the results for the whole sample period in Table 3.7. For the European 
markets, the returns to the loser portfolio are substantially larger than to the 
winner portfolio, with the opposite being the case for the U.S and Canada. 
Thus, as hypothesised in H3, momentum returns are primarily driven by loser 
stocks in optimistic periods for European countries, although this is not the 
case for the North American Markets.  
 
Examination of columns 4-6 for western markets shows that momentum 
profits are insignificantly different from zero in all five countries under 
pessimism, with the returns being negative in three out of five cases. The 
negative or insignificant momentum returns under pessimism are due to the 
returns to the loser portfolio not being of the sign consistent with momentum. 
The returns to the winner portfolio are positive in four out of the five cases 
under pessimism, with three out of the four being significant at the 5% level 
or higher, whereas the returns to the loser portfolio under pessimism are 
positive in all five cases, with three being significant at the 10% level or higher. 
The final three columns of Table 3.8 show differences in winner, loser and 
momentum returns between optimistic and pessimistic states. In all five 
cases, the differences for momentum returns are statistically significant and 
of the expected sign. The findings are consistent with H3: the momentum 
effect is stronger under optimism than pessimism for western markets.  
 
We now turn to consider the results for ESEA markets in table 3.8. While the 
results for western markets showed a marked and significant difference 
between sentiment states, for the east there is no such clear difference, as 
hypothesised in H4. Table 3.8 shows that momentum returns are 
insignificantly different from zero in both sentiment states for all countries. 
There is also very little evidence of significance of return continuation to the 
winner or loser portfolios, with 2 out of the 10 cases being significant at the 
10% level or higher. Significant return continuations are only found for winner 
stocks for Hong Kong during optimistic states and for those for Thailand 
during pessimistic states. Moreover, in all five countries the difference in 
momentum returns between optimistic and pessimistic periods is 
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insignificantly different from zero, clearly supporting H4.  
 
Panel B of Table 3.8 presents the country-average and composite results by 
culture groups. The results shown in this panel further confirm the findings 
from Panel A and are consistent with the hypotheses 3 and 4. Furthermore, 
the results in Panel B also allow us to directly examine H5 which states that 
momentum returns under optimism will be greater in western markets than 
ESEA markets. The figures in the third column show that both country-
average and composite momentum profits are sizeable and significant in 
western markets during optimistic periods whereas those in ESEA markets 
are insignificantly different from zero. Notably, momentum profits are 
primarily driven by the underperformance of loser stocks. In addition, there 
is no such difference under pessimism between the two cultural groups. Thus, 
the findings are consistent with H5.  
 
Taken together, the results presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 provide strong 
support for hypotheses 2-5. In addition to momentum profits clearly differing 
based on culture and sentiment as shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, the 
examination of the five western and five ESEA markets supports our 
argument that cognitive dissonance plays a large part in explaining the 
difference in momentum profits in different markets. Specifically, by taking 
account of the psychology literature on beliefs relating to continuation and 
reversal and how these differ between western and ESEA cultures, we 
hypothesise how the interaction between sentiment and culture will impact 
on momentum returns in the two culture groups. Our results are consistent 
with these arguments. 
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Table 3.8 Momentum Profits and Sentiment for Western and ESEA Countries 
This table reports the average monthly returns (%) of winner, loser and momentum portfolios across sentiment states (optimistic and pessimistic) for each of the 10 countries 
(Panel A) and the country-average and composite portfolios (Panel B). For each country, stocks are ranked into quintiles based on their past 6-month cumulative returns and 
held for 6 months and the past 6-month cumulative returns of each stock in the winner (loser) portfolios must be larger (less) than 0%. Stocks are ranked in quintiles in order 
to have a reasonable number of stocks. Other stock selection criteria and the formation of momentum portfolios are discussed in detail in Table 3.3. The sentiment formation 
is discussed in detail in Table 3.4. The average monthly returns to the country-average and composite portfolios during two sentiment periods (optimistic and pessimistic) are 
reported in Panel B. The formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is detailed in Table 3.3. The first three columns in Panel A show the returns of winner, 
loser and momentum portfolios under optimism, the second three columns show the returns of the three portfolios under pessimism and last three columns show the 
differences in returns of these portfolios between optimism and pessimism. For brevity, we only list results of winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Corresponding t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits conditional on sentiment by country 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
        West 
Canada 1.698(1.89)* 0.382(0.52) 1.316(2.37)** -0.194(-0.15) 0.536(0.29) -0.730(-0.68) 1.892(1.98)** -0.154(-0.08) 2.046(2.13)** 
France 0.597(1.04) -0.892(-1.40) 1.489(3.55)*** 1.743(3.74)*** 2.461(5.00)*** -0.718(-1.500) -1.146(-2.01)** -3.353(-3.47)*** 2.207(2.96)*** 
Germany -0.326(-0.68) -1.708(-2.08)** 1.382(2.19)** 1.937(4.91)*** 1.677(2.67)*** 0.260(0.54) -2.263(-4.98)*** -3.385(-4.01)*** 1.122(2.01)** 
United 














 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
China 1.622(1.23) 1.906(1.13) -0.284(-0.31) 0.954(1.01) 1.096(1.26) -0.142(-0.26) 0.668(0.78) 0.810(0.53) -0.142(-0.31) 
Hong Kong 2.070(1.73)* 2.035(1.76)* 0.035(0.09) 0.265(0.22) -0.110(-0.07) 0.375(0.63) 1.805(1.71)* 2.145(1.83)* -0.340(-0.51) 
Japan -0.627(-0.95) -0.922(-1.33) 0.295(0.99) 0.463(0.71) 1.120(1.26) -0.657(-1.33) -1.090(-1.31) -2.042(-1.61) 0.952(1.01) 
Korea -0.471(-0.38) -1.523(-1.41) 1.052(1.32) 2.265(1.63) 2.395(1.21) -0.130(-0.14) -2.736(-1.63) -3.918(-1.65) 1.182(1.01) 
Thailand 0.996(1.12) 0.691(0.63) 0.305(0.44) 3.936(5.99)*** 3.631(4.18)*** 0.305(0.48) -2.940(-3.78)*** -2.940(-3.51)*** 0.000(0.00) 
Panel B. Country-average and Composite portfolios 
Panel B.1. Country-average portfolio 
West 0.661(2.00)** -0.850(-2.16)** 1.511(10.73)*** 1.200(3.21)*** 1.595(4.56)*** -0.395(-1.50) -0.539(-0.78) -2.445(-4.12)*** 1.906(9.01)*** 
East 0.718(1.32) 0.437(0.60) 0.281(1.27) 1.577(2.30)** 1.626(2.55)** -0.049(-0.26) -0.859(-0.92) -1.189(-1.03) 0.330(1.07) 
West-East -0.057 -1.287(1.57) 1.230(4.70)*** -0.377(-0.48) -0.031(-0.04) -0.346(-1.01) 0.320(0.27) -1.256(1.97)** 1.576(4.22)** 
Panel B.2. Composite portfolio 
West 0.576(1.34) -1.011(1.98)** 1.587(4.98)*** 1.336(2.91)*** 1.567(2.34)** -0.231(-0.59) -0.760(-1.85)* -2.578(-2.71)*** 1.818(2.69)*** 
East 0.777(1.19) 0.267(0.41) 0.510(1.09) 1.451(2.44)** 1.388(1.78)* 0.063(0.29) -0.674(-1.09) -1.121(-1.52) 0.447(0.78) 
West-East -0.201(-0.24) -1.287(-2.31)** 1.077(2.46)** -0.115(-0.21) 0.179(0.31) -0.294(-0.61) -0.086(-0.21) -1.457(2.37)** 1.371(2.01)** 
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3.5 Robustness tests 
3.5.1 An Alternative Individualism Index  
To examine the robustness of our results for 40 countries, we follow Chui et 
al. (2010) and collect an alternative measure of individualism from the 
GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness) 
project. The GLOBE project is a group of researchers focusing on culture 
and leadership in 62 countries. In the project, there are nine cultural 
dimensions: Performance Orientation, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, 
Humane Orientation, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Power 
Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance. Among these dimensions, Chui et al. 
(2010) suggest that institutional collectivism appears to reflect the same 
construct as Hofstede’s individualism. We collect the country scores on the 
GLOBE’s institutional collectivism (IndvGLOBE) dimension for our sample from 
House et al. (2004). To be consistent with Hofstede’s individualism index, we 
define a new variable IndvGLOBE, which is equal to GLOBE’s institutional 
collectivism times -1. Thus, a higher value of IndvGLOBE suggests a higher 
degree of individualism of the country. The two indices are highly correlated 
so the categorical variable of GLOBE individualism is almost identical to the 
categorical variable of Hofstede’s individualism. We expect the coefficient on 
the GLOBE individualism index is qualitative similar to that of Hofstede’s 
individualism index. The regression model shown in equation (3.1) is re-
estimated, with Hofstede’s individualism index being replaced with GLOBE’s 
institutional collectivism and we find the IndvGLOBE coefficient to be positive 
and significant at the 1% level and the interaction term between individualism 
and sentiment remains significant at the 10% level. Overall, our results are 
robust regardless of whether we use the GLOBE collectivism index or 
Hofstede’s individualism index. 
3.5.2 Is It Risk? 
While the evidence so far suggests that there is a marked difference in 
momentum profits between western and ESEA cultures conditional on 
investor sentiment, we have not addressed whether such findings are due to 
economic risk factors. We now investigate this issue by estimating the Fama 
and French (2015) 5-factor (thereafter, FF-5) risk-adjusted returns during  
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Table 3.9 Determinants of Momentum Profits across Countries and the 
GLOBE Individualism Measure 
Monthly momentum returns are regressed on the GLOBE individualism index, the 
sentiment variables and an interaction term between individualism and sentiment. 
GLOBE individualism index, is equal to GlOBE’s institutional collectivism times -1. 
Categorical variable of IndvGLOBE equals 1 (-1) if IDV score belongs to the top 
(bottom) 30% of their scores, otherwise 0. All other variables are defined in Table 
4.5. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to 
the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 


















IDV*SENT  0.0028 
(1.83)* 
 
Country FE YES YES  
Time FE YES YES  
N 8231 8231  
R squared (%) 1.41 1.65  
 
different sentiment periods. Fama and French (2015) show that the FF-5 
factor model generally performs better than the FF-3 factor model in 
explaining different anomalies. The FF-5 risk factors are able to capture a 
significant part of such anomalies, such as net share issues, accruals, 
volatility and market β. However, the risk factors still fail to explain the 
momentum effect (Fama and French, 2015).   
 
In order to estimate risk-adjusted returns, we follow Cooper et al. (2004) to 
form a time-series of raw returns relating to each holding month and then 
regress time-series returns on the FF-5 factors and a constant. Therefore, 
we obtain the estimated factor loadings for each portfolio and a constant. The 










𝑟𝑎𝑤  are the risk-adjusted- and raw-returns for each 
momentum portfolio in holding month K, in calendar month t, respectively,. 
𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the realization of factor i of FF-5 in calendar month t, and 𝛽𝑖𝑘 is the 
estimated factor loading in month K on 𝑓𝑖𝑡 . We compute the FF-5 factor 
adjustments which are excess return of the value-weighted market index 
as 𝑅𝑚, over the 1-month T-bill return 𝑅𝑓 as the market portfolio, the return 
differential between small and big firms (SMB), the difference between the 
returns on diversified portfolios of stocks with high and low book-to-market 
firms (HML), the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of 
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stocks with robust and weak profitability as operating profitability (OP) and 
the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks of low 
and high investment firms as Investment factors (INV).37 We follow Fama 
and French (2015) to form the risk factor portfolios. The stock market data 
are obtained from Datastream and the accounting data are downloaded from 
Compustat. At the end of each June, stocks are categorised into two size 
groups (Small and Big) based on the median of stocks’ capitalization. To 
calculate the HML factor, stocks are first allocated independently to three B/M 
groups (low, median and high) based on 30/40/30 cutoffs. The intercepts of 
the two sorts (size and B/M) create six value-weighted Size to B/M portfolios. 
The sort is taken in June of year t, B is book equity at the end of the fiscal 
year ending in year t-1 and M is market capitalization at the end of December 
of year t-1.  
 
The Size-OP and Size-Inv portfolios are formed in the same way as the Size-
B/M portfolios. The operating profitability (OP) measured with accounting 
data for the fiscal year ending in year t-1, is revenue minus cost of goods 
sold, minus selling, general, and administrative expenses, minus interest 
expense all divided by book equity. Investment, INV, is the change in total 
assets from the fiscal year ending in year t-2 to the fiscal year ending in t-1, 
divided by t-2 total assets. The value factor HML is calculated as the equally 
weighted average of the two (Small and Big) high B/M portfolio returns minus 
the average of the two low B/M portfolio returns. The profitability and 
investment factors are calculated in the same way as that of HML apart from 
HML being replaced by either operating profitability (RMW) (robust minus 
weak) or investment (CMA) (conservative minus aggressive). The size factor 
SMB is calculated as the equally weighted average of the three small stock 
portfolio returns minus the average of the three big stocks portfolio returns. 
 
Table 3.10 presents the FF-5 (2015) risk-adjusted momentum profits for ten 
markets in the east and west without any split by sentiment. In contrast to the 
results in Table 3.7, the momentum returns appear to be primarily driven by 
the loser stocks in three out of the five countries (France, Germany and the 
UK), with the other countries being primarily driven by the winner stocks 
(Canada and the U.S). Momentum profits for all five western countries  
 
                                               
37 The FF-5 risk factors are explained in detail in Fama and French (2015).  
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Table 3.10 Risk-Adjusted Momentum Profits for the Western and ESEA 
Countries 
This table reports the risk-adjusted returns (%) of momentum portfolios for each 
of the ten countries. For each momentum portfolio, a time-series of raw returns is 
formed and is regressed on excess market return, the SMB, HML, OP and Inv 
factors when risk is adjusted according to the FF (2015) 5-factor model. Panel A 
shows risk-adjusted momentum profits for each country. For each country, stocks 
are ranked into quintiles based on their past 6-month cumulative returns and held 
for 6 months and the past 6-month cumulative returns of each stock in the winner 
(loser) portfolios must be larger (less) than 0%. Stocks are ranked in quintiles in 
order to have a reasonable number of stocks. Other stock selection criteria and 
the formation of momentum portfolios are discussed in detail in Table 3.3. The 
sentiment formation is discussed in detail in Table 3.4. Panel B reports results of 
the country-average and composite portfolios for Western and ESEA countries. 
The formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is detailed in Table 
3.3. For brevity, we only list results of winner, loser and momentum portfolios. 
Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the 
level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits by country 
Country Winner (W) Loser (L) W Minus L 
West    
Canada 0.939(2.29)** 0.775(1.53) 0.164(0.35) 
France 0.319(2.21)** -0.566(-2.27)** 0.885(3.37)*** 
Germany -0.275(-1.82)* -1.693(-5.91)*** 1.418(4.82)*** 
United Kingdom 0.489(2.87)*** -0.696(-2.43)** 1.185(4.84)*** 
U.S. 0.280(2.36)** -0.137(-0.57) 0.417(2.41)** 
ESEA    
China 1.178(1.83)* 0.990(1.44) 0.188(0.50) 
Hong Kong -1.596(-4.87)*** -2.492(-5.66)*** 0.896(2.32)** 
Japan -0.203(-1.52) -0.346(-1.59) 0.143(0.56) 
Korea -0.921(-2.40)** -1.993(-4.19)*** 1.072(2.59)** 
Thailand -0.270(-0.81) -0.446(-1.22) 0.176(0.39) 
Panel B. Country-average and Composite portfolios 
Panel B.1. Country-average Portfolio 
West  0.350(1.79)* -0.463(-1.16) 0.813(3.49)*** 
East -0.362(-0.79) -0.857(-1.37) 0.495(2.13)** 
West-East 0.712(1.43) 0.394(0.53) 0.312(1.03) 
Panel B.2. Composite Portfolio 
West  0.299(2.86)*** -0.643(-3.38)*** 0.942(4.62)*** 
East -0.073(-0.33) -0.474(-1.85)* 0.401(1.88)* 
West-East 0.372(3.11)*** -0.169(-0.71) 0.541(2.93)*** 
 
remains positive, with the returns being highly significant in four out of the 
five countries (the exception again being Canada), consistent with the results 
shown in Table 3.7. For ESEA markets, in contrast to the findings without risk 
adjustments in Table 3.7, risk-adjusted momentum returns in Hong Kong and 
Korea are significantly positive, with the other countries remaining 
insignificantly different from zero. In addition, returns to loser portfolios in 
Hong Kong and Korea reduce significantly to -2.492% and -1.993%, 
suggesting that significant momentum profits in both countries are primarily 




Panel B shows the results for the country-average and composite portfolios. 
For both portfolios, there is a substantial difference in momentum returns 
between the two culture groups. In contrast to the results in Table 3.7, the 
magnitude of momentum returns to the country-average portfolio is similar to 
that without risk adjustments in Table 3.7 but the average returns to the 
winner and loser portfolios in western markets reduce remarkably to 0.354% 
and -0.463% respectively, with the returns to winner stocks at the 10% level.  
 
Again, in contrast to the results in Table 3.7, momentum returns to the 
country-average portfolio in ESEA markets increase to 0.49% per month, 
significant at the 10% level, with the returns to loser portfolios being 
significantly negative. The difference in momentum profits between western 
and ESEA countries is 0.312%, which is insignificant. However, the 
difference in momentum profits between the two culture groups for the 
composite portfolio is highly significant, which is consistent with hypothesis 
2 that states momentum profits will be significantly greater in western 
markets than in ESEA markets. It is observed that momentum profits are 
primarily driven by the underperformance of loser stocks. Overall, after 
adjusting for the FF-5 factors, although there are differences in raw 
momentum profits and risk-adjusted momentum, both raw and risk-adjusted 
results provide clear support to H2. 
 
We then go on to consider whether the impact of sentiment on momentum 
profits in the two culture groups can be subsumed by the FF-5 risk factors. 
Table 3.11 shows risk-adjusted returns to winner, loser and momentum 
portfolios under optimism and pessimism as well as the differences between 
the two sentiment states for all three portfolios. Again, Panel A shows results 
for individual countries in the east and west and Panel B for country-average 
and composite portfolios. As shown in Panel A of Table 3.11, risk-adjusted 
momentum profits for all western countries are all significant under optimism. 
Risk-adjusted returns to winner portfolios are positive in four out of the five 
western countries, with Canada and the U.S being significant at 10% or 
higher and those to the loser portfolios in all five cases being negative, with 
three out of the five being significant at the 1% level (the exception being 
Canada and the U.S).38 The findings confirm the evidence in Table 3.8 in 
                                               
38 Raw returns to the loser portfolio are significant in only two countries. 
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which momentum returns are primarily driven by loser stocks in optimistic 
periods for European markets, although this is not the case for the North 
American markets. Columns 4-6 of Panel A of Table 3.11 for western markets 
show that momentum profits under pessimism are insignificantly different 
from zero in France and the UK, and are significantly negative for Canada 
and the U.S. The insignificant or negative momentum profits under 
pessimism are due to returns to both loser and winner portfolios not being of 
the sign consistent with momentum. The risk-adjusted momentum returns for 
Germany under pessimism becomes significantly positive, which is 
inconsistent with those from Table 3.8, but for the other countries, results are 
qualitatively similar. The final three columns of the table show differences 
between optimistic and pessimistic states. In four out of the five, the 
differences are statistically significant and of the expected sign, with the 
exception being Germany. The country-average and composite results in 
Panel B suggest that momentum profits are only significant during optimistic 
periods in western countries and are primarily driven by the 
underperformance of loser stocks, consistent with hypothesis H3. Overall, 
the results in Table 3.11 for western countries are broadly consistent with 
those in Table 3.8 and hypothesis 3, in which the momentum effect is 
stronger during optimistic periods than pessimistic periods for western 
markets. 
 
We now turn to consider the results for ESEA countries in Table 3.11. The 
results for risk-adjusted returns are overall consistent with those of raw 
returns in Table 3.8. In nine out of the ten cases (optimism and pessimism), 
momentum returns are insignificantly different from zero during both 
sentiment states, consistent with hypothesis 4. The country-average and 
composite results in Panel B of Table 3.10 confirm the findings from Panel A 
and are consistent with H5: momentum returns during optimistic periods will 
be greater in western markets than ESEA markets. Again, the pattern of 
momentum profits for ESEA markets in Table 3.8 remains robust to these risk 
adjustments. 
 
Overall, the results of risk-adjusted returns are broadly consistent with the 
hypotheses and the findings using raw returns in previous sections. While  
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Table 3.11 Risk-Adjusted Momentum Profits Conditional on Sentiment for Western and ESEA Countries 
This table reports the risk-adjusted returns (%) of momentum portfolios across sentiment states (optimistic and pessimistic) for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and 
the country-average and composite portfolio (Panel B). The sample period spans Jan. 1991 to Dec. 2013. For each momentum portfolio, a time-series of raw returns is 
formed and is regressed on excess market return, the SMB, HML, OP and Inv factors when risk is adjusted according to FF (2015) 5-factor model. For each country, 
stocks are ranked into quintiles based on their past 6-month cumulative returns and held for 6 months and the past 6-month cumulative returns of each stock in the 
winner (loser) portfolios must be larger (less) than 0%. Stocks are ranked in quintiles in order to have a reasonable number of stocks. Other stock selection criteria and 
the formation of momentum portfolios are discussed in detail in Table 3.3. The sentiment formation is discussed in detail in Table 3.4. The average monthly returns on 
the country-average and composite portfolios during two sentiment periods (optimistic and pessimistic) are reported in Panel B. The formation of the country-average 
and composite portfolios is detailed in Table 3.3. The first three columns in Panel A show the returns of winner, loser and momentum portfolios under optimism and the 
second three columns show the returns of the three portfolios under pessimism and last three columns show the difference in returns of these portfolios between 
optimism and pessimism. For brevity, we only list results of winner, loser and momentum portfolios under optimism and pessimism. Corresponding t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits conditional on sentiment by country 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
West 
Canada 1.341(1.84)* -0.190(-0.30) 1.531(2.47)** -0.558(-0.71) 1.669(1.44) 
-2.227(-










3.57)*** 1.451(2.43)** 0.159(0.47) 
-1.252(-




4.58)*** 1.835(4.86)*** 0.251(0.73) 0.150(0.21) 0.101(0.18) -0.167(-0.31) 
-1.901(-
4.73)*** 1.734(4.81)*** 




 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 






















3.68)*** 1.595(2.35)** -0.600(-1.04) -1.407(-1.31) 0.807(0.96) -0.225(-0.27) -1.013(-1.18) 0.788(1.23) 
Thailand -0.212(-0.43) -0.486(-0.67) 0.274(0.34) 0.376(0.60) 0.359(0.46) 0.017(0.02) -0.588(-0.98) -0.845(-1.11) 0.257(0.31) 
Panel B. Country-average and Composite portfolios 
Panel B.1 Country-average portfolio 
West 0.293(0.90) -1.116(-2.85)** 1.409(8.08)*** -0.038(-0.22) 0.269(0.55) -0.307(-0.48) 0.331(0.70) 
-1.385(-
6.56)*** 1.716(2.82)** 
East -0.618(-1.05) -1.078(-1.80) 0.460(1.48) -0.160(-0.40) -0.487(-0.95) 0.327(1.69) -0.458(-2.12)* -0.591(-2.51)* 0.133(0.42) 
West-
East 0.911(1.36) -0.038(-0.05) 0.949(2.67)** 0.122(0.28) 0.756(1.07) -0.634(-0.96) 0.789(1.51) -0.794(-2.50)** 1.583(2.51)** 
Panel B.2 Composite portfolio 
West 0.216(1.27) 
-1.200(-
4.64)*** 1.416(5.01)*** -0.005(0.03) -0.048(-0.16) 0.043(0.13) 0.221(1.29) 
-1.152(-
4.96)*** 1.373(4.99)*** 
East -0.360(-0.94) -0.964(-2.44)** 0.604(1.20) 0.140(0.40) -0.061(-0.14) 0.201(0.78) -0.500(-1.17) -0.903(-2.24)** 0.403(0.93) 
West-
East 0.576(1.63) -0.236(-0.79) 0.812(2.01)** -0.145(-0.51) 0.013(0.08) -0.158(-0.67) 0.721(1.81)* -0.249(-0.65) 0.970(2.41)** 
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every possible risk-based explanation cannot be ruled out, it is sensible to 
conclude that the difference in momentum profits between the two culture 
groups cannot be subsumed by rational risk premia as modeled in the FF-5 
factor model. 
3.5.1 An Alternative Sentiment Index  
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results for ten western and 
ESEA countries to an alternative index for investor sentiment. The sentiment 
measure is constructed by Baker et al. (2012) for international markets, who 
suggest that investor sentiment can be captured by variables that related to 
investors’ propensity to speculate. In contrast to the consumer confidence 
index which is a pure survey sentiment measure, Baker et al. (2012) 
sentiment measure is constructed using stock market data. Due to data 
availability in global markets, they construct a yearly sentiment index using 
four proxies: a volatility premium, the number of IPOs, the average first day 
IPO return and market turnover.39 The stock market data is obtained from 
Datastream and IPO data is from updated version of Loughran et al. (1994) 
((http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/Int2008.pdf). They also regress each of these 
variables against macro-economic fundamentals. The sentiment index is the 
1st principal component of the residual series from the regressions. We follow 
their procedures to construct the sentiment index for each of five western and 
ESEA countries. However, each of four proxies is not adjusted for the macro 
series since Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) suggest that both adjusted and 
unadjusted indices yield similar results and the macro data are not available 
for all countries. The results in Tables 3.8 (raw returns) and 3.10 (risk-
adjusted returns) are re-estimated. First, the total sentiment index 
coefficients for each of ten western and ESEA markets are reported as 
follows: 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎,𝑡 = 0.448𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.589𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.678𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 − 0.211𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝑡 = 0.66𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.530𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.439𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.291𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦,𝑡 = 0.627𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.657𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.393𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.148𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑈𝐾,𝑡 = 0.557𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.526𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.564𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 − 0.309𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
                                               
39 Volatility premium is the log ratio of the value-weighted average market-to-book ratios of 
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility (top tercile) and stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility 
(bottom tercile). The number of IPOs is the log number of initial public offerings over the year. 
The average first day returns is the average first-day returns of initial public offering over the 
year. The turnover ratio is measured as the detrended log market turnover with an up-to five 
year moving average.  
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𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑈𝑆,𝑡 = 0.513𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.412𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.536𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.572𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎,𝑡 = 0.675𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.130𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.298𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.663𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑔,𝑡 = 0.589𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.599𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 − 0.008𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.543𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐽𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛,𝑡 = 0.531𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.566𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.599𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.200𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝐾𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑡 = −0.309𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.432𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.559𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.637𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 ; 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑,𝑡 = 0.445𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 0.605𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.596𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.286𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡; 
In each market, there is at least one eigenvalue of the variables that exceeds 
one. 40  The percentage of variance explained by the first principlal 
component is, in order of listed countries above, 46.7%, 43.6%, 47.5%, 
43.6%, 43.1%, 37.8%, 51.9%, 47.7%, 36.5% and 50.2%. These figures are 
similar to the 49% reported in Baker and Wurgler (2006) for a six-factor index 
of U.S. sentiment and to the average 42% reported in Baker et al. (2012) for 
the four-factor index of sentiment in six international countries. 
 
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 report Tables 3.8- and 3.10- equivalent momentum raw- 
and FF-5 risk-adjusted- returns during optimistic and pessimistic periods, 
using the Baker et al. (2012) sentiment measure instead of the consumer 
confidence index. All other calculations remain the same as those in Tables 
3.8 and 3.10. As shown in Panel A of Table 3.12, raw momentum profits are 
positive and highly significant under optimism for all five western markets. In 
contrast to the findings using the consumer confidence index, momentum 
returns under optimism in all five cases appear to be driven by the winner 
stocks, with all but Germany exhibiting significantly positive returns to this 
group and the returns to loser portfolios in four out of the five countries being 
insignificantly different from zero. However, after adjusting by the FF-5 
factors as shown in Table 3.13, returns to winner stocks drop substantially in 
all five markets and those to loser portfolios for all five countries become 
negative, with four out of the five to loser portfolios being significant at the 
10% level or higher. It suggests that after adjusted for the FF-5 risk factors, 
momentum profits in western countries seem to be driven by loser stocks 
instead of winner stocks, consistent with H3 which states that for western 
markets, momentum profits are primarily driven by loser stocks when 
sentiment is optimistic. Furthermore, both raw and FF-5 risk-adjusted 
momentum profits under pessimism are insignificantly different from zero or  
                                               





Table 3.12 Momentum Profits and the Alternative Sentiment Index for Western and ESEA Countries 
This table reports the average monthly returns (%) of momentum portfolios across sentiment states (optimistic and pessimistic) for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and the 
country-average and composite portfolios (Panel B). For each country, stocks are ranked into quintiles based on their past 6-month cumulative returns and held for 6 months and 
the past 6-month cumulative returns of each stock in the winner (loser) portfolios must be larger (less) than 0%. Other stock selection criteria and the formation of momentum 
portfolios are discussed in detail in Table 3.3. Sentiment is measured using the yearly sentiment index constructed by Baker et al. (2012) using volatility premium, number and 
1st-day returns in IPOs, and market turnover. The overall sentiment index is the first principal component of the four sentiment proxies. The sentiment formation is discussed in 
detail in Table 3.4. The average monthly returns on the country-average and composite portfolios during two sentiment periods (optimistic and pessimistic) are reported in Panel 
B. The formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is detailed in Table 3.3. The first three columns in Panel A show the returns of winner, loser and momentum 
portfolios under optimism and the second three columns show the returns of the three portfolios under pessimism and last three columns show the difference in returns of the 
three portfolios between optimism and pessimism. For brevity, we only list results of winner, loser and momentum portfolios under optimism and pessimism. Corresponding t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits conditional on sentiment by country 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.- Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
        West 
Canada 2.010(2.25)** 0.690(0.85) 1.320(2.62)*** 3.484(4.29)*** 4.579(3.34)*** -1.095(-0.98) -1.474(-2.03)** -3.899(-2.89)*** 2.415(2.68)*** 
France 1.944(3.07)*** 0.894(1.69)* 1.050(2.89)*** 0.405(0.88) 0.390(0.49) 0.015(0.03) 1.539(2.71)*** 0.504(0.76) 1.035(2.18)** 
Germany 0.826(1.51) 0.047(0.08) 0.779(2.05)** -0.265(-0.51) -1.240(-1.32) 0.975(1.67)* 1.091(1.87)* 1.287(1.47) -0.196(-0.13) 
United 
Kingdom 
1.450(2.86)*** 0.073(0.17) 1.377(3.78)*** -0.019(-0.04) -0.837(-0.90) 0.817(1.53) 1.469(2.91)*** 0.910(1.14) 0.560(1.01) 





 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
China 2.778(2.32)** 2.920(2.35)** -0.142(-0.32) 1.744(1.42) 1.439(0.90) 0.305(0.47) 1.034(1.13) 1.481(1.31) -0.447(-0.49) 
Hong 
Kong 
3.469(3.07)*** 4.598(3.09)*** -1.129(-1.36) 1.527(1.79)* 0.680(0.63) 0.847(1.79)* 1.942(1.84)* 3.918(2.71)*** 
-1.976(-
2.01)** 
Japan 1.481(2.17)** 1.211(1.78)* 0.270(0.70) -0.522(-0.79) 0.272(0.28) -0.794(-1.46) 2.003(2.32)** 0.939(1.52) 1.064(1.71)* 
Korea 3.083(2.61)*** 2.602(1.92)* 0.481(0.63) -1.655(-0.94) -1.637(-0.76) -0.018(-0.02) 4.738(2.99)*** 4.239(2.73)*** 0.499(0.83) 
Thailand 3.252(3.50)*** 2.966(3.12)*** 0.286(0.46) -0.478(-0.41) -0.410(-0.25) -0.068(-0.06) 3.730(3.71)*** 3.376(3.35)*** 0.354(0.61) 
Panel B. Country-average and Composite portfolios 
Panel B.1 Country-average portfolio 
  Optimistic Pessimistic Opt. - Pess. 
  W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
West 1.532(7.17)*** 0.423(2.53)* 1.109(10.2)*** 0.943(1.39) 0.976(0.92) -0.033(-0.07) 0.589(1.05) -0.553(-0.57) 1.142(2.45)* 






4.31)*** 1.155(3.74)** 0.820(0.42) 0.907(0.77) -0.087(-0.17) -2.101(-2.40)** -3.343(-2.84)** 1.242(1.91)* 
Panel B.2 Composite portfolio 
West 1.664(3.91)*** 0.428(1.07) 1.236(5.30)*** 0.697(1.53) 0.272(0.36) 0.425(0.90) 0.967(2.01)** 0.156(0.23) 0.811(1.99)** 














Table 3.13 Risk-Adjusted Momentum Profits and the Alternative Sentiment Index for Western and ESEA Countries 
This table reports the FF-5 risk-adjusted returns (%) of momentum portfolios across sentiment states (optimistic and pessimistic) for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and the 
country-average and composite portfolio (Panel B). For each country, stocks are ranked into quintiles based on their past 6-month cumulative returns and held for 6 months and 
the past 6-month cumulative returns of each stock in the winner (loser) portfolios must be larger (less) than 0%. Stocks are ranked in quintiles in order to have a reasonable number 
of stocks. Other stock selection criteria and the formation of momentum portfolios are discussed in detail in Table 3.3. For each momentum portfolio, a time-series of raw returns is 
formed and is regressed on excess market return, the SMB, HML, OP and Inv factors when risk is adjusted according to FF (2015) 5-factor model. Sentiment is measured using 
the yearly sentiment index constructed by Baker et al. (2012) using volatility premium, number and 1st-day returns in IPOs, and market turnover. The overall sentiment index is the 
1st principal component of the 4 sentiment proxies. The sentiment formation is discussed in detail in Table 3.4. The average monthly returns on country-average and composite 
portfolios during two sentiment periods (optimistic and pessimistic) are reported in Panel B. The formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is detailed in Table 3.3. 
The first three columns in Panel A show the returns of winner, loser and momentum portfolios under optimism and the second three columns show the returns of the three portfolios 
under pessimism and last three columns show the difference in returns of the three portfolios between optimism and pessimism. For brevity, we only list results of winner, loser and 
momentum portfolios under optimism and pessimism. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%). 
Panel A. Risk-adjusted momentum profits conditional on sentiment by country 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
        West 
Canada 0.891(1.09) -0.255(-0.34) 1.146(1.80)* 2.584(3.57)*** 3.085(2.89)*** -0.501(-0.51) -1.693(-2.01)** -3.340(-3.36)*** 1.647(1.99)** 
France 0.090(0.26) -0.634(-1.65)* 0.724(2.00)** -0.457(-1.62) -0.787(-1.41) 0.330(0.52) 0.547(1.43) 0.153(0.31) 0.394(0.99) 
Germany -0.732(-2.71)** -1.472(-3.16)*** 0.740(1.76)* -0.702(-2.09)** -1.449(-2.72)*** 0.747(1.23) -0.030(-0.21) -0.023(-0.16) -0.007(-0.03) 
United 
Kingdom 
0.188(0.59) -0.847(-2.39)** 1.035(2.95)*** -0.033(-0.09) -0.140(-0.19) 0.107(0.19) 0.221(0.41) -0.707(-1.97)** 0.928(2.71)*** 




China 2.340(1.87)* 2.794(2.22)** -0.454(-0.47) -0.025(-0.02) -0.226(-0.22) 0.201(0.50) 2.365(1.91)* 3.020(2.41)** -0.655(-0.75) 
Hong 
Kong 
-1.876(-2.42)** -1.662(-1.56) -0.214(-0.24) 
-1.323(-
2.84)*** 
-2.594(-3.87)*** 1.271(2.39)** -0.553(-0.61) 0.932(1.41) -1.485(2.13)** 
Japan -0.394(-1.71)* -0.617(-1.87)* 0.223(0.58) -0.313(-1.33) 0.218(0.76) -0.531(-1.22) -0.081(-0.12) -0.835(-2.16)** 0.754(1.61) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
          
Korea -0.803(-1.15) -2.036(-2.51)** 1.233(1.51) -0.814(-0.82) -0.432(-0.36) -0.382(-0.37) 0.011(0.10) -1.604(-1.76)* 1.615(1.81)* 
Thailand 0.511(0.94) 0.603(0.91) -0.092(-0.12) -1.016(-1.74)* -0.153(-0.20) -0.863(-0.84) 1.527(1.89)* 0.756(1.37) 0.771(1.01) 
Panel B. Country-average and Composite portfolios 
Panel B.1 Country-average portfolio 
West 0.203(0.74) -0.729(3.74)** 0.932(11.01)*** 0.225(0.37) 0.400(0.47) -0.175(-0.43) -0.021(-0.05) -1.129(-1.75) 1.108(2.40)* 
East -0.044(-0.06) -0.184(-0.21) 0.139(0.47) -0.698(-2.96)** -0.637(-1.27) -0.061(-0.16) 0.654(1.18) 0.454(0.57) 0.200(0.36) 
West-
East 0.248(0.35) -0.545(-1.61) 0.793(2.58)** 0.923(1.44) 1.037(1.08) -0.114(-0.05) -0.675(-0.95) -1.583(-1.37) 0.908(1.72) 
Panel B.2 Composite portfolio 
West 0.211(1.53) -0.728(3.33)*** 0.939(4.12)*** 0.208(0.61) 0.132(0.20) 0.076(0.22) 0.003(0.08) -0.860(-3.51)*** 0.863(3.91)*** 
East 0.056(0.12) -0.349(-1.03) 0.405(1.49) -0.531(-1.49) -0.545(-1.52) 0.014(0.10) 0.587(1.34) 0.196(0.51) 0.391(1.51) 
West-
East 0.155(0.71) -0.379(2.01)** 0.534(1.98)** 0.739(1.61) 0.677(-1.59) 0.062(0.20) -0.584(-1.42) -1.056(3.92)*** 0.472(2.31)** 
101 
 
significantly negative in all five western markets. Overall, the findings for 
western markets are consistent with H3.  
 
We now consider the results for ESEA countries in Tables 3.12 and 3.13. 
Under both sentiment states, raw momentum returns are insignificantly 
different from zero in nine out of the ten cases (optimistic and pessimistic) as 
shown in Table 3.12. After controlling for FF-5 risk factors, momentum returns 
for all ESEA markets become insignificantly different from zero under 
optimism, with the magnitude of returns to winner stocks dropping 
remarkably in all five markets. Both raw and risk-adjusted momentum returns 
under pessimism remain insignificantly different from zero in four out of five 
ESEA markets (the exception being Hong Kong). The country-average and 
composite results in Panel B of Tables 3.12 and 3.13 show that there is no 
clear difference in momentum profits (both raw and risk-adjusted returns) 
between optimism and pessimism, consistent with the results using the 
consumer confidence index and hypothesis 4. It is also observed from Panel 
B of Tables 3.12 and 3.13 that for both country-average and composite 
portfolios, the differences in raw and risk-adjusted momentum profits 
between western markets and ESEA markets are significant at the 5% level 
or higher during optimistic states. However, there is no significant difference 
in both raw and risk-adjusted momentum profits between the two culture 
groups when sentiment is pessimistic. The findings are consistent with H5: 
momentum returns during optimistic periods will be greater in western 
markets than in ESEA markets.    
 
Overall, the results in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 from using the alternative 
sentiment measure are qualitatively similar to those using the consumer 
confidence index as a proxy for sentiment, suggesting that the interaction of 
sentiment and culture affect cognitive dissonance and the extent of 
momentum profits regardless of the choice of investor sentiment proxy.  
3.5.2 Sensitivity tests 
We carry out three additional sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of the 
results: (1) re-estimating empirical analysis in all tables using an alternative 
ranking-(J) and holding (K) periods (J=K=12) as shown in Tables A3.3 to A3.5, 
which is also a widely researched momentum strategy in the literature; (2) a 
40% cutoff for optimistic/pessimistic sentiment is used as shown in Tables  
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A3.6 and A3.7; (3) we follow Stambaugh et al. (2012) to identify investor 
sentiment periods as shown in Tables A3.8 and A3.9. Specifically, a high-
sentiment month (optimistic) is one in which the 3-month rolling average 
score of the consumer confidence index in the previous month is in the top 
30% of the 3-month rolling average time series values and a low-sentiment 
month (pessimistic) is one in the bottom 30% of the 3-month rolling average 
time series values, with the rest being mild states. The results of these tests, 
which are reported in the appendix, are qualitatively similar to those reported 
in the earlier analysis.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The momentum puzzle seems to be a major challenge to the efficient market 
hypothesis, and to date no satisfactory explanation for the anomaly has been 
provided. However, a mixed picture has emerged globally, with western 
markets showing clear evidence of momentum, but ESEA markets broadly 
being characterized by insignificant momentum profits. We propose that 
cognitive dissonance may be an important driver of the anomaly, with the 
interaction of investor sentiment and culture causing cognitive dissonance to 
arise in different circumstances and to differing degrees in the west and the 
east. While previous studies of the momentum anomaly have examined the 
roles of sentiment and culture independently, to date no study have 
examined their joint impact or considered the implications of their interaction 
on cognitive dissonance and momentum.  
 
In this chapter, we take account of the interaction between sentiment and 
culture and using an approach in the spirit of Hong and Stein (1999) propose 
five hypotheses to explain differences across countries in relation to the 
profitability of the momentum strategy. In addition to examining momentum 
across 40 countries, we focus attention on the five largest markets in each 
of the west and the east, given psychological arguments and evidence about 
differences in self-construal in the two cultures. Specifically, we recognise 
that westerners have a strong tendency to believe in continuation, while 
those from the east expect reversal. Our results provide support to all 
hypotheses and provide evidence consistent with cultural biases and 
sentiment interacting to impact on cognitive dissonance. Results suggest 
that cultural biases concerning continuation and reversal are important 
drivers for the differences in relation to the momentum anomaly across 
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western and ESEA markets. Results are robust to a number of additional 
tests and alternative specifications. By identifying how the interaction of 
sentiment and culture affects cognitive dissonance and the extent of 
momentum profits across countries, it is interesting to see how such an effect 
influences post-earnings-announcement-drift, since Hong et al. (2003) find 
that earnings momentum is stronger in the west than in the east. Thus, in the 
next chapter, we will proceed to investigate how the interaction affects 




























3.7.1 Definitions of Control Variables in the Regression 
Analysis 
Table A3. 1 Variables, Sources and Definitions in the Regression Analysis 
Variable Source Definition 
Firm characteristics 
Market trading volume (TV) Datastream Market trading volume for each country in 
each month is calculated as the market 
dollar trading volume of the Datastream 
Global index of this country scaled by the 
index’s market capitalization in this 
month. 
Stock market volatility (V) Datastream Stock market volatility for each country in 
each month is measured as the sum of 
squared return on each stock divided by 
the number of stocks. 
Analyst coverage (Cov) IBES Analyst coverage (Cov) for each country 
in each month is the sum of average 
number of analysts offering one-year 
ahead earnings forecast for all available 
stocks. If there is no analyst data for a firm 
from IBES, then the average number of 
analysts is treated as zero. 
Dispersion of analyst forecasts 
(Disp) 
IBES Arithmetic mean of standard deviation of 
analyst forecasts for each earnings 
announcement of each country in each 
year. 
Cash flows growth rate 
volatility (VolFCF) 
Datastream The equally weighted average of 
annualized standard deviation of log free 
cash flow changes for each country in 
each year. The annualize standard 
deviation is measured as monthly 
standard deviation of log free cash follow 
growth *(12)1/2.  
Median firm size (Size) Datastream Median of firm size for each country is the 
median of each country’s market 
capitalisation of Datastream global index 
in each year. 
Price to book ratio (PB) Datastream Price to book ratio for each country in 
each year is measured as arithmetic 
mean of each country’s market to book 
ratio of Datastream global index. 
Financial market development variables 





Total private credit for each country in 
each year divided by this country’s GDP  
Familiarity of foreign investors 
(LANG) 
Chan et al. 
(2005) 
An average value of common language 
dummy that equals to one if two countries 
share a major language, zero otherwise. 
Control of capital flows 
(CONTRL) 
Chan et al. 
(2005) 
A higher value suggests more restrictions 
on capital flows. 




The variable is calculated as the market 
capitalisation of constituent stocks in the 
S&P’s /International Finance Corporation 
Investor index divided by those in the 
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S&P’s/International Finance Corporation 
global index of this country. 
Insider index (INSIDER) La Porta et al. 
(2006) 
A lower value indicates that insider trading 
is more pronounced. 
Corruption index (CORRP) International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
A lower score indicates a higher level of 
corruption. 
political risk index (POLITICAL) ICRG A lower score indicates a higher political 
risk.  
Transaction costs index 
(TRAN) 
Chan et al. 
(2005) 
A lower value indicates lower transaction 
costs.  
Investor protection index 
(PROTECTION) 
ICRG A lower score indicates a lower level of 
investor protection. 
Macroeconomic variables 
Inflation rate(Inflation) IMF Annual consumer price index changes 
(%) for each country in each year. 
GDP growth rate (GDP) IMF Nominal GDP growth rate for each 
country in each year. 
3.7.2 Country-Average Results for Table 3.5  
Table A3. 2 Investor Sentiment, Individualism and Momentum for the 
Country-Average Portfolio 
This table presents the average monthly returns (%) of momentum strategy for the 
country-average portfolio sorted by investor sentiment and Individualism index. 
Panel A reports momentum profits sorted by individualism. Panels B and C present 
momentum profits for high and low individualism levels after controlling for the effect 
of sentiment. At the end of each month, momentum portfolios for each country are 
constructed and all countries in the sample are sorted into three groups by using top 
(bottom) 30% cutoffs based on their individualism index. Each month is identified as 
optimism, mild or pessimism. The definition of sentiment states of holding period is 
discussed in detail in Table 3.4. Both the country-average and composite portfolios 
are formed in each individualism - and investor sentiment-sorted category. The 
formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is described in table 3.3. 
For brevity, we only report results of composite portfolio. The asterisks refer to the 
level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Country-
average 
portfolios   
        Momentum Portfolio 
   
        Winner   Loser   
Winner-
Loser 
Panel A. Portfolio returns and 
Individualism      






    ***(10.62)  (1.57)  ***(4.31) 
Low IDV    1.372  1.374  -0.002 
    ***(5.26)  ***(3.99)  (-0.007) 
High. - Low.   0.008  -0.963  0.971 
    (-0.15)  *(-1.66)  ***(3.24) 
Sentiment level 
Panel B. High Individualism 
Optimistic  1.137  -0.390  1.527 
    ***(3.30)  (-1.11)  ***(3.11) 
Pessimistic   1.870  1.422 
 0.448 
    *** (2.98)  (1.21) 
 (1.04) 




    (-0.87)  *(1.73)  **(1.97) 
Panel C. Low Individualism 
Optimistic 1.087  0.874  0.213 
    (0.7)  (0.47)  (0.06) 
Pessimistic   1.396  2.103  -0.707 
    ***(2.77)  ***(2.83)  (-1.48) 
Opt.-






        (-0.33)   **(-2.32)   (1.24) 
3.7.3 Momentum Strategy with Ranking-(J) and Holding (K) 
Periods =12 
Table A3. 3 Momentum, Investor sentiment and Individualism with Ranking 
and Holding Periods=12 
This table presents the average monthly returns (%) of momentum strategy for the 
composite portfolio sorted by investor sentiment and Individualism index. Panel A 
reports momentum profits sorted by individualism. Panel B and C present 
momentum profits for high and low individualism levels after controlling for the effect 
of sentiment. At the end of each month, momentum portfolios for each country are 
constructed and all countries in the sample are sorted into three groups by using top 
(bottom) 30% cutoffs based on their individualism index. Each month is identified as 
optimism, mild or pessimism. The definition of sentiment states of holding period is 
discussed in detail in Table 3.4. Both the country-average and composite portfolios 
are formed in each individualism - and investor sentiment-sorted category. The 
formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is described in table 3.3. 
For brevity, we only report results of composite portfolio. The asterisks refer to the 
level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Composite portfolios   
Momentum portfolios 
 
   Winner Loser   W-L 
Individualism level       
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism      






    ***  
 
 *** 
Low IDV    1.933  1.643  0.290 
    ***  ***  
 
High. - Low.   -0.344  -1.131  0.787 
      ***  ** 
Sentiment level 
 






Optimistic    0.813  -0.903  1.716 
    **  **  *** 
Pessimistic   2.131  1.613 
 0.518 
    ***  ***  
 
Opt. - Pes.    -1.312  -2.516  1.198 
    ***  ***  ** 






Optimistic    1.212  0.949  0.263 
107 
 
         
Pessimistic   2.111  2.443  -0.332 
    **  **   
Opt.-Pes.    -0.899  -1.494  0.595 
         **   
 
Table A3. 4 Momentum Profits for Western and ESEA countries with Ranking 
and Holding Periods=12 
This table reports the average monthly momentum returns (%) for each of the ten 
countries. Panel A shows the individual momentum profits for each country, along 
with its standard deviation. For each country, stocks are ranked into quintiles based 
on their past 6-month cumulative returns and held for 6 months. In order to increase 
the power of the test, overlapping portfolios are formed. The winner (loser) portfolio 
consists of 12 overlapping winner (loser) portfolios formed in the previous 12 months. 
The Return on each of the 6 overlapping winner (loser) portfolios is the simple 
average of returns on stocks in the winner (loser) portfolio and the return on the 
winner or loser portfolio is the equally weighted average return of the 6 portfolios in 
that month. The momentum returns are the returns of the winner portfolio minus the 
returns of the loser portfolio. To mitigate microstructure issues, 1 month is allowed 
between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period and 
several stock selection criteria are applied, as discussed in detail in Table 3.1. Panels 
B and C report the country-average and composite momentum profits for western 
and ESEA countries. For brevity, we only list results of winner, loser and momentum 
portfolios. The asterisks refer to different significant levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits by country 
Country Winner (W) Loser (L) W Minus L  
West     
Canada 1.413*** 0.431* 0.982***  
France 1.314*** 0.612** 0.702***  
Germany 1.021*** -0.112 1.133***  
United Kingdom 0.809*** 0.012 0.797***  
U.S. 0.981 *** 0.179 0.802***  
ESEA     
China 0.732 0.539 0.193  
Hong Kong 1.350** 0.892* 0.458  
Japan 0.898** 0.691* 0.207  
Korea 1.212* 0.672 0.540  
Thailand 1.111** 0.821* 0.290  
 
Panel B. Country-average portfolio 
 Winner(W) Loser(L) W Minus L  
West  1.108*** 0.224 0.883***  
ESEA 1.061*** 0.723*** 0.338  
West-East 0.047 -0.499* 0.546**  
Panel C. Composite portfolio 
West  1.412*** 0.601** 0.811***  
ESEA 1.012 0.798 0.214  





Table A3. 5 Momentum Profits and Sentiment for Western and ESEA Markets with Ranking and Holding Periods=12 
This table reports the average monthly returns (%) of winner, loser and momentum portfolios across sentiment states (optimistic and pessimistic) 
for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and the country-average(Panel B) and composite portfolios (Panel C). For each country, stocks are ranked 
into quintiles based on their past 6-month cumulative returns and held for 6 months and the past 6-month cumulative returns of each stock in the 
winner (loser) portfolios must be larger (less) than 0%. Stocks are ranked in quintiles in order to have a reasonable number of stocks. Other stock 
selection criteria and the formation of momentum portfolios are discussed in detail in Table 3.3. The sentiment formation is discussed in detail in 
Table 3.4. The average monthly returns to the country-average and composite portfolios during two sentiment periods (optimistic and pessimistic) 
are reported in Panel B. The formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is detailed in Table 3.3. The first three columns in Panel A 
show the returns of winner, loser and momentum portfolios under optimism and the second three columns show the returns of the three portfolios 
under pessimism and last three columns show the differences in returns of these portfolios between optimism and pessimism. For brevity, we only 
list results of winner, loser and momentum portfolios. The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits conditional on sentiment by country 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
        West 
Canada 1.512*** -0.128 1.640*** 0.823** 0.678* 0.145 0.689** -0.806* 1.495*** 
France 0.621*** -0.921*** 1.542*** 1.571*** 1.901*** -0.33 -0.950*** -2.822*** 1.872*** 
Germany 0.412 -1.489*** 1.901*** 1.312*** 1.389*** -0.077 -0.900*** -2.878*** 1.978*** 
United Kingdom 0.643*** -1.284*** 1.927*** 1.251*** 1.301*** -0.05 -0.608*** -2.585*** 1.977*** 














Optimistic Pessimistic Opt-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
China 1.368* 1.210* 0.158 0.787 0.413 0.374 0.581 0.797 -0.216 
Hong Kong 1.783*** 1.653** 0.13 0.672 0.341 0.331 1.111** 1.312** -0.201 
Japan 0.213 -0.238 0.451 0.901** 0.987** -0.086 -0.688 -1.225*** 0.537 
Korea 0.289 -1.011 1.300 1.906*** 1.998*** -0.092 -1.617** -3.009*** 1.392* 
Thailand 0.783 0.731 0.052 2.682*** 2.111*** 0.571 -1.899** -1.380** -0.519 




























































































































3.7.4 40% Cutoffs for Investor Sentiment  
Table A3. 6 Momentum, Investor Sentiment and Individualism with 40% 
Sentiment Cutoffs 
This table presents the average monthly returns (%) of momentum strategy for the 
composite portfolio sorted by investor sentiment and Individualism index. The 
formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is described in detail in 
Table 3.3. Panel A reports momentum profits sorted by individualism. Panels B and 
C present momentum profits for high and low individualism levels after controlling for 
the effect of sentiment, respectively. At the end of each month, momentum portfolios 
for each country are constructed and all countries in the sample are sorted into three 
groups by using top (bottom) 30% cutoffs based on their individualism index. Each 
month is identified as optimism, mild or pessimism. The definition of sentiment states 
of holding period is discussed in detail in Table 3.4. Both the country-average and 
composite portfolios are formed in each individualism - and investor sentiment-
sorted category. The formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is 
described in table 3.3. For brevity, we only report results of composite portfolio. The 
asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Composite portfolios   
Momentum portfolios 
 
   Winner Loser   W-L 
Individualism level       
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism      






    ***  
 
 *** 
Low IDV    1.933  1.862  0.071 
    ***  ***   
High. - Low.   -0.482  -1.483  1.001 
    
 
 ***  *** 
Sentiment level 
 






Optimistic    0.781  -0.871  1.652 
    *  *  *** 
Pessimistic   1.543  1.189 
 0.354 
    ***  *  
 
Opt. - Pes.    -0.762  -2.060  1.298 
    *  ***  ** 
Panel C. Low Individualism 
Optimistic    1.513  0.412  1.101 
    **    * 
Pessimistic   2.312  1.437  0.875 
    **  *   
Opt.-Pes. 












Table A3. 7 Momentum Profits and Sentiment for Western and ESEA Countries with 40% Sentiment Cutoffs 
This table reports the monthly momentum returns (%) during two sentiment states (optimistic, mild and pessimistic) for each of the 10 countries 
(Panel A) and the country-average portfolio (Panel B) and the composite portfolio (Panel C). Since we are not interested in the momentum profits 
during mild state, returns for winner, loser and momentum portfolios during optimistic and pessimistic states are reported. The stocks ranked in top 
decile based on past six-month cumulative return are winner “W” stocks and those in the bottom decile are loser “L” stocks. Each month is identified 
as optimistic, mild or pessimistic. To identify a particular formation period as optimistic or pessimistic; I calculate the corresponding sentiment score 
is calculated by using the weighted average scheme as follows. The weights 3, 2 and 1 are given to the month t, t-1 and t-2. If the weighted average 
score of the formation month belongs to the top 40% of the time series of rolling average sentiment scores, it is defined as optimistic, whereas if 
the weighted average score of the formation month belongs to the bottom 40% of the time series observations, it is defined as pessimistic, with 
the rest being mild states. The average monthly returns in percentage on country-average and composite portfolios during two sentiment periods 
(optimistic and pessimistic) are reported in Panel B. The formation of country-average and composite portfolios is discussed in detail in Table 3.3. 
The first three columns in Panel A show the returns of winner, loser and momentum portfolios under optimism and the second three columns show 
the returns of the three portfolios under pessimism and last three columns show the differences of returns of the three portfolios under between 
optimism and pessimism. The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Momentum profits conditional on sentiment by country 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.- Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
        West 
Canada 1.913*** 0.312 1.601*** 0.213 0.873*** -0.660* 1.700*** -0.561 2.261*** 
France 0.213 -1.213*** 1.426*** 1.103*** 1.987*** -0.884*** -0.890*** -3.200*** 2.310*** 
Germany -0.301 -1.984*** 1.683*** 1.213*** 1.761*** -0.548** -1.514*** -3.745*** 2.231*** 
United Kingdom 0.412 -1.010*** 1.422*** 1.701*** 1.116*** 0.585* -1.289*** -2.126*** 0.837*** 








 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
China 1.310* 1.701** -0.391 0.783 0.791 -0.008 0.527 0.910 -0.383 
Hong Kong 1.891** 1.801** 0.090 0.781 0.301 0.480 1.110** 1.500** -0.390 
Japan -0.281 -0.101 -0.180 1.413** 1.781** -0.368 -1.694** -1.882** 0.188 
Korea -0.101 -1.271* 1.170 1.783** 2.871*** -1.088 -1.884** -4.142*** 2.258*** 
Thailand 1.212** 0.564 0.648 2.982*** 2.691*** 0.291 -1.770** -2.127*** 0.357 
Panel B. Country-average portfolio 
West 0.594 -0.859*** 1.453*** 1.184*** 1.349*** -0.165 -0.591 -2.209*** 1.618*** 
East 0.806* 0.539 0.267 1.548*** 1.687*** -0.139 -0.742 -1.148** 0.406 
West-East -0.213 -1.398*** 1.185*** -0.364 -0.338 -0.027 0.152 -1.060** 1.212*** 
Panel C. Composite portfolio 
West 0.698* -0.756** 1.454*** 1.543*** 1.792*** -0.249 -0.845** -2.548*** 1.730*** 
East 0.823* 0.531 0.330 1.213** 1.412** -0.199 -0.670 -1.199** 0.529 




3.7.5 Different Sentiment Definition by Stambaugh et al. (2012) 
Table A3. 8 Momentum, Investor Sentiment and Individualism with a Different 
Sentiment Definition 
This table presents average monthly returns (%) of momentum strategy for 
composite portfolios sorted by investor sentiment and Individualism index. The 
formation of the country-average and composite portfolios is described in detail in 
Table 3.3. Panel A reports momentum profits sorted by individualism. Panel B and C 
present momentum profits for high and low individualism levels after controlling for 
the effect of sentiment. At the end of each month, momentum portfolios for each 
country are constructed and all countries in the sample are sorted into three groups 
by using top (bottom) 30% cutoffs based on their individualism index. Each month is 
identified as optimism, mild or pessimism. The definition of sentiment states of 
holding period is discussed in detail in Table 3.4. Both the country-average and 
composite portfolios are formed in each individualism - and investor sentiment-
sorted category. For brevity, we only report results of composite portfolio. The 
asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Composite portfolios   
Momentum portfolios 
 
   Winner Loser   W-L 
Individualism level       
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism      






    ***  
 
 *** 
Low IDV    1.933  1.862  0.071 
    ***  ***  (0.30) 
High. - Low.   -0.482  -1.483  1.001 
    
 
 ***  *** 
        






Optimistic    0.781  -0.891  1.672 
    *  **  *** 
Pessimistic   1.792  1.212 
 0.580 
    ***  ***  
 
Opt. - Pes.    -1.011  -2.103  1.092 
    **  ***  ** 






Optimistic    1.633  1.034  0.599 
    **     
Pessimistic   1.732  1.828  -0.096 
    ***  **  
 
Opt.-Pes.    -0.099  -0.794  0.695 





Table A3. 9 Momentum Profits and Sentiment for Western and ESEA Countries with a Different Sentiment Definition 
This table reports the monthly momentum returns (%) during two sentiment states (optimistic, mild and pessimistic) for each of the 10 countries 
(Panel A) and the country-average portfolio (Panel B) and the composite portfolio (Panel C). Since we are not interested in the momentum profits 
during mild state, returns for winner, loser and momentum portfolios during optimistic and pessimistic states are reported. The stocks ranked in top 
decile based on past six month cumulative return are winner “W” stocks and those in the bottom decile are loser “L” stocks. Each month is identified 
as optimistic, mild or pessimistic. To identify a particular formation period as optimistic or pessimistic; we calculate the corresponding sentiment 
score is calculated by using the weighted average scheme as follows. The weights 3, 2 and 1 are given to the month t, t-1 and t-2. If the weighted 
average score of the holding month belongs to the top 30% of the time series of rolling average sentiment scores, it is defined as optimistic, 
whereas if the weighted average score of the formation month belongs to the bottom 30% of the time series observations, it is defined as 
pessimistic, with the rest being mild states. The average monthly returns in percentage on country-average and composite portfolios during two 
sentiment periods (optimistic and pessimistic) are reported in Panel B. The formation of country-average and composite portfolios is detailed in 
Table 3.3. The first three columns in Panel A show the returns of winner, loser and momentum portfolios under optimism and the second three 
columns show the returns of the three portfolios under pessimism and last three columns show the differences of returns of the three portfolios 
under between optimism and pessimism. The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%) 
Panel A. Momentum profits conditional on sentiment by country 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
        West 
Canada 0.891** -0.310 1.201*** 2.012*** 2.210*** -0.198 -1.121*** -2.520*** 1.399*** 
France 0.542 -0.981*** 1.523*** 1.222*** 1.792*** -0.570* -0.680 -2.773*** 2.093*** 
Germany 0.213 -1.984*** 2.197*** 0.901** 1.761*** -0.860** -0.688** -3.745*** 3.057*** 
United Kingdom 0.781*** -0.990*** 1.771*** 1.301*** 1.012*** 0.289 -0.520 -2.002*** 1.482*** 








 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt-Pess. 
 W L Mom W L Mom W L Mom 
China 0.721 0.622 0.099 1.341 1.012 0.329 -0.620 -0.390 -0.230 
Hong Kong 1.210*** 1.012 0.198 0.998 0.561 0.437 0.212 0.451 -0.239 
Japan 0.341 0.010 0.331 1.011*** 0.781** 0.230 -0.670 -0.771 0.101 
Korea 0.389 0.201 0.188 1.998*** 1.210** 0.788 -1.609** -1.009* -0.600 
Thailand 1.341** 0.783 0.558 2.193*** 1.341* 0.852 -0.852 -0.558 -0.294 





























































































































4 Culture and Investor Sentiment: The Impact of 
Cognitive Dissonance on Post-Earnings-
Announcement-Drift 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, we examined the interaction between culture and investor 
sentiment on the momentum which is one of the above suspicion anomalies 
(Fama, 1998). It is interesting to examine the interaction effect on the other 
above suspicion anomaly, i.e. Post-earnings-announcement-drift (thereafter, 
PEAD) which is one of the biggest challenges to the efficient market 
paradigm (Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Fama 1998). Numerous arguments 
have been put forward to try to explain the anomaly, both from behavioural 
and rational perspective. For example, behavioural explanations include 
three main streams: analyst underreaction, investor underreation and biased 
information processing. In terms of rational explanations, examples include 
macroeconomic risk, beta risk, and liquidity risk. The evidence and causes 
of PEAD are discussed in detail in section 2.4. However, despite this work it 
is not clear about the reasons for the existence of PEAD. Given the findings 
that sentiment, culture and cognitive dissonance are relevant to price 
momentum as discussed in section 3, in this chapter, we seek to investigate 
whether culture, sentiment and cognitive dissonance can explain this 
phenomenon using data across a wide range of countries. We pay particular 
attention to the impact of differences between western and ESEA cultures. 
 
Our work is motivated by the fact that while the evidence for PEAD is 
extensive, it is not found for all international markets. Evidence of PEAD in 
international markets is discussed in detail in Section 2.4.2. Cultural factors, 
in particular, Hofstede’s individualism are shown to be significantly correlated 
with earnings momentum profits. However, to date, it is not clear why cultural 
factors might impact the level of returns, particular in relation to the 
differences between western and ESEA countries. It is the issue which we 
seek to address by bringing together arguments from the psychology 
literature regarding differences in relation to views of change between 
eastern and western cultures, sentiment and the notion of cognitive 
dissonance. In the previous chapter, we discussed the difference between 
eastern and western cultures. These differences suggest that people from 




earnings surprises. In addition, while sentiment has been shown to be of 
relevance to earnings momentum (see e.g. Livnat and Petrovits, 2009; Mian 
and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012), to date its interaction with culture has not 
been investigated. This is important since under optimistic and pessimistic 
states cultural expectations will cause investors to experience cognitive 
dissonance in different situations, affecting their responses to news. For 
example, in relation to recent good news stocks, an investor from the East 
who believes in reversal will experience cognitive dissonance under 
optimism, whereas investors from the west will not, given their beliefs in 
continuation.41  
 
Using a framework in the spirit of Hong and Stein (1999) heterogeneous 
trader model, we take account of the differences between eastern and 
western views of cognition and how these interact with sentiment to develop 
specific hypotheses concerning differences in PEAD between the two culture 
groups.42 We test the hypotheses in relation to sentiment and culture first 
using data from 34 countries worldwide. We perform portfolio analysis and 
find that the cumulative returns of both good and bad news are significantly 
higher in individualistic cultures than those in collectivistic cultures, 
respectively, and PEAD of good (bad) news is more prominent under 
pessimism (optimism). Double sorts are under taken on the basis of 
individualism and sentiment. The findings suggest that the effect of sentiment 
on PEAD for both good and bad news is much stronger in the high 
individualism group than in the low individualism group. We then test the 
interaction between culture and sentiment on PEAD in a multivariate 
regression setting while controlling for other determinants that can potentially 
explain differences in PEAD across countries. We find that individualism and 
sentiment indices as well as their interaction are all highly significant even 
after controlling for such variables. 
 
We then focus the analysis on the five largest markets in each of the east 
and west and find that PEAD following good news is evident in both western 
and ESEA markets during pessimistic periods and is much higher in western 
countries. Also, PEAD following bad news during optimistic periods is much 
                                               
41 Good news stocks are defined as the top 30% of stocks with the most positive earnings 
surprises.  
42 We again make use of Hong and Stein’s (1999) model to develop specific hypotheses on 
sentiment, cognitive dissonance and post-earnings-announcement drift, which are similar to 




stronger in western markets than in ESEA markets, suggesting that cognitive 
dissonance is more evident in western markets for good (bad) news than in 
ESEA markets during pessimistic (optimistic) periods. Overall, the results are 
consistent with our specific hypotheses and provide strong support to the 
importance of cognitive dissonance in explaining differences in PEAD across 
cultures.  
 
To ensure that our results are not driven by a particular sentiment index, we 
consider an alternative index of investor sentiment (Baker et al., 2012). We 
construct the alternative sentiment index for each of the ten countries in the 
east and west and re-estimate the portfolio analysis for PEAD in both western 
and ESEA markets using the alternative measure. The results are robust to 
this alternative. Furthermore, our basic results in this chapter also survive a 
number of sensitivity tests, including using raw returns, an alternative 
measure of earnings surprises and different cut-offs for investor sentiment.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the study provides 
the first examination of the interaction of sentiment and culture on PEAD of 
good and bad news in markets around the world. Second, while Dou et al. 
(2015) show that culture is relevant to PEAD, to date it is not clear why 
cultural factors might influence the level of returns. We tackle this issue by 
bringing together arguments from the psychology literature regarding the 
differences in relation to views of change between western and ESEA 
cultures, sentiment and the notion of cognitive dissonance and find that the 
resulting difference of cognitive dissonance between western and ESEA 
cultures can provide a better understanding of differences in PEAD between 
the two cultures. Third, we advance the PEAD literature by showing that 
PEAD is different across sentiment states in international markets. 
 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows: in section 4.2, we 
discuss issues relating to culture, sentiment and cognitive dissonance and 
develop specific hypotheses concerning PEAD and how the anomaly differs 
between western and ESEA cultures. Section 4.3 presents the data and 
methodology. Section 4.4 shows the main empirical analysis and is followed 




4.2 Cultural Bias, Information-Based Traders and Feedback 
Traders: Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Individualism, Sentiment and PEAD 
Dou et al. (2013) examine the impact of culture on earnings momentum and 
find that there is a significant relationship between the individualism index 
and earnings momentum profits. However, they do not link culture to investor 
sentiment. Livnat and Petrovits (2009) examine the impact of investor 
sentiment on earnings momentum and find that good (bad) news diffuses 
slowly under pessimistic (optimistic) states for the U.S market. Antoniou et 
al. (2013) examine the impact of cognitive dissonance on earnings surprises 
by taking accounting of the role of sentiment. In the first part of our analysis, 
we seek to investigate the interaction of culture and investor sentiment on 
PEAD following good and bad news.  
 
While previous studies have examined the impact of cultural variables and 
sentiment on PEAD separately, to date no study has investigated the joint 
impact of these factors or the way they impact on cognitive dissonance. 
Therefore, before we go on to consider arguments relating to specific 
differences between investors from the west and the east, we consider more 
general arguments relating to cognitive dissonance and concepts of 
individualism versus collectivism. In section 3.2, we introduced the 
psychology literature relating to individualism and collectivism, which has 
been related to the concepts of independent and interdependent self-
construal. Individuals in high individualism cultures with strong independent 
self-construal place greater value on self-integrity and are likely to be strongly 
affected by cognitive dissonance. For example, given their belief in 
continuation, westerners with their tendency for independent self-construal 
will experience cognitive dissonance when faced with good (bad) news 
stocks and a pessimistic (optimistic) state of sentiment. In contrast, people 
with sense of interdependent self-construal place greater weight on the 
obligations and responsibilities within a group and will be less concerned with 
self-consistency.  
 
We again use the Hong and Stein (1999) model as a starting point, once 




traders may be affected by cultural bias.43 As Hong and Stein (1999) argue, 
investors may respond differently to public news (e.g. earnings 
announcements) compared to private news, given that public news becomes 
available to all investors at the same time. We begin by examining possible 
cognitive dissonance arising from combinations of the nature of earnings 
surprises (positive or negative) and sentiment. If two factors (public 
information and sentiment) are inconsistent, cognitive dissonance will be 
evident and investors will be slow to respond to the information. Specifically, 
when the new information arrives, investors will underweight such 
information which contradicts their sentiment and adjust their expectations in 
a non-Bayesian manner. Such information will be slowly incorporated into 
stock prices, resulting in underreaction to both good and bad news in the 
presence of cognitive dissonance. Given the difference between 
individualistic and collectivist cultures, we expect that investors in 
individualistic cultures will experience stronger cognitive dissonance than in 
collectivist cultures, resulting in stronger PEAD in individualistic culture 
groups.44 
 
This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: the effect of investor sentiment on PEAD following both good and bad 
news will be more pronounced in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic 
cultures, since people in individualistic cultures will experience stronger 
cognitive dissonance than those in collectivistic cultures. 
 
We examine the first hypothesis in relation to individualism using a sample 
of 34 countries around the world.45 
4.2.2 Cognitive Dissonance and PEAD: Western and ESEA 
Cultures 
If investors are affected by cultural bias, they will react in a similar (but 
possibly less strong) manner to public news as to private news, with western 
investors expecting continuation of either positive or negative earnings 
                                               
43 The Hong and Stein (1999) mode is discussed in detail in section 2.1.3. 
44 Much of this section has direct parallels with the section 3.2.2 in chapter 3, with hypotheses 
being very similar, given the fact that we are drawing on the same arguments in relation to 
PEAD as we did for price momentum. 
45 Due to the availability of earnings announcements data form IBES, only 34 countries are 




surprises and ESEA investors expecting reversal. 46 , 47  Furthermore, we 
argue that such investors may be also influenced by sentiment (as Antoniou 
et al.,2013 argue). The implication of this interaction between sentiment and 
investor responses to earnings surprises in terms of cognitive dissonance 
will be similar as for the earlier consideration of private news (as reflected in 
winner and loser stocks in Chapter 3) for westerners and ESEA investors. 
Specifically, if all three factors (public news, sentiment and cultural beliefs) 
impact in the same direction, then there is no cognitive dissonance and we 
expected traders to respond without delay to news, which will diffuse 
relatively quickly. However, cognitive dissonance will be evident when the 
three factors do not suggest similar future price movements. In such a 
situation, we expect investors will respond more slowly (underreact) to the 
news and PEAD will be larger. Give their belief in continuation, western 
investors will not experience cognitive dissonance when there is positive 
(negative) news and the sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic), but will 
experience cognitive dissonance otherwise. In contrast, ESEA investors 
believe good or bad news will mean revert, but are more comfortable with 
contradiction and will, therefore, experience weak cognitive dissonance in 
both sentiment states for both good and bad news, since the nature of public 
news always contradicts their beliefs in reversion, regardless of the 
sentiment. Exhibit 4.1 shows expectations based on these culturally-biased 
responses. 
 
Exhibit 4.1. Cognitive dissonance, public news and sentiment 
This exhibit summarises the cognitive dissonance (CD) experienced by 
westerners and ESEA for stocks with ‘good’ news and stocks with ‘bad’ news in 
two different sentiment periods. 
 Westerners – belief in 
continuation 
ESEA – belief in reversal 
 Good news Bad news Good news  Bad news 
Sentiment     
Optimistic No CD CD Weak CD Weak CD 
Pessimistic CD No CD Weak CD Weak CD 
 
The above arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: for stocks with good news in western markets, PEAD will be greater 
                                               
46 Following Hong and Stein’s arguments, it is reasonable to assume that (at least some) 
information-based traders will have little, if any, cultural bias in relation to public news. 
However, the initial response by these investors to earnings surprises is likely to generate a 
culturally-biased response from feedback traders. 




during pessimistic states than during optimistic states, and for stocks with 
bad news in western markets, PEAD will be greater during optimistic states 
than during pessimistic states.  
 
H3: for ESEA markets, limited PEAD may arise under any combination of 
sentiment and earnings surprises. However, the extent of PEAD will be 
greater in western markets than ESEA markets for stocks with good news 
during pessimistic periods and stocks with bad news when sentiment is 
optimistic. 
 
We now consider the interaction of private news, public news, cultural bias 
and sentiment. Specifically, we examine situations in which earnings 
surprises (public news) have the same direction as recent stock price 
movements (assumed to be driven by private news) and the interaction of 
this mix of public and private news with sentiment and cultural beliefs. Thus, 
the analysis is concerned with cases where good news arises for winner 
stocks and bad news occurs in relation to loser stocks. In such situations, 
good (bad) public news reinforces the private news and the cultural beliefs 
associated with winners (losers). 48 , 49  For western investors the winners 
(losers) with good (bad) news will be expected to yield future positive 
(negative) returns and will induce cognitive dissonance during pessimistic 
(optimistic) sentiment periods. For ESEA investors, winners (losers) with 
good (bad) news will be expected by culturally biased investors to reverse, 
again leading to cognitive dissonance in each sentiment state. Exhibit 4.2 
shows expectations based on these culturally-biased responses. 
 
Exhibit 4.2. Cognitive dissonance, momentum, public news and sentiment 
This exhibit summarises cognitive dissonance for winners with ‘good’ news and 
loser with ‘bad’ news in optimistic and pessimistic states for the two cultural 
groups. 
 Westerners – belief in 
continuation 
ESEA – belief in reversal 
 Optimism Pessimism Optimism Pessimism  
Winner with good news No CD CD Weak CD Weak CD 
Loser with bad news CD No CD Weak CD Weak CD 
 
We, therefore, have the following hypotheses: 
                                               
48 When we mention good (bad) news, we refer it to as public news. 
49  It is possible that for (at least some) information-based traders the earnings surprise 
rationalizes the recent price trend and, hence, the belief in continuation or reversal is less 
strong. However, as in the previous case, feedback traders are likely to continue to be 





H4: for winner stocks with good news in western markets PEAD will be 
greater during pessimistic states than optimistic states and for loser stocks 
with bad news in western markets PEAD will be greater during optimistic 
states than pessimistic states. 
 
H5: for ESEA markets limited PEAD may arise under any combination of 
sentiment, momentum and earnings surprise. However, the extent of PEAD 
will be greater in western markets than ESEA markets for winner stocks with 
good news during pessimistic periods and loser stocks with negative bad 
news when sentiment is optimistic. 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Earnings Announcements  
The earnings announcement and analyst forecast data are from the IBES 
International Summary File for all countries, except for the U.S which are 
from the IBES U.S Summary File. Several selection criteria are applied to 
reach our final data sample. First, companies must be listed on a major 
exchange in their home country and cross-listed companies are deleted. 
Second, firms must be represented in both Datastream and IBES databases 
for international markets and in the CRSP and IBES databases for the U.S 
market. The sample period varies across countries due to the availability of 
earnings announcement data.50 Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of 
stock markets and earnings announcements for each country. Our finial 
sample includes 37,567 stocks with earnings announcements available, 
234,719 earnings announcements, and 1,451,933 forecasts in total. There is 
a considerable variation in the number of stocks, earnings announcements 
and forecasts across countries. For example, the U.S has the largest number 
of firms (12,100), earnings announcements (62,430) and forecasts (489,251), 
followed by Japan and the UK.  Hungary has the least number of firms (65) 
and earnings announcement (359) and the Czech Republic has the least 
number of forecasts (2,015). It is worth noting the difference in samples for 
the five western and five ESEA countries used in the later analysis. The 
sample includes 20,445 stocks with earnings announcements available,  
                                               
50 The sample period for each country is the same in this chapter as that in chapter 3 and is 





Table 4.1 Earnings Announcements Descriptive Statistic 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the earnings announcements of 34 stock markets 
in the sample. It reports the name of the country and the number of firms with earnings 
announcements available, the number of announcements and the number of forecasts for 
each country. The earnings announcements data and analyst forecasts data are from the 
IBES International Summary File for all countries, except for the U.S which are from the 
IBES U.S Summary File. Several selection criteria are applied to reach our final data 
sample. First, companies must be listed on a major exchange in their home country and 
cross-listed companies are deleted. Second, firms must be represented in both Datastream 










Argentina 119 798 4,300 Ireland 124 933 3,833 
Australia 1,626 9,159 48,878 Italy 558 4,121 32,975 
Austria 187 1,365 7,072 Japan 2,753 33,017 123,330 
Belgium 221 1,808 10,350 Mexico 264 1,546 11,148 
Brazil 222 1,138 6,624 
Netherland
s 
467 3,322 36,863 
Canada 1,550 7,400 63,348 
New 
Zealand 
207 1,495 6,340 
Chile 178 1,284 3,907 Norway 522 2,796 15,514 
China 1,558 8,755 31,773 Portugal 131 829 5,110 
Czech 
Republic 
84 362 2,015 
South 
Africa 
682 4,262 15,725 
Denmark 405 2,658 13,618 Korea 1,323 8,365 31,448 
Finland 277 2,231 15,348 Spain 384 2,900 32,589 
France 1,474 9,888 65,966 Sweden 849 4,560 24,343 
Germany 1297 8,398 66,336 Switzerland 596 4,057 31,523 
Greece 331 2187 9,387 Thailand 737 2,668 20,567 
Hong 
Kong 
1,215 7,650 54,225 Turkey 498 3,288 18,180 
Hungary 65 359 2,138 
United 
Kingdom 
4,040 26,318 134,533 
Indonesia 523 2,372 13,376 U. S 12,100 62,430 489,251 
Total 37,567 234,719 1,451,933     
  
116,749 earnings announcements and 819,064 forecasts for the west and 
7,586 stocks with earnings announcements available, 60,455 earnings 
announcements and 261,343 forecasts for the east.51 As shown in Table 4.1, 
the U.S. and Japan have the largest number of companies in the west and 
east, respectively, while Germany and Hong Kong have the smallest 
population of firms in the west and east, respectively. There are six countries 
missing in the sample including Bulgaria, Colombia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Russia and Slovenia due to the non-availability of earnings announcements 
data. Earnings surprises (SUE) are calculated as actual earnings per share 
minus the last median analyst consensus forecast before the earnings-
announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the earnings 
                                               




announcement.52 The measure of SUE is discussed in detail in Section 2.4.1. 
To examine PEAD or reversal we take the cumulative abnormal returns of 
stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings 
announcement.5354 The cumulative abnormal return is computed as the buy 
and hold raw return of the stock minus the buy and hold return on the market 
index as follows: 




𝑡=+2                      (4.1) 
rj,y,t is the raw return of stock j for day t relative to the earnings announcement 
y, rmy,t is the market return from the market index for day t relative to the 
earnings announcement y, and n is 60 days. 
 
In each year, all sample stocks are sorted into deciles according to their SUE 
within each country. The top 30% includes stocks with the most positive 
earnings surprises and are defined as stocks with “good news”, while the 
bottom 30% contains the stocks with the most negative earnings surprises 
and are defined as stocks with “bad news”. Returns on these portfolios are 
calculated as average cumulative returns of stocks in these portfolios. For 
each country, we calculate PEAD of good (bad) news stocks as the mean of 
the cumulative abnormal returns of all firm-years observations in the top 
(bottom) 30% of SUE. The country-average returns for good (bad) news 
portfolio across all countries are calculated as the average of PEAD of all 
countries. For example, for each of the 34 countries, PEAD is calculated. 
PEAD of the country-average portfolio for the 34 countries is calculated as 
the mean average of PEAD of the 34 countries. Returns for the pool-average 
portfolio for good (bad) news are calculated as PEAD of all firm-years of all 
available countries in the top (bottom) 30% of SUE.   
                                               
52 Gu and Wu (2003) suggest that the median analyst forecast is a better proxy for the market 
expectation of earnings compared to the mean analyst forecast. The results are qualitatively 
similar when the mean analyst forecast is used and are reported in the appendix. 
53 Berkman and Truong (2009) report that almost 50 percent of earnings announcements 
were made outside trading hours in the U.S in a recent period. They suggest that researchers 
should calculate PEAD from day +2 following the earnings announcement date to avoid 
biasing PEAD upward by any contemporaneous stock price reaction. While we do not know 
the proportion of after-hours earnings announcements in the international stock markets 
because IBES and Bloomberg do not provide a complete time stamp, we choose to be 
conservative in our estimations by starting on day +2 
54 We also examined the cumulative raw returns to measure PEAD. The results are reported 




4.4 Empirical Analysis 
4.4.1 Individualism, Sentiment and PEAD 
 Portfolio Analysis 
We begin by analysing PEAD without any split by sentiment, to establish 
whether PEAD is still evident across countries around the world using recent 
data. Table 4.2 presents results for PEAD following good news and negative 
news, with Panel A of Table 4.2 showing results by country and Panel B 
presenting results for the country- and pool-average portfolios.55 The results 
in Panel A show that 29 out of the 34 countries exhibiting PEAD following 
good news, with 22 out of the 29 countries exhibiting significant PEAD: the 
U.S. has the largest (5.402%), followed by Indonesia (4.998%), Greece 
(3.305%), and Canada (3.193%). PEAD following bad news stocks is in 21 
out of the 34 countries, with PEAD for bad news in 13 out of the 21 countries 
being significantly negative. The largest PEAD following bad news is in 
Argentina (-5.737%), Norway (-3.211%), South Africa (-3.052%), and 
Australia (-2.556%), with all being significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, 
of the five western countries include in the later analysis, for good news, all 
but Germany exhibit significant PEAD while for bad news, all but the UK and 
the U.S. exhibit significant PEAD. Similarly, PEAD is significantly positive 
following good news in all ESEA countries except Korea, while only Korea 
and Thailand exhibit significant PEAD following bad news, with the other 
three countries showing reversal. Panel B of Table 4.2 reports results for the 
country- and pool-average portfolios. The results in Panel B show that PEAD 
to the country- and pool-average portfolios following good news is 1.468% 
and 2.897%, respectively, with both being significant at the 1% level. 
However, PEAD following bad news to the country-average portfolio is a 
significant -0.639% whereas the pool-average portfolio exhibits significant 
reversal.56 In sum, the results for the whole sample periods demonstrate that 
PEAD following good and bad news varies substantially across countries.  
                                               
55 Throughout the paper we treat positive (negative) returns in the period following good (bad) 
news as PEAD. Significant returns in the opposite direction will be referred to as reversal. 
While some of the motivating literature is based on studies of earnings momentum (profits 
resulting from zero-investment portfolios), given the hypotheses developed below, our focus 
is on PEAD, rather than earnings momentum. When we refer simply to momentum profits we 
are referring to price or returns momentum, in line with prior literature. 
56 The returns following both good and bad news for the pool-average portfolio is larger than 
that of the country-average portfolio since the formation of pool-average portfolio is weighted 
average across observations from all countries in the sample. The country that has more 




Table 4.2 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift across Countries 
This table presents post-earnings-announcement drift (%) for good and bad news stocks based on 
earnings surprises for the 34 countries in our sample. Panel A reports PEAD for good news stocks and 
bad news stocks for each of the 34 countries and Panel B reports the results for the pool- and country-
average portfolios. The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to +60 
trading days following the earnings announcement and the abnormal returns are buy and hold stock 
returns minus buy and hold market returns. Stocks in each country are ranked on earnings surprise 
(SUE) from annual earnings announcements. SUE is calculated as the difference between actual 
earnings and the median analyst forecast, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the earnings 
announcement. In each year, stocks are ranked into deciles based on their SUE. SUE1 consists of 
stocks in the bottom 30 percent of earnings surprises and SUE3 consists of stocks in the top 30% of 
earnings surprises in each year in each country. These equally weighted portfolios are held for three 
months from day +2 after the earnings announcement. The pool-average portfolio is the mean average 
of all firm-year observations of the 34 countries. The country-average portfolio consists of equally 
weighted PEAD across the 34 countries. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors 
on the firm level. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level 
of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A: Post-earnings-announcement-drift for each country 
Country Good news Bad news Country Good news  Bad news 
Americas Europe   
Argentina 0.907(0.60) -5.737(-2.83)*** Netherlands 1.368(2.78)*** -0.091(-0.13) 
Brazil 2.286(3.60)*** 0.855(1.01) Norway 0.248(0.46) -3.211(-5.15)*** 
Canada 3.193(9.39)*** -1.162(-2.88)*** Portugal 1.066(1.42) 2.237(1.98)** 
Chile -1.165(-1.40) 1.128(0.96) South Africa -0.729(-1.10) -3.052(-4.35)*** 
Mexico 2.456(3.34)*** 1.755(1.79)* Spain 1.200(1.68)* 0.968(1.01) 
U.S. 5.402(18.86)*** 2.331(7.49)*** Sweden 0.946(2.33)** -1.823(-4.05)*** 
Europe Switzerland 0.328(0.79) -0.579(-1.08)   
Austria 1.454(1.69)* -0.587(-0.54) Turkey 1.986(1.89)* -1.469(-1.27) 






1.059(0.56) -1.421(-0.69) Asia Pacific   
Denmark -0.035(-0.06) -1.030(-1.30) Australia 0.473(1.08) -2.556(-5.17)*** 
Finland 1.306(2.88)*** -1.072(-2.19)** China 1.943(3.51)*** 0.971(1.71)* 
France 0.969(2.99)*** -1.327(-3.47)*** Hong Kong 2.616(4.31)*** 1.175(1.54) 
Germany -1.131(-2.81)*** -1.872(-3.32)*** Indonesia 4.998(4.98)*** -0.240(-0.23) 
Greece 3.305(3.30)*** 0.836(0.76) Japan 2.869(15.0)*** 1.608(8.09)*** 
Hungary 0.017(0.01) -2.687(1.67)* Korea -0.482(-0.68) -2.270(-2.45)** 
Ireland 2.772(1.77)* -2.466(-1.99)** New Zealand 1.454(2.02)** -0.257(-0.25) 
Italy 1.176(2.21)** 0.347(0.58) Thailand 2.563(3.99)*** -2.028(-2.91)*** 







We now consider the results in relation to PEAD and investor sentiment. 
Each month is identified as optimistic, mild or pessimistic. We calculate its 
corresponding sentiment score by using the weighted average scheme as 
follows. The weights 3, 2 and 1 are given to the month t, t-1 and t-2. If the 
weighted average score of the announcement month belongs to the top 
(bottom) 30% of the time series of rolling average sentiment scores, it is 
defined as optimistic (pessimistic), with the rest being mild states. Columns 




good news between optimistic and pessimistic states.57 Under pessimistic 
states, all but six countries (Australia, Chile, Germany, South Africa, Spain 
and Switzerland) show PEAD. PEAD for good news stocks during 
pessimistic states in 15 out of the 34 countries are significant at the 10% level 
or higher. The largest PEAD for good news stocks in pessimistic periods is 
in the U.S (9.26%), followed by Thailand (7.386%), Hong Kong (5.495%) and 
Canada (5.06%). In contrast, during optimistic states, 9 out of the 34 
countries exhibit significant PEAD for good news stocks. The largest PEAD 
for good news stocks in optimistic periods is in Spain (6.317%), Portugal 
(4.902%), Brazil (4.394%) and Indonesia (4.353%), with all being significant 
at the 1% level. The difference in PEAD for good news stocks between 
optimism and pessimism is negative in 20 out of the 34 countries and is 
statistically significant in 23 cases, with 15 differences being significantly 
negative. The finding suggests that there is clear evidence of a slower 
diffusion of good news during pessimistic periods. 
 
The results in Columns 2 and 5 of Table 4.3 allow examination of PEAD for 
bad news stocks under optimism and pessimism. The findings provide a 
remarkable difference in PEAD for bad news stocks between optimism and 
pessimism. During optimistic periods, all but seven countries (Brazil, China, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Portugal and Spain) exhibit PEAD. PEAD 
for bad news stocks in 17 out of the 34 countries in optimistic periods is 
significant at the 10% level or higher. The largest PEAD following bad news 
in optimistic periods is in the Korea (-9.63%), Finland (-6.87%) and South 
Africa (-4.151%). However, during pessimistic states, only 4 out of the 34 
countries (Argentina, Australia, China and Germany) show significant PEAD. 
                                               
57 The magnitude of post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) for some countries during 
optimistic or pessimistic states is much larger than that without splitting by investor sentiment. 
However, the value is comparable to that of other studies (see, for example, Livnat and 
Petrovits, 2008; Antoniou et al., 2013; Dou et al., 2015). For example, Antoniou et al. (2013) 





Table 4.3 Post-Earnings Announcement-Drift and Investor Sentiment 
This table reports post-earnings-announcement drift (%) for good news and bad news stocks during optimistic and pessimistic periods for each of the 34 countries 
(Panel A) and the pool-average and country-average portfolios (Panel B). The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading 
days following the earnings announcements and the abnormal returns are calculated as buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold market returns. Since we are 
not interested in the momentum profits during mild state, only results for optimistic and pessimistic states are reported. The formation of good news portfolios and bad 
news portfolios is discussed in detail in Table 4.2. Each month is identified as optimistic, mild or pessimistic. We calculate its corresponding sentiment score by using 
the weighted average scheme as follows. The weights 3, 2 and 1 are given to the month t, t-1 and t-2. If the weighted average score of the announcement month 
belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the time series of rolling average sentiment scores, it is defined as optimistic (pessimistic), with the rest being mild states. The 
formation of the country-average and pool-average portfolios is discussed in detail in Table 4.2. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on the 
firm level. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. country momentum profits and sentiment states 
Country Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.-Pess. 
  Good news Bad news Good news Bad news Good news Bad news 
Americas       
Argentina 0.408(0.35) -1.929(-1.09) 2.798(0.86) -11.396(-2.04)** -2.390(-0.68) 9.467(1.65)* 
Brazil 4.394(5.374)*** 1.133(1.01) 0.281(0.13) 10.131(3.83)*** 4.113(3.80)*** -8.998(-3.05)*** 
Canada 1.109(2.19)** -2.594(-3.96)*** 5.060(7.37)*** 0.384(1.50) -3.951(-3.28)*** -2.978(-2.98)*** 
Chile -0.523(-0.38) -1.572(-0.95) -4.287(-1.79)* 2.792(1.51) 3.764(1.32) -4.364(-1.99)** 
U.S. 1.589(3.09)*** -2.803(-5.01)*** 9.260(14.91)*** 8.048(11.32)*** -7.671(-9.78)*** -10.851(-13.01)*** 
Europe       
Austria 1.172(0.78) -1.542(-0.86) 1.685(1.01) 0.715(0.38) -0.513(-0.39) -2.257(-1.35) 
Belgium 0.387(0.36) -0.868(-0.98) 1.582(1.67)* 2.455(1.77)* -1.195(-1.16) -3.323(-2.26)** 
Czech Republic 3.445(1.09) 0.447(0.18) 2.244(0.67) -5.484(-1.52) 1.201(0.47) 5.931(1.68)* 
Denmark -0.324(-0.33) -4.127(-4.35)*** 1.650(1.24) 2.125(1.04) -1.974(-1.69)* -6.252(-5.14)*** 
Finland -1.891(-2.12)** -6.870(-7.17)*** 4.428(5.63)*** 0.573(0.65) -6.319(-6.26)*** -7.443(-8.37)*** 
France -0.328(-0.60) -2.883(-4.26)*** 1.558(2.41)** 0.421(0.56) -1.886(-3.13)*** -3.304(-4.80)*** 
Germany -2.143(-3.33)*** -3.371(-4.32)*** -2.372(-3.21)*** -3.782(-4.35)*** 0.229(0.21) 0.411(0.15) 




Hungary 4.199(1.54) 1.738(0.44) 1.621(0.62) -1.999(-0.80) 2.578(1.03) 3.737(1.31) 
Indonesia 4.353(3.38)*** -3.739(-2.76)*** 2.273(0.92) -2.389(-1.15) 2.080(2.15)** -1.350(-1.16) 
Ireland 1.838(0.50) -2.827(-1.41) 1.256(0.61) -3.124(-1.08) 0.582(0.13) 0.297(0.23) 
Italy 0.834(0.71) -2.486(-2.66)*** 0.808(0.79) 1.824(1.56) 0.026(0.09) -4.310(-3.47)*** 
Mexico 0.001(0.01) 0.103(0.69) 2.018(1.23) 3.384(1.88)* -2.017(-1.73)* -3.281(-2.12)** 
Netherland -0.725(-0.82) -2.781(-2.09)** 3.133(2.83)*** 4.823(3.13)*** -3.858(-3.13)*** -7.604(-4.93)*** 
Norway 0.223(0.31) -3.210(-2.86)*** 3.259(2.65)*** -0.816(-0.23) -3.167(-2.14)** -2.720(-2.29)** 
Portugal 4.902(3.15)*** 3.511(1.49) 1.366(1.09) 1.725(0.96) 3.536(1.99)** 1.786(1.01) 
South Africa 0.714(0.76) -4.151(-4.270)*** -3.190(-1.83)* -1.594(-0.91) 3.904(2.01)** -2.557(-1.69)* 
Spain 6.317(2.93)*** 0.522(0.37) -2.033(-1.40) -0.217(-0.11) 8.350(4.01)*** 0.739(0.65) 
Sweden 0.166(0.28) -3.672(-5.74)*** 2.546(2.75)*** 1.957(2.14)** -2.380(-2.37)** -5.629(-3.27)*** 
Switzerland 0.686(1.01) -0.966(-1.14) -1.157(-1.48) -2.212(-1.15) 1.843(1.98)** 1.246(0.78) 
Turkey 0.551(0.48) -2.026(-1.41) 1.724(0.54) -1.204(-0.30) -1.173(-0.43) -0.822(-1.02) 
United Kingdom -0.006(-0.01) -0.496(-0.95) 4.183(7.12)*** 2.064(2.19)** -4.189(-7.21)*** -2.560(-2.48)** 
Asia Pacific       
Australia 1.603(1.98)** -2.042(-2.22)** -0.166(-0.27) -1.543(-1.67)* 1.769(2.07)** -0.499(-0.96) 
China 2.964(1.69)* 2.059(1.71)* 0.484(0.77) -1.759(-1.81)* 2.480(1.78)* 3.818(1.86)* 
Hong Kong -1.769(-1.43) -3.228(-1.72)* 5.495(4.07)*** 3.670(2.31)** -7.264(-5.51)*** -6.898(-3.12)*** 
Japan 1.542(4.91)*** -0.959(-3.27)*** 2.916(7.81)*** 2.037(5.20)*** -1.374(-2.39)** -2.996(-7.60)*** 
Korea -5.923(-5.38)*** -9.360(-6.79)*** 3.548(2.10)** 5.272(2.62)*** -9.471(-6.16)*** -14.632(-8.10)*** 
New Zealand 1.760(1.24) -1.243(-0.58) 2.045(1.78)* 2.068(1.32) -0.285(-0.43) -3.311(-1.60) 
Thailand 1.863(1.65) -2.773(-2.39)** 7.386(4.65)*** -1.270(-0.79) -5.523(-4.12)*** -1.503(-1.52) 
Panel B. Pool-average and country-average portfolios 
Pool-average 0.713(3.66)*** -2.398(-10.77)*** 4.133(19.81)*** 2.557(10.43)*** -3.420(-11.89)*** -4.955(-13.39)*** 




The difference in PEAD for bad news stocks between optimism and 
pessimism is negative in 25 out of the 34 countries, with the difference being 
significantly negative in 18 cases. The results indicate that bad news diffuses 
slowly during optimistic periods, resulting in higher PEAD. 
 
It is worth noting the difference in results for the five western and five ESEA 
countries used in the later analysis. In the case of western markets, in four 
out of the five countries, PEAD following good news is significant under 
pessimism, with their differences between optimism and pessimism being 
significantly negative. In relation to bad news, PEAD under optimism is 
significant in four out of the five countries. Similarly, for ESEA markets, PEAD 
following good news under pessimism is significant in all five countries and 
PEAD following bad news stocks under optimism is significant in all five 
countries except for China.  
 
Examination of Panel B shows that PEAD following good (bad) news is 
positive (negative) and significant at the 1% level under pessimism (optimism) 
for both country- and pool-average portfolios. The difference in PEAD 
following good (bad) news between optimism and pessimism is of the 
expected sign and significant in both country- and pool-average portfolios. 
Taken together, the results in Table 4.3 clearly demonstrate the difference in 
PEAD for good and bad news stocks between sentiment states across 
countries. We now turn to consider the interaction between culture and 
sentiment and test our first hypothesis. 
 
Table 4.4 presents results where the roles of culture and sentiment are 
considered in relation to PEAD. Double sorts are undertaken on the 
individualism index and sentiment. Each country in the sample is categorised 
into one of three culture measure groups based on their scores on the 
individualism index (IDV). 58  Specifically, using the IDV, we separate 
countries into the top and bottom 30%, with the middle 40% being excluded 
from the analysis. Results are reported for the pool-average portfolio on 
these splits.59 The table is divided into three panels and in each panel PEAD 
is shown for good news stocks and bad news stocks. Before going on to 
consider the role of sentiment, Panel A of Table 4.4 provides the results split 
                                               
58 The cut-off points are 30/40/30.  




by individualism only. There is a clear difference in PEAD between high and 
low individualism countries. Both high and low individualistic countries exhibit 
significant PEAD following good news whereas both high and low 
individualistic countries exhibit reversal following bad news, with the former 
being significant. Also, the magnitude of PEAD following good news and 
reversal following bad news in the high individualism culture group is much 
higher than that in the low individualism group, respectively. Specifically, 
PEAD for good news stocks in the high and low individualism countries is 
3.876% and 1.987%, respectively, with the difference being significantly 
positive. Similarly, reversal for bad news stocks in the high and low 
individualism culture groups is 1.137% and 0.080%, with the difference being 
significant at the 1% level. A key question is whether these findings apply in 
all sentiment states or are driven by differences across the states. 
 
The results in Panels B and C of Table 4.4 allow us to investigate this issue 
and to test hypothesis H1 which states that the effect of investor sentiment 
on PEAD following both good and bad news will be more pronounced in 
individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures, since people in 
individualistic cultures will experience stronger cognitive dissonance than 
those in collectivistic cultures. The results of PEAD in optimistic and 
pessimistic states are shown for high individualism countries in Panel B and 
Panel C shows those for low individualism countries. The findings provide 
clear evidence of interaction between sentiment and culture. For the high 
individualism group, PEAD following good news is 6.420% under pessimism, 
which is significant at the 1% level and the difference in PEAD following good 
news between optimism and pessimism is significantly negative, suggesting 
good news diffuses slowly under pessimism. In contrast, PEAD following 
good news in the low individualism group drops dramatically to 1.940% 
compared to that in the high group (6.420%). The evidence reveals that good 
news diffuses much more slowly under pessimism in the high individualism 
group than in the low individualism group, consistent with H1 for good news. 
In other words, underreaction is much stronger in the high individualism 
countries than in the low individualism countries. In relation to bad news, 
again for high individualism markets, PEAD is –2.302% under optimism, 
which is significant at the 1% level and the difference between optimism and 
pessimism is -6.980%, which is significant at the 1% level, suggesting bad 




Table 4.4 Post-Earnings Announcement-Drift, Individualism and Investor 
Sentiment 
This table presents the pool-average results for post-earnings-announcement drift 
(%) following good news and bad news sorted by investor sentiment and 
individualism index. The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of 
stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings announcement and 
the abnormal returns are buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold market 
returns. Each country is categorised into either the top or bottom 30% based on 
the individualism index score, or the middle 40% which is excluded from the 
analysis. The announcement month is identified as optimism, mild or pessimism. 
The definition of sentiment states of the announcement month is discussed in 
detail in Table 4.3. The formation of the pool-average portfolio is discussed in 
detail in Table 4.2. Panel A reports PEAD for good news and bad news stocks 
sorted by the individualism index. Panels B and C present PEAD for good news 
and bad news stocks across sentiment states in the high and low individualism 
culture groups, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered 
standard errors on the firm level. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%). 
Pool-average portfolio PEAD 
  Good news Bad news 
Individualism level 
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism 
High IDV  3.876(22.08)*** 1.137(5.73)*** 
Low IDV  1.987(7.73)*** 0.080(0.28) 
High. - Low.  1.889(7.21)*** 1.057(5.23)*** 
Sentiment level 
Panel B. High Individualism 
Optimistic  1.122(3.49)*** -2.302(-6.42)*** 
Pessimistic  6.420(18.02)*** 4.678(10.85)*** 
Opt. - Pes.  -5.298(-12.13)*** -6.980(-15.31)*** 
Panel C. Low Individualism 
Optimistic  -0.858(-1.85)* -1.427(-2.91)*** 
Pessimistic  1.940(4.67)*** -0.017(-0.13) 
Opt.-Pes.  -2.798(-6.21)*** -1.410(2.78)*** 
 
group, while PEAD following bad news stocks is -1.427%, which is significant 
at the 1% level, its magnitude (1.427%) is smaller than that for the high 
individualism group (2.302%). The results in two Panels allow us to compare 
the difference in PEAD of good and bad news across the two sentiment 
states between the two culture groups. During optimistic (pessimistic) 
periods, the difference in PEAD following bad (good news) between the two 
culture groups is significant -0.875% (4.480%), suggesting that the 
underreaction of good (bad) news stocks under pessimism (optimism) is 
stronger in the high individualistic cultures than in the low individualistic 
cultures, consistent with our first hypothesis.60 
                                               
60 The difference in PEAD following both good and bad news across difference sentiment 




 Regression Analysis 
We next investigate the impact of sentiment, individualism and their 
interaction on PEAD in a multivariate regression setting by taking account of 
other potential determinants of PEAD that vary across countries. In particular, 
we regress PEAD for good and bad news stocks on the sentiment index, 
individualism, the interaction variable between sentiment and individualism, 
and other control variables, respectively, as in the following model: 
Exret𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑉 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑉 + γ ∗
control                                                      (4.2) 
Exret𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑉 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝑉 + γ ∗
control                                                      (4.3) 
Where Exreti,t is cumulative returns of the good or bad news portfolio for 60 
days minus the corresponding cumulative returns on the market index for 
country i in year t as shown in the equation 4.1. IDVj is a categorical variable 
of IDV index of country j equals 1 (-1) if the IDV score belongs to the top 
(bottom) 30% of their scores, otherwise 0. Sent is a categorical variable 
which equals 1 (-1) if the monthly sentiment of each country belongs to the 
optimistic (pessimistic) group with the rest being 0. IDV*SENT is the 
individualism and sentiment interaction variable. We follow Dou et al. (2015) 
to use the country and time fixed effects in the regression. Standard errors 
are clustered by country and year. We follow Chui et al. (2010) and Dou et 
al. (2015) to include other cross-country variables that may explain cross-
country variations in PEAD. The potential variables are classified as firm 
characteristics, financial market development, institutional quality and 
macroeconomic variables which are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Table 4.5 presents the results of equations (4.2) and (4.3), respectively. We 
first consider the results in relation to good news as shown in the first three 
columns of Table 4.5. In model 1, we regress abnormal cumulative returns of 
the good news portfolio only on the individualism index and the sentiment 
index and the estimated coefficients on IDV and sent are 0.04 and -0.0112, 
respectively, with both being significant at the 5% level. It suggests that 
PEAD of good news is more pronounced during periods of pessimism and in 
the high individualistic culture countries. In model 2, the model 1 is extended 
by adding the interaction variable (IDV*Sent) between individualism and 




Table 4.5 Determinants of PEAD across Countries 
PEAD on good and bad news portfolios are regressed on the categorical individualism index (IDV) and 
categorical sentiment (sent) variables, respectively. The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal 
returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings announcements and the abnormal 
returns are buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold market returns. The categorical variable of 
IDV index equals 1 (-1) if IDV score belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of their scores, otherwise 0. Sent is 
a categorical variable which equals 1 (-1) if the monthly sentiment of each country belongs to the 
optimistic (pessimistic) group with the rest being 0. IDV*SENT is the individualism and sentiment 
interaction variable. Model (3) and (6) report the results with control variables, including firm 
characteristics, financial market development, and institutional quality variables. The firm characteristics 
variables include the natural logarithm of market trading volume (LnTV), the natural logarithm of stock 
market volatility (LnV), the natural logarithm of analyst coverage, the natural logarithm of the dispersion 
of analyst forecasts (LnDISP), the cash flows growth rate volatility (VolFCF), the logarithm of median firm 
size (LnSISE) and the average price to book ratio (PB). The financial market development variables 
include the total private credit expressed as the ratio of GDP (CREDIT), the average common language 
dummy variable (LANG), the ratio between the monthly market value of the S&P-IFC market index and 
the monthly market value of the S&P-IFC investable index (OPEN), and an index on control of capital 
flows (CONTRL). The institutional quality variables include the insider index (INSIDER, a high value 
suggests that insider trading is less prominent), the ICRG corruption index the ICRG (CORRP), the ICRG 
political risk index (POLITICAL), the natural logarithm of the transaction cost index (LnTRAN), and the 
investor protection index (PROTECTION). The macroeconomic variables include the GDP growth rate 
(GDP) and inflation rate (Inflation). Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Corresponding t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%). 
 Good news Bad news 






















































































LnCov   
0.0032 
(1.49) 





LnDISP   
-0.0099 
(-1.61) 





VolFCF   
0.023 
(1.41) 





LnSIZE   
0.0014 
(0.41) 





PB   
-0.0013 
(-0.62) 





CREDIT   
0.0014 
(0.71) 
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0.0014 
(1.32) 

























LnTRAN   
0.0014 
(0.71) 



















(-0.93) (0.91)  










INFLATION   
0.0001 
(0.23) 





N 60,005 60,005 60,005 60,005 60,646 60,646 60,646 60,646 
R squared (%) 3.21 3.43 5.86 4.14 3.24 3.50 5.96 4.31 
 
at the 10% level, suggesting that the effect of investor sentiment on PEAD of 
good news is more prominent in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic 
cultures, consistent with our first hypothesis for good news. We further 
consider whether the explanatory power of independent variables can be 
subsumed by the control variables in model 3. The results indicate that while 
controlling for other explanatory variables, IDV, Sent and IDV*Sent are 
significant at the 10% level or higher. Furthermore, we notice that PEAD for 
good news stocks increases in stock market volatility, cash flow growth rate 
volatility and the level of political risk and decreases in stock market volatility, 
the level of common language, the level of stock market openness and the 
level of insider trading. In model (4), we present regressions that include only 
those variables that are significant at the 10% level or higher in model (3). 
The significance level and magnitude of those variables remain qualitatively 
similar to model (3).  
 
We next turn to consider the results in relation to bad news as shown in the 
last three columns of Table 4.5. Similarly, in model 5, PEAD for bad news 
stocks is only regressed on IDV and Sent and the estimated coefficients are 
-0.0165 and 0.0002, respectively, with both being significant at the 5% level 
or higher, suggesting that PEAD for bad news stocks is significantly higher 
during optimistic periods and in the high individualistic culture countries. The 
interaction variable, IDV*Sent is incorporated in model 6 and others cross-
country variables are considered in model 7. The results in model 6 show 
that the interaction term is -0.0003, which is significant at the 1% level and 
IDV and Sent remain significant and of the expected sign. After controlling 
for other explanatory variables in model 7, IDV, Sent and IDV*Sent still 
remains significant and of the expected sign. In model 8, we present 
regressions that include only those variables that are significant at the 10% 
level of higher. The regression includes stock market volatility, dispersion of 
analyst forecasts, cash flow volatility, price to book ratio, common language 
dummy variable, stock openness, insider index, political risk index and GDP 




those in previous regressions. The results are consistent with H1 for bad 
news: the effect of investor sentiment on PEAD of bad news is more 
pronounced in high individualistic cultures than in low individualistic cultures. 
There is some evidence that PEAD for bad news stocks increases in the level 
of common language and the level of political risk and decreases in stocks 
market volatility, cash flow growth rate volatility and the level of openness, 
with the level of openness being significant at the 10% level and other 
variables being significant at the 5% level or higher. 
4.4.2 Cognitive dissonance and PEAD: Western and ESEA 
cultures 
In this section, we now turn to examine hypotheses 2-5 in relation to 
differences in behaviour between western and ESEA countries and the 
impact of these differences on PEAD. We only include good news stocks with 
positive earnings surprises and bad news stocks with negative earnings 
surprises. 
 
The analysis of PEAD for the ten countries begins without any split based on 
sentiment, to establish whether or not PEAD is evident in the sample 
countries. Table 4.6 shows PEAD for good news and bad news stocks. 
Results for each country are shown in Panel A and Panels B and C present 
results for the country- and pool-average portfolios for western and ESEA 
markets, respectively. In Panel A, it can be seen that in nine out of the ten 
countries PEAD following good news is positive and significant. The 
exception is Germany where returns in the post-announcement period are 
significantly negative (reversal). The highest returns in the western sample 
are the two North American markets, while in the ESEA sample Thailand and 
Japan have the highest PEAD. From Panel B, it is evident that in both 
western and ESEA markets PEAD on the pool-average portfolio is significant 
following good news, with the former being significantly higher.61 As shown 
in Panel C, for the country-average portfolio, both western and ESEA 
markets exhibit significant PEAD following good news but there is no 
significant difference in PEAD following good news between the culture  
Table 4.6 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift for Western and ESEA Countries 
                                               
61 Comparing the results in table 4,2 for the ten countries to those in table 4.6, we see there 
are some minor differences. This is due to the additional filter applied for this section of only 
including in our sample good news stocks that have positive earnings surprises and bad news 




This table reports the post-earnings announcement drift (%) for the ten countries in 
the sample. Panel A reports PEAD for good and bad news stocks for each of the 10 
countries and Panels B and C report the results for the pool-average and country-
average portfolios, respectively. The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal 
returns (market-adjusted) of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the 
earnings announcement and the abnormal returns are buy and hold stock returns 
minus buy and hold market returns. Earnings surprises are measured as actual 
earnings per share minus the last median analyst consensus forecast before the 
earnings-announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the earnings 
announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked on earnings 
surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with “good” (“bad”) 
news. Earnings surprises for each stock in the good (bad) news portfolios must be 
larger (less) than 0%. Returns on these portfolios are calculated as the average of 
returns of stocks in these portfolios. The formation of the country-average and pool-
average portfolios is discussed in detail in Table 4.2. The t-statistics are calculated 
using clustered standard errors on the firm level. Corresponding t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** 
(5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. PEAD by country 
 Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 
ESEA-Belief in reversal 




Canada 3.157(9.11)*** China 2.000(3.51)*** 
France 0.884(2.69)*** Hong Kong 0.921(1.81)* 
Germany -0.997(-2.27)** Japan 2.836(13.44)*** 
UK 1.885(7.11)*** Korea 1.024(2.19)** 
U.S. 6.369(16.71)*** Thailand 3.298(3.37)*** 
Bad 
news 
Canada -0.635(-1.71)* China 0.954(1.72)* 
France -1.514(-3.21)*** Hong Kong -0.252(-0.43) 
Germany -1.762(-3.28)*** Japan 1.591(8.01)*** 
UK 0.283(0.93) Korea 1.648(2.18)** 
U.S. 4.345(9.89)*** Thailand -0.042(-0.09) 









3.942(8.43)*** 2.243(3.34)*** 1.699(3.01)*** 
Bad news 1.764(3.59)*** 1.203(2.27)** 0.561(1.98)** 








news 2.260(1.83)* 2.016(4.25)*** 0.244(0.184) 




The picture relating to bad news is less clear cut. PEAD is significant in 
Canada, France and Germany, but insignificantly different from zero in the 
UK and there is significant reversal in the U.S. For ESEA markets, there is 
mixed evidence of PEAD following bad news: returns are insignificantly 
different from zero in Hong Kong and Thailand but there is significant reversal 




significant reversal in both western and ESEA markets following bad news. 
The country-average results in Panel C show that the returns following bad 
news are insignificantly different from zero in western markets whereas the 
country-average portfolio for ESEA countries exhibit significant reversal 
following bad news. Thus, in both cultures there is evidence of an upward 
drift in prices following both good and bad news. While an upward drift is 
consistent with PEAD following good news, in relation to bad news the results 
suggest reversal in prices and a possible initial overreaction to the negative 
shock.62 
 
We now go on to consider the hypotheses relating to PEAD by splitting our 
sample based on sentiment. Table 4.7 presents results for our sample 
countries (Panel A) and for the country- and pool-average portfolios (Panels 
B and C). Recall that H2 hypothesised in western markets PEAD will be 
greater in pessimistic states for good news and greater in optimistic states 
for bad news. For western markets, during optimistic periods, only Canada 
exhibits significant PEAD for good news, with the U.S having sizeable but 
insignificant PEAD and the other three European countries exhibiting 
reversal, with only Germany’s being significant. In contrast, during 
pessimistic periods, four out of the five western countries show significant 
PEAD following good news, with Germany being the exception with 
significant reversal. As far as the pooled average results are concerned as 
in Panel B, for western markets, there is no evidence of PEAD following good 
news during optimistic states, but significant PEAD when sentiment is 
pessimistic. The country-average results in Panel C are qualitatively similar 
to those reported in Panel B. The results in both Panels B and C are 
consistent with H2 for good news. Turning to negative news in western 
markets, PEAD is found in all five markets during optimistic periods, with all 
but the UK being significant at the 1% level. However, when sentiment is 
pessimistic, only Germany exhibits significant PEAD, with the other four 
cases having positive returns, indicating reversal and possible initial 
overreaction. The pooled average results in Panel B confirm this pattern, with 
returns being significantly negative under optimism, but significantly positive 
when sentiment is pessimistic. The country-average results in Panel C show 
a similar pattern to the pooled average results in Panel B. Thus, for western  
                                               
62 The reversal in the pool-average portfolio of bad news is mainly dominated by the results 




Table 4.7 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift and Sentiment for Western and 
ESEA Countries 
This table reports post-earnings-announcement drift (%) for good and bad news 
stocks during optimistic and pessimistic states for each of the 10 countries (Panel 
A) and the pool-average portfolio (Panel B) and the country-average portfolio (Panel 
C). The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to 
+60 trading days following the earnings announcement and the abnormal returns 
are buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold market returns. Earnings are 
measured as actual earnings per share minus the last median analyst consensus 
forecast before the earnings-announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days 
prior to the earnings announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked 
on earnings surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with 
“good” (“bad”) news. Earnings surprises for each stock in the good (bad) news 
portfolios must be larger (less) than 0%. The definition of sentiment states of the 
announcement month is discussed in detail in Table 4.3. The formation of the 
country-average and pool-average portfolios is discussed in detail in Table 4.2. The 
t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. 
Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the 
level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. PEAD by country 
 Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 
ESEA-Belief in reversal 


























































































Panel B. Pool-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 
ESEA-Belief in reversal 



































 Opt. Pess. 
Good news 0.218(0.41) 4.834(3.77)*** 
Bad news -1.469(-2.89)*** 4.250(3.21)*** 
Panel C. Country-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 





































 Opt. Pess. 
Good news 
-0.194(-0.09) 0.341(0.15) 
Bad news -0.510(-0.31) -0.501(-0.20) 
 
countries, there is strong evidence of PEAD following bad news under 
optimism, but reversal under pessimism, with the differences being 
statistically significant, again consistent with H2 for bad news.  
 
It is hypothesised (H3) that for eastern markets PEAD may be evident in any 
combination of earnings surprises and sentiment, but that PEAD will be less 
evident in ESEA countries than in western countries for good news during 
pessimistic periods and bad news during optimistic periods. Again, the 
results are consistent with the hypothesis: there is evidence in Panel A of 
significant PEAD in all four combinations of earnings surprises and sentiment 
(for example, when sentiment is optimistic and news is good (bad)), with bad 
news during pessimistic states showing the lowest number of countries with 
PEAD (only two) and three countries exhibiting reversal. Specifically, for 
good news stocks, two and four out of the five countries showing significant 
PEAD under optimism and pessimism, respectively. For bad news stocks, all 
but China exhibit significant PEAD under optimism, with China showing 
significant reversal, whereas only China shows significant PEAD under 
pessimism. Results in Panel B provide evidence for the hypothesis in three 
out of the four combinations (news interact with sentiment), with reversal for 
bad news when sentiment is pessimistic. While the differences in returns 
between optimism and pessimism are of the expected sign and significant 
asfor the western culture, those relating to the east are of a much smaller 
magnitude. The results of the country-average portfolio in Panel C are 
qualitatively similar to those of the pool-average portfolio in Panel B. 
 
Consideration of differences between the western and ESEA markets show 
significant differences in PEAD of the pool-average portfolio (Panel B) for 




H3.63 In Panel C, for the pool-average portfolio, there is strong evidence of 
PEAD following bad news being significant higher in western countries than 
in ESEA countries and significant difference in PEAD following good news 
under pessimism between the two culture groups. The evidence for the pool-
average portfolio is consistent with H3 for both good and bad news.64  
 
Therefore, the results in Table 4.7 are general consistent with the hypotheses 
and again suggest that cognitive dissonance and cultural differences 
between the west and east result in differences in the extent of the anomaly 
in the two culture groups.  
4.4.3 Cognitive Dissonance, PEAD and Momentum Profits: 
Western and ESEA Cultures 
Our final hypothesis relates to the extent of PEAD for stocks that are both 
recent momentum winners with good news and recent momentum loser 
stocks with bad news. These are subsets of the samples examined in Table 
4.7 and can be considered to be the most extreme cases in terms of both 
momentum and earnings surprises. Within the Hong and Stein (1999) 
framework, for these stocks there is assumed to be both private news 
(diffusing via the actions of information-based traders and reflected in 
momentum) and public news (the earnings surprises). Results relating to 
these portfolios split by sentiment are presented in Table 4.8, with Panel A 
again showing findings for individual countries and Panel B those for the 
pool- and country-average portfolios.65 The two hypotheses for this part of 
the analysis are directly analogous to the two previous hypotheses relating 
to earnings surprises only. Specifically, for western markets, PEAD will be 
greater for winner (loser) stocks with good (bad) news during pessimistic 
(optimistic) periods (H4); and for ESEA markets PEAD may arise under any 
combination of sentiment and momentum and earnings surprises, but for the 
                                               
63 While the difference is also significant for bad news when sentiment is pessimistic, this 
relates to reversal, rather than PEAD. 
64 The difference in PEAD following good (bad) news during pessimistic (optimistic) periods 
between the two culture groups is insignificant. However, the t-stats are calculated based on 
five figures. 
65 For some of these cells the number of observations is small, particularly for ESEA markets 
and there is some clustering of observations. For example, while for the western markets the 
smallest number of observations in any combination of sentiment and winner (loser) with good 
(bad) earnings news is 183, for 12 of the 20 combinations for ESEA countries the sample is 
below 100, with the lowest being 45 observations. In addition, for China there are 68 
observations, but 62 fall within the same five-month period. As such the results on a country 




two higher PEAD categories identified in relation to H5, PEAD will be lower 
for ESEA markets than for western market (H5). To test these hypotheses, 
sentiment and momentum portfolios are identified in month t and stocks with 
earnings announcement in month t+1 are identified. An event study is 
performed to examine the PEAD for winners with good news and losers with 
bad news.  
 
In western markets, Panel A shows that for winners with good news, there is 
a mixed picture for individual countries when sentiment is optimistic: the three 
European countries exhibit no PEAD whereas North American markets have 
significantly positive returns during the post-announcement period. Winners 
with good news during pessimism yield significant PEAD for two out of the 
five markets. Examination of Panels B and C of the pool-average and 
country-average portfolios shows that there is clear evidence of PEAD for 
winners during pessimistic periods. The difference between the two 
sentiment states is significant at the 1% level. For loser stocks with bad news, 
significant PEAD is evident for all five western countries during optimistic 
periods, but only one country (Germany) when sentiment is pessimistic 
(Panel A). Indeed, the significant reversal can be seen for four out of the five 
western markets under pessimism. Results for both pool-average (Panel B) 
and country-average portfolios (Panel C) provide clear evidence of PEAD for 
losers with bad news when sentiment is optimistic, and significant reversal 
when sentiment is pessimistic, with the difference again being statistically 
significant. Overall, the results are consistent with H4. 
 
As far as the ESEA markets are concerned, there is mix evidence of PEAD 
for winner stocks with good news during optimistic periods, with two being 
significantly different from zero. During pessimistic periods, three out of the 
five showing significant PEAD. For loser stocks with bad news, returns are 
negative for four out of the five countries under optimism, with two of these 
being significant, while all five countries show reversal under pessimism, with 
four being significantly different from zero. Results in Panels B and C of Table 
4.8 demonstrate that PEAD is evident only for winner stocks with good news 
under pessimism for ESEA countries. However, while the portfolio of loser 
stocks with bad news generates significantly higher PEAD under optimism 
for the western markets than for the ESEA markets, consistent with H5, the 




Table 4.8 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Momentum and Sentiment for 
Western and ESEA Countries 
This table reports post earnings announcement drift (%) for winner stocks with good 
news and losers with bad news during optimistic and pessimistic states for each of 
the 10 countries (Panel A) and for the pool-average portfolio (Panel B) and for the 
country-average portfolio (Panel C). The drift is calculated as the cumulative 
abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings 
announcement and the abnormal returns re buy and hold stock returns minus buy 
and hold market returns. Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share 
minus the last median analyst consensus forecast before the earnings-
announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the earnings 
announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked into deciles based 
on earnings surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with 
“good” (“bad”) news. The definition of sentiment states of the announcement month 
is discussed in detail in Table 4.3. Momentum portfolios are defined in Table 3.2. 
Stocks with earnings announcement in month t+1 is identified and an event study 
is performed to examine the post earnings announcement drift. Returns on these 
portfolios are calculated as average returns of stocks in these portfolios. The 
formation of the country-average and pool-average portfolios is discussed in detail 
in Table 4.2. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on the 
firm level. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer 
to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
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Panel B. Pool-average portfolio 
 Western ESEA 



























































































pessimistic, which is not in line with H5.66 
 
Overall, the results in relation to PEAD across the two groups of five 
countries are broadly consistent with expectations for hypotheses 2-5 with 
the exception of one group for H5. These findings are consistent with the 
view that differences between western and ESEA cultures and the 
associated impact on cognitive dissonance explain differences in PEAD 
across the two groups of countries. 
4.5 Robustness tests 
4.5.1 An Alternative Individualism Index 
To examine the robustness of our results for 34 countries, we follow Chui et 
al. (2010) and collect an alternative measure of individualism from the 
GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness) 
project. 67  We collect the country scores on the GLOBE’s institutional 
collectivism (IndvGLOBE) dimension for our sample from House et al. (2004). 
To be consistent with Hofstede’s individualism index, we define a new 
variable IndvGLOBE, which is equal to GLOBE’s institutional collectivism times 
-1. Thus, a higher value of IndvGLOBE suggests a higher degree of 
individualism of the country. We construct is a categorical variable of 
IndvGLOBE index of country j equals 1 (-1) if IDV score belongs to the top 
(bottom) 30% of their scores, otherwise 0. Our regression models shown in 
equations (4.2) and (4.3) are re-estimated, with Hofstede’s individualism 
index being replaced with GLOBE’s institutional collectivism. 68  The two 
indices are highly correlated so the categorical variable of GLOBE 
individualism is almost identical to the categorical variable of Hofstede’s 
individualism. We expect the coefficient on the GLOBE individualism index 
is qualitative similar to that of Hofstede’s individualism index. The regression 
                                               
66 A possible explanation for this finding is that the belief in reversal in relation to momentum, 
coupled with pessimism leads to an initial underreaction to the positive earnings surprise. 
67 The GLOBE individualism index is discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
68 The two individualism indices are highly correlated so the categorical variable of GLOBE 
individualism is almost identical to the categorical variable of Hofstede’s individualism. We 
expect the coefficient on the GLOBE individualism index is qualitative similar to that of 




results are shown in Table 4.9. We find the IndvGLOBE coefficient to be positive 
and significant at the 5% level and the interaction term between individualism 
and sentiment remains significant at the 10% level or higher. Overall, the 
results are robust regardless of whether we use the GLOBE collectivism 
index or Hofstede’s individualism index. 
  
Table 4.9 Determinants of PEAD across Countries and the GLOBE 
Individualism Index 
PEAD on good and bad news portfolios are regressed on the GLOBE individualism 
index, the sentiment variables and an interaction term between individualism and 
sentiment. GLOBE individualism index, is equal to GlOBE’s institutional collectivism 
times -1. Categorical variable of IndvGLOBE equals 1 (-1) if IDV score belongs to the 
top (bottom) 30% of their scores, otherwise 0. All other variables are defined in Table 
4.5. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Corresponding t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** 
(5%), * (10%). 



















































YES YES YES YES 
YEAR FE 
 
YES YES YES YES 
N 60,005 60,005 60,646 60,646 
R squared 
(%) 
3.20 3.42 3.22 3.51 
4.5.2 An Alternative Sentiment Index 
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results for 10 western and 
ESEA countries to an alternative index for investor sentiment. The yearly 
sentiment measure is constructed by Baker et al. (2012) for international 
markets, who suggest that investor sentiment can be captured by variables 
related to investors’ propensity to speculate.69 The results for the alternative 
index for each of the ten countries are presented in section 4.3. The results 
in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 are re-estimated using the alternative sentiment 
measure. All other calculations remain the same as those in Tables 4.7 and 
4.8, respectively.   
                                               




We first consider the results of PEAD and the alternative sentiment measure 
in western and ESEA countries in Table 4.10. In contrast to the findings in 
Table 4.7, as shown in Panel A of Table 4.10, for good news, Canada, the 
UK and the U.S. exhibit significant PEAD when sentiment is optimistic. PEAD 
for good news stocks is significant under pessimism in all five western 
countries in contrast to the four countries showing significant PEAD in Table 
4.7. As far as the pooled-average results are concerned in Panel B, while 
there is strong evidence of PEAD during both sentiment states, PEAD is 
much higher under pessimism than under optimism, with the difference in 
PEAD for good news stocks between the two sentiment states being 
significant at the 1% level. The results are consistent with those in Table 4.7 
and H2. Turning to bad news in western markets, there is clear evidence of 
PEAD during pessimistic periods but strong reversal under optimism, 
consistent with the results in Table 4.7 and H2. Specifically, as shown in 
Panel A, PEAD is shown in all western countries, with four out of the five 
being significant at the 5% level or higher (the exception being the UK). 
However, when sentiment is pessimistic, all five countries exhibit strong 
reversal, with the returns being positive in all cases. Overall, the results for 
western countries are consistent with H2. 
 
We now consider the results for ESEA countries in Table 4.10. There is a 
mixed picture of PEAD for individual country across sentiment states.70 In 
contrast to the results in Table 4.7, when sentiment is optimistic, all but China 
exhibit significant PEAD following good news. During pessimistic periods, 
three out of the five ESEA countries (China, Japan and Thailand) exhibit 
significant PEAD for good news stocks, with the other two countries showing 
significant reversal. Consistent with the results in Table 4.7, the pooled 
average results in Panel B show that PEAD is evident for good news stocks 
under both sentiment periods but it is much stronger under pessimism, 
consistent with H3 for good news. In relation to bad news, in contrast to the 
findings in Table 4.7, PEAD is significant during both sentiment periods in 
only two out of the five ESEA countries, with the others exhibiting significant  
 
                                               
70 The results for each of the five ESEA countries are quite sensitive to the choice of sentiment 
index (especially in China, Hong Kong and Korea) since the consumer confidence and Baker 
et al.’s sentiment are different measures and have different frequencies. The results using the 
alternative sentiment index show significant reversal following bad news during optimistic 
periods whereas those using the consumer confidence exhibit significant PEAD in both the 
country-average and pool-average portfolios. The rest of the results using the alternative 




Table 4.10 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift and the Alternative Sentiment 
Measure for Western and ESEA Countries 
This table reports post-earnings-announcement drift (%) during optimistic and 
pessimistic states for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and the pool-average portfolio 
(Panel B) and the country-average portfolio. The drift is calculated as the cumulative 
abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings 
announcement and abnormal return is buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold 
market returns. Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share minus the last 
median analyst consensus forecast before the earnings-announcement dates, scaled by 
stock prices 10 days prior to the earnings announcement. In each year, stocks in each 
country are ranked on earnings surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined 
as stocks with “good” (“bad”) news. Sentiment is measured using the yearly sentiment 
index constructed by Baker et al. (2012) using volatility premium, the number of IPOs, 
1st-day returns in IPOs, and market turnover. The overall sentiment index is the 1st 
principal component of the 4 sentiment proxies. Returns on these portfolios are 
calculated as average returns of stocks in these portfolios. The formation of the pool- 
and country-average portfolios is detailed in Table 4.2. The t-statistics are calculated 
using clustered standard errors on the firm level. Corresponding t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. PEAD by country 
 Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 
ESEA-Belief in reversal 





































































































Panel B. Pool-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in continuation ESEA-Belief in reversal 

































 Opt. Pess. 
Good news 1.316(3.33)*** 4.865(5.31)*** 
Bad news -2.916(-3.53)*** 4.433(5.12)*** 
Panel C. Country-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 




































 Opt. Pess. 
Good news 0.043(0.03) 2.631(0.80) 
Bad news -2.660(-1.53) 2.836(0.88) 
 
reversal. The pooled average results in Panel B of Table 4.10 demonstrate 
significant reversal following bad news across both sentiment periods, which 
is inconsistent with H3 for bad news. Examination of Panel B of Table 4.10 
also allows us to see the difference in PEAD between western and ESEA 
markets across sentiment states. The results indicate that there are 
significant differences in PEAD for good news announced when sentiment is 
pessimistic and for bad news announced during optimistic periods, 
consistent with H3. In sum, the results in Table 4.10 of using the alternative 
sentiment measure generally confirm the findings using the consumer 
confidence index and support our hypotheses, suggesting that the interaction 
of sentiment and culture affect cognitive dissonance and the extent of 
PEAD.71 
 
We next turn to consider the sensitivity of interaction between PEAD and 
momentum to the alternative sentiment index. Recall that H4 hypothesised 
that for western markets, PEAD will be greater for winner (loser) stocks with 
good (bad) news during pessimistic (optimistic) periods; and H5 
hypothesised that for ESEA markets PEAD may arise under any combination 
of sentiment and momentum and earnings surprises, but for the two higher 
PEAD categories identified in relation to H5, PEAD will be lower for ESEA 
markets than for western market (H5). Table 4.11 reports Table 4.8-
equivalent results for optimistic and pessimistic periods using the alternative 
sentiment index. Inconsistent with the results in Table 4.8, in western markets, 
all countries exhibit PEAD for winners with good news during both sentiment 
states except for the Germany showing significant reversal during optimistic 
periods. Consistent with the results in Table 4.8, for losers with bad news, all 
                                               
71 The results for the country-average portfolio in Panel C are qualitatively similar to those 
for the pool-average portfolio in Panel B. Thus, for brevity, we only discuss the results for the 




countries exhibiting strong PEAD under optimism and significant reversal 
under pessimism. Consistent with the results in Table 4.8 and our hypothesis 
4, results in Panel B provide evidence for the pooled sample of PEAD in all 
four cases: PEAD is evident for winners with good news under both 
sentiment but that is much higher under pessimism than under optimism, 
with the differences between optimism and pessimism being highly 
significant. In relation to losers with bad news, there is strong continuation of 
loser stocks with bad news under optimism but significant reversal under 
pessimism. 
 
As far as ESEA markets are concerned, inconsistent with the results in Table 
4.8, for winners with good news, reversals are found for China during 
optimistic states, Hong Kong during optimistic sentiment periods and for 
Korea during both states. For losers with bad news, all five countries exhibit 
reversal when sentiment is optimistic, with three out of the five being 
significant at the 1% level , which is again inconsistent with the results in 
Table 4.8. The other results in Panel A of Table 4.11 are qualitatively similar 
to those in Panel A of Table 4.8. Consistent with the results in Table 4.8, 
Panel B demonstrates that PEAD is evident for winner with good news during 
both sentiment periods and significant reversal for losers with bad news 
under both sentiment states. The results in Panel B also allow us to compare 
the difference in PEAD between western and ESEA countries during the two 
sentiment periods. Consistent with the results in Table 4.8 and H5, PEAD for 
winners with good news is significantly higher in western markets than in 
ESEA markets during pessimistic periods and PEAD for loser stocks with bad 
news is significantly higher in western markets than in ESEA markets when 
sentiment is optimistic. 
 
Overall, the results in Table 4.10 using the alternative sentiment measure are 
consistent with the results using the consumer confider index in Table 4.7 
except for bad news under optimism. The results using both sentiment 
measures are consistent with H2 and H3. In relation to winners with good 
news, the results in Table 4.11 of using the alternative sentiment measure 
show that there is significant PEAD for winners with good news in both 
western and ESEA countries under pessimism, with the former being 
significantly higher, consistent with H5 for winner with good news. However, 




Table 4.11 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Momentum and the Alternative 
Sentiment Measure 
This table reports post-earnings-announcement-drift (%) for winner stocks with 
good news and loser stocks with bad news during optimistic and pessimistic states 
for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and the pool-average portfolio (Panel B) and 
the country-average portfolio. The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal 
returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings 
announcement and abnormal return is buy and hold stock returns minus buy and 
hold market returns. Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share minus 
the last median analyst consensus forecast before the earnings-announcement 
dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the earnings announcement. In each 
year, stocks in each country are ranked on earnings surprises. The top (bottom) 
30% of stocks are defined as stocks with “good” (“bad”) news. The definition of 
momentum portfolio and sentiment is discussed in detail in Table 3.2 and Table 4.9, 
respectively. Sentiment and momentum portfolios are identified in month t and 
stocks with earnings announcements in month t+1 are identified. Returns on these 
portfolios are calculated as average returns of stocks in these portfolios. The t-
statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. 
Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to the 
level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. PEAD by country 
 West ESEA 

























































































Panel C. Pool-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in continuation Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 












































Panel C. Country-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in continuation ESEA-Belief in reversal 















































both western and ESEA countries exhibit significant PEAD for winners with 
good news under pessimism, with the latter being significant higher, 
inconsistent with H5 for winners with good news. In relation to losers with 
bad news, the results using the two sentiment measures are qualitatively 
similar, showing that there is significant PEAD (reversal) for losers with bad 
news for western (ESEA) countries under optimism, consistent with H5.  
4.5.3 Sensitivity tests 
Three sensitivity tests are carried out to assess the robustness of the results: 
(1) re-estimating PEAD using mean analyst forecast in the portfolio analysis 
for Tables 4.3 and 4.4 as shown in Tables A4.3 to A4.7 ; (2) a 40% cut-off for 
optimistic/pessimistic sentiment is used as shown in Table A4.9 and A4.10; 
(3) Raw returns are used instead of market-adjusted returns as shown in 
Tables A4.11 to A4.14. The results of these tests are qualitatively similar to 
those reported and are reported in the appendix. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Post-earnings announcement drift has been documented to be one of the 
biggest challenges to the efficient market hypothesis and it was identified by 
Fama (1998) as one of the candidates for being “above-suspicion” anomalies. 
A mixed picture has emerged globally and the evidence in relation to PEAD 
is inconclusive. To date, there is no satisfactory explanation for the anomaly. 
We propose that cognitive dissonance may be a major driver of the anomaly, 
with the interaction of sentiment and culture causing the phenomenon to 
arise in different cases and to differing degrees in western and ESEA markets. 
While previous studies have examined the effect of sentiment and culture on 
PEAD independently, to date no study has examined their interaction effect 






In this chapter, we investigate the interaction effect using an approach in the 
spirit of Hong and Stein (1999) and propose a number of hypotheses to 
explain the difference in PEAD across countries around the world. We first 
examine the impact of cognitive dissonance arising from the interaction of 
individualism and sentiment on PEAD in 34 countries. Subsequently, we 
focus attention on the five largest markets in each of the east and west, given 
psychological arguments and evidence in differences in beliefs concernings 
change in the two cultures in which westerners tend to believe in continuation 
while those from the east expect reversal. Our hypotheses in relation to views 
of change are developed using an approach in the spirit of Hong and Stein 
(1999).We find that in high individualism and western cultures, news diffuses 
much more slowly which contradicts investor sentiment states than in low 
individualism and ESEA cultures. We also carry out a range of robustness 
tests which support our main findings. Our results provide general support 
for our hypotheses, which is consistent with cultural biases and sentiment 
interacting to impact on cognitive dissonance, resulting in the difference in 
PEAD across countries. Thus, our analysis suggests that cognitive 


















4.7.1 Earnings Announcements Descriptive statistics for 
Western and ESEA Countries 
Table A4. 1 Earnings Announcements Descriptive Statistics for Western 
and ESEA Countries 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the earnings announcements in 
the east and west. It reports the name of the country and the number of firms 
for each country and the number of stocks that also has earnings 
announcements available and number of announcements for each country. The 
earnings announcement data and analyst forecast data are from the IBES 
International Summary File for all countries, except the U.S which are from the 
IBES U.S Summary File. Several selection criteria are applied to reach our final 
data sample. First, companies must be listed on a major exchange in their home 
country and cross-listed companies are deleted. Second, firms must be 
represented in both the Datastream and IBES databases for international 
markets and in the CRSP and IBES databases for the U.S market.  
Country Firms Announcements Forecasts 
WEST    
Canada 1,550 7,400 63,348 
France 1,474 9,888 65,966 
Germany 1,281 10,713 65966 
United 
Kingdom 
4,040 26,318 134,533 
United 
States 
12,100 62,430 489,251 
Total 20,445 116,749 819,064 
ESEA    
China 1,558 8,755 31,773 
Hong Kong 1,215 7,650 54,225 
Japan 2,753 33,017 123,330 
Korea 1,323 8,365 31,448 
Thailand 737 2,668 20,567 
















4.7.2 The Country-Average Results for Table 4.4 
Table A4. 2 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Investor sentiment and 
Individualism for the country-average portfolio 
This table presents the country-average results for post-earnings-
announcement drift (%) following good news and bad news sorted by 
investor sentiment and individualism index. The drift is calculated as the 
cumulative abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days 
following the earnings announcement and the abnormal returns are buy 
and hold stock returns minus buy and hold market returns. Each country 
is categorised into the top and bottom 30% based on the individualism 
index score, with the middle 40% being excluded from the analysis. The 
announcement month is identified as optimism, mild or pessimism. The 
definition of sentiment states of the announcement month is discussed in 
detail in Table 4.3. The formation of pool-average portfolio is discussed in 
detail in Table 4.2. Panel A reports PEAD for good news and bad news 
stocks sorted by individualism. Panels B and C present PEAD for good 
news and bad news stocks across sentiment states in the high and low 
individualism culture groups, respectively. Panel D presents the difference 
in PEAD between the two culture groups. Asterisks refer to the level of 
significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Country-average portfolios PEAD 
  Good news Bad news Good-Bad 
Individualism level 
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism 
High IDV  1.615 -0.411 2.026 
  ***  *** 
Low IDV  1.929 0.209 1.720 
  ***  *** 
High. - Low.  -0.314 -0.620 0.306 
     
Sentiment level 
Panel B High Individualism 
Optimistic  1.043 -1.770 2.813 
  ** ***  *** 
Pessimistic  2.918 2.024 0.894 
  *** **  
Opt. - Pes.  -1.875 -3.794 1.919 
  ** *** ** 
Panel C Low Individualism 
Optimistic  0.135 -1.026 1.161 
     
Pessimistic  2.352 1.150 1.202 
  ***   
Opt.-Pes.  -2.217 -2.176 -0.041 












4.7.3 SUE is Calculated by using Mean Analyst Forecast  
Table A4. 3 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Sentiment and 
Individualism using Mean Analyst Forecast 
This table presents the pool-average results for post-earnings announcement drift 
(%) following good news and bad news sorted by investor sentiment and 
individualism index. Stocks in each country are ranked on earnings surprise (SUE) 
from annual earnings announcements. SUE is calculated as the difference 
between actual earnings and mean analyst forecast, scaled by stock prices 10 
days prior to the earnings announcement. Each country is categorised into the top 
and bottom 30% based on the individualism index score, with the middle 40% 
being excluded from the analysis. Each year is identified as optimism, mild or 
pessimism. The definition of sentiment states of the holding period is discussed in 
detail in Table 4.3. The formation of pool-average portfolio is discussed in detail 
in Table 4.2. Panel A reports PEAD for good news and bad news stocks sorted 
by individualism. Panels B and C present PEAD for good news and bad news 
stocks across sentiment states in the high and low individualism culture groups, 
respectively. Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%).  
Pool-average portfolios PEAD 
  Good news Bad news Good-Bad 
Individualism level 
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism 
High IDV  4.312 2.001 2.311 
  *** *** *** 
Low IDV  2.014 0.978 1.036 
  *** *** *** 
High. - Low.  2.298 1.023 1.275 
  *** *** *** 
Sentiment level 
Panel C High Individualism 
Optimistic  1.784 -2.103 3.887 
  *** *** *** 
Pessimistic  7.432 6.812 0.620 
  *** ***  
Opt. - Pes.  -5.648 -8.915 3.267 
  *** *** *** 
Panel C Low Individualism 
Optimistic  0.879 -1.562 2.441 
  ** *** *** 
Pessimistic  1.783 0.991 0.792 
  *** ** * 
Opt.-Pes.  -0.904 -2.553 1.649 

















Table A4. 4 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Investor Sentiment and 
Individualism using Mean Analyst Forecast 
This table presents the country-average results for post-earnings announcement 
drift (%) following good news and bad news sorted by investor sentiment and 
individualism index. Stocks in each country are ranked on earnings surprise (SUE) 
from annual earnings announcements. SUE is calculated as the difference 
between actual earnings and mean analyst forecast, scaled by stock prices 10 
days prior to the earnings announcement. Each country is categorised into the top 
and bottom 30% based on the individualism index score, with the middle 40% 
being excluded from the analysis. Each year is identified as optimism, mild or 
pessimism. The definition of sentiment states of the holding period is discussed in 
detail in Table 4.3. The formation of pool-average portfolio is discussed in detail 
in Table 4.2. Panel A reports PEAD for good news and bad news stocks sorted 
by individualism. Panels B and C present PEAD for good news and bad news 
stocks across sentiment states in the high and low individualism culture groups, 
respectively. Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Country-average portfolios PEAD 
  Good news Bad news Good-Bad 
Individualism level 
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism 
High IDV  1.787*** -0.512 2.299*** 
Low IDV  1.432*** 0.319 1.113*** 
High. - Low.  0.355 -0.831* 1.186*** 
Sentiment level 
Panel B.1 High Individualism 
Optimistic  1.162** -1.891*** 3.053*** 
Pessimistic  2.797*** 1.775** 1.022* 
Opt. - Pes.  -1.635** -3.666*** 2.031*** 
Panel C. Low Individualism 
Optimistic  0.310 -0.910** 1.220** 
Pessimistic  2.034** 1.430** 0.604 





















Table A4. 5 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift for Western and ESEA 
Countries using Mean Analyst Forecast 
This table reports the post-earnings announcement drift (%) based for the ten 
countries in the sample. The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of 
stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings announcement and 
abnormal return is buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold market returns. 
Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share minus the mean analyst forecast 
before the earnings-announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the 
earnings announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked on earnings 
surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with “good” (“bad”) 
news. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. 
The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. PEAD by country 
 Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 
ESEA-Belief in reversal 




Canada 3.157*** China 2.000*** 
France 0.884*** Hong Kong 0.921* 
Germany -0.9972** Japan 2.836*** 
UK 1.885*** Korea 1.024** 
U.S 5.233*** Thailand 3.298*** 
Bad 
news 
Canada -0.635* China 0.954* 
France -1.514*** Hong Kong -0.252 
Germany -1.762*** Japan 1.591*** 
UK 0.283 Korea 1.648** 
U.S. 2.471*** Thailand -0.042 







Good news 3.942%*** 2.243%*** 1.699%*** 
Bad news 1.764%*** 1.203%*** 0.561%** 
















Table A4. 6 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift and Sentiment for Western and 
ESEA Countries using Mean Analyst Forecast 
This table reports post-earnings-announcement drift (%) for good and bad news stocks 
during optimistic and pessimistic states for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and pool-
average portfolio (Panel B). The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of 
stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings announcement and the 
abnormal returns are buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold market returns. 
Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share minus the mean analyst forecast 
before the earnings-announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the 
earnings announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked on earnings 
surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with “good” (“bad”) news. 
The definition of sentiment states of the announcement month is discussed in detail in 
Table 4.3. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. 
The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. PEAD by country 
 Westerners-Belief in continuation ESEA-Belief in reversal 




Canada 0.959 3.435*** China 3.672** -2.911** 
France -0.008 0.703 Hong Kong 1.618 6.619*** 
Germany -2.466***  4.452*** Japan 1.925*** 3.513*** 
UK -0.004 4.310*** Korea -5.223*** 4.084*** 
U.S. 1.471*** 9.077*** Thailand 1.829 4.120* 
Bad 
news 
Canada -1.032 2.506** China -2.060 -3.817*** 
France -1.899*** 0.050 Hong Kong -1.190 3.266 
Germany -3.594*** 3.113*** Japan -0.702* 2.337*** 
UK -0.556 1.819*** Korea -9.746*** 4.827*** 
U.S. -2.774*** 8.251*** Thailand -2.607* 0.668 
  
Panel B. Pool-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in continuation ESEA-Belief in reversal 
 Opt. Pess. Opt.-Pess. Opt. Pess. Opt.-Pess. 

























Panel C. West-ESEA 
 Opt. Pess. 
Good news -0.800 2.397 
*** 

















Table A4. 7 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Momentum and Sentiment using 
Mean Analyst Forecast 
This table reports post earnings announcement drift (%) for winner stocks with good news 
and losers with bad news during optimistic and pessimistic states for each of the 10 countries 
(Panel A) and the pool-average portfolio (Panel B). The drift is calculated as the cumulative 
abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings 
announcement and the abnormal returns re buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold 
market returns. Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share minus the mean 
analyst forecast before the earnings-announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days 
prior to the earnings announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked on 
earnings surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with “good” (“bad”) 
news. The definition of sentiment states of the announcement month is discussed in detail 
in Table 4.3. Momentum portfolios are defined in Table 3.2. Stocks with earnings 
announcement in month t+1 is identified and an event study is performed to examine the 
post earnings announcement drift. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard 
errors on the firm level. The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%). 
 West ESEA 





Canada 1.596** 1.052* China 7.067*** -2.694*** 
France 0.228 1.212** Hong Kong -0.256 5.648 
Germany -1.350 3.242*** Japan 1.473 6.956*** 
UK -0.328 2.222*** Korea -2.743** -1.751 





Canada -2.127* 9.189*** China 22.675*** -3.270 
France -4.638*** 2.369*** Hong Kong -2.232 8.009 
Germany -6.470*** 2.953*** Japan -0.262 5.086*** 
UK -2.733*** 2.289*** Korea -4.843*** 0.692 
U.S. -3.894*** 8.669*** Thailand -1.250 4.337* 
Panel B. Pool-average Portfolio 
 Western ESEA 
 Opt. Pess. Opt.-
Pess. 











































4.7.4 40% Cut-off for Investor Sentiment Measure 
Table A4. 8 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Individualism and Investor 
Sentiment 
This table presents the pool-average results for post-earnings-announcement drift (%) 
following good news and bad news sorted by investor sentiment and individualism index. 
The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading 
days following the earnings announcement and the abnormal returns are buy and hold 
stock returns minus buy and hold market returns. Each country is categorised into the top 
and bottom 30% based on the individualism index score, with the middle 40% being 
excluded from the analysis. The announcement month is identified as optimism, mild or 
pessimism. The sentiment state of the announcement month is defined using 40% cut-off 
points. The formation of pool-average portfolio is discussed in detail in Table 4.2. Panel A 
reports PEAD for good news and bad news stocks sorted by individualism. Panels B and 
C present PEAD for good news and bad news stocks across sentiment states in the high 
and low individualism culture groups, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
clustered standard errors on the firm level. Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** 
(1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Pool-average portfolios PEAD 
  Good news Bad news Good-Bad 
Individualism level 
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism 
High IDV  5.540 2.331 3.209 
  *** *** *** 
Low IDV  2.321 0.690 1.631 
  *** *** *** 
High. - Low.  3.219 1.641 1.578 
  *** *** *** 
Sentiment level 
Panel B High Individualism 
Optimistic  1.613 -2.671 4.284 
  *** *** *** 
Pessimistic  8.340 6.621 1.719 
  *** *** *** 
Opt. - Pes.  -6.727 -9.292 2.565 
  *** *** *** 
Panel C Low Individualism 
Optimistic  0.732 -1.793 2.525 
  *** *** *** 
Pessimistic  3.424 1.781 1.643 
  *** *** *** 
Opt.-Pes.  -2.692 -3.574 0.882 





























Table A4. 9 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift and Sentiment for Western and 
ESEA Countries using 40% Cutoffs for Investor Sentiment Measure 
This table reports post-earnings-announcement-drift (%) for good and bad news stocks 
during optimistic and pessimistic states for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and pool-
average portfolio (Panel B). The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of 
stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings announcement and the 
abnormal returns are buy and hold stock returns minus buy and hold market returns. 
Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share minus the last median analyst 
consensus forecast before the earnings-announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 
days prior to the earnings announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are 
ranked on earnings surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with 
“good” (“bad”) news. The sentiment state of the announcement month is defined using 
40% cut-off points. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on the 
firm level. The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 




Opt. Pess. ESEA Opt. Pess. 
Good 
news 
Canada 0.963*** 4.763*** China 3.112 -1.238 
France -0.288 0.998* Hong 
Kong 
0.882 6.567*** 
Germany -1.973***   -2.228*** Japan 2.188*** 1.002*** 
UK -1.973*** -2.228*** Korea -5.923*** 2.442 
U.S. 1.242 6.345*** Thailand 1.863 7.386*** 
Bad 
news 
Canada -2.482*** 0.497 China 0.980* -3.207*** 
France -3.081*** -3.823*** Hong 
Kong 
-0.528 4.962*** 
Germany -3.370*** -3.782*** Japan -0.290 1.193*** 
UK -0.009 -0.008 Korea -9.361*** 3.171 
U.S. -2.564*** 6.752*** Thailand -2.773** -1.270 
Panel B. Pool-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in continuation ESEA-Belief in reversal 
 Opt. Pess. Opt.-Pess. Opt. Pess. Opt.-Pess. 
Good 
news 
0.782*** 4.125*** -3.343*** 1.806*** 2.783*** -0.997* 
Bad 
news 








Table A4. 10 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Momentum and Sentiment for Western and 
ESEA Countries using 40% Cutoffs for Investor Sentiment Measure 
This table reports post-earnings-announcement drift (%) for winner stocks with good news and losers with 
bad news during optimistic and pessimistic states for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) and pool-average 
portfolio (Panel B). The drift is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks during +2 to +60 
trading days following the earnings announcement and the abnormal returns re buy and hold stock returns 
minus buy and hold market returns. Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share minus the last 
median analyst consensus forecast before the earnings-announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 
days prior to the earnings announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked on earnings 
surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with “good” (“bad”) news.  The sentiment 
state of the announcement month is defined using 40% cut-off points. Momentum portfolios are defined in 
Table 3.2. Stocks with earnings announcement in month t+1 is identified and an event study is performed 
to examine the post earnings announcement drift. Returns on these portfolios are calculated as average 
returns of stocks in these portfolios. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on the 
firm level. The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. Individual country portfolio 
 
 West Opt. Pess. 
Opt.-
pess. 









1.899** 3.035*** -1.107 China -3.514** -1.921 -9.923*** 
France 0.265 0.250 -0.222 
Hong 
Kong 
0.216 9.053*** -7.679** 
Germa
ny 
-1.019 -0.303 2.105* Japan 0.979 4.247*** -4.967** 
UK -0.000 3.047*** -2.283*** Korea -3.491*** -1.356 -3.841* 







-4.335*** 3.909*** -10.403*** China 21.38*** -1.100 32.73*** 
France -3.597*** 1.206 -5.249*** 
Hong 
Kong 
-2.472 9.990** -10.271*** 
Germa
ny 
-4.532*** -2.926*** -0.564 Japan -2.435** 5.012*** -5.259** 
UK -2.553*** 1.124*** -5.524*** Korea -6.121*** 0.211 -6.363*** 
U.S. -4.739** 7.771*** -14.158*** Thailand -1.949* 2.226* -3.216*** 
Panel B. Pool-average portfolio 
  West  ESEA 
  Opt. Pess. 
Opt.-
Pess. 
 Opt Pess Opt-Pess 
Winner with 
good news 
0.989** 1.486** -0.497  0.213 4.335*** -4.122*** 
Loser with bad 
news 
-3.780*** 5.431*** -9.211***  0.895* 4.312*** --3.417** 
Panel C. West-ESEA  














4.7.5 PEAD is calculated using Raw Returns 
Table A4. 11 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Investor sentiment and 
Individualism using Raw Returns 
This table presents the pool-average results for post-earnings-announcement-drift (%) 
following good news and bad news sorted by investor sentiment and individualism index. 
The drift is calculated as the cumulative raw returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days 
following the earnings announcement. Each country is categorised into the top and bottom 
30% based on the individualism index score, with the middle 40% being excluded from the 
analysis. The announcement month is identified as optimism, mild or pessimism. The 
definition of sentiment states of the announcement month is discussed in detail in Table 
4.3. The formation of pool-average portfolio is discussed in detail in Table 4.2. Panel A 
reports PEAD for good news and bad news stocks sorted by individualism. Panels B and 
C present PEAD for good news and bad news stocks across sentiment states in the high 
and low individualism culture groups, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
clustered standard errors on the firm level. Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** 
(1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Pool-average portfolios PEAD 
  Good news Bad news Good-Bad 
Individualism level 
Panel A. Portfolio returns and Individualism 
High IDV  3.346 1.511 1.835 
  *** ** *** 
Low IDV  4.250 3.187 1.063 
  *** *** ** 
High. - Low.  -0.904 -1.676 0.772 
  * ** * 
Sentiment level 
Panel B.1 High Individualism 
Optimistic  2.710 -1.665 4.375 
  *** ** *** 
Pessimistic  4.430 4.316 0.114 
  *** ***  
Opt. - Pes.  -1.720 -5.981 4.261 
  *** *** *** 
Panel C Low Individualism 
Optimistic  0.042 -1.583 1.625 
   ** ** 
Pessimistic  7.327 6.634 0.693 
  *** **  
Opt.-Pes.  -7.285 -8.217 0.932 


















Table A4. 12 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift for Western and ESEA 
Countries using Raw Returns 
This table reports the post-earnings announcement-drift (%) based for the ten 
countries in the sample. Panel A reports PEAD for good and bad news stocks for 
each of the 10 countries and Panels B and C report the results for the pool-average 
and country-average portfolios, respectively. The drift is calculated as the cumulative 
raw returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings 
announcement. Earnings surprises are measured as actual earnings per share 
minus the last median analyst consensus forecast before the earnings-
announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the earnings 
announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked on earnings 
surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with “good” (“bad”) 
news. Returns on these portfolios are calculated as the average of returns of stocks 
in these portfolios. The t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors on 
the firm level. The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%). 
Panel A. PEAD by country 
 Westerners-Belief in 
continuation 
ESEA-Belief in reversal 




Canada 4.666*** China 1.361*** 
France 2.089*** Hong Kong 3.981*** 
Germany 0.763* Japan 1.955*** 
UK 3.197*** Korea 3.067*** 
U.S. 8.562*** Thailand 5.037*** 
Bad 
news 
Canada 0.521 China -0.076 
France -0.279 Hong Kong 2.824*** 
Germany -0.339 Japan 1.299*** 
UK 1.578*** Korea 1.210 
U.S. 5.537*** Thailand 0.652 




































Table A4. 13 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift and Sentiment for Western 
and ESEA Countries using Raw Returns 
This table reports post-earnings-announcement-drift (%) for good and bad news 
stocks during optimistic and pessimistic states for each of the 10 countries (Panel A) 
and pool-average portfolio (Panel B). The drift is calculated as the cumulative raw 
returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days following the earnings announcement. 
Earnings are measured as actual earnings per share minus the last median analyst 
consensus forecast before the earnings announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 
10 days prior to the earnings announcement. In each year, stocks in each country 
are ranked on earnings surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as 
stocks with “good” (“bad”) news. The definition of sentiment states of the 
announcement month is discussed in detail in Table 4.3. The t-statistics are 
calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. The asterisks refer to the 
level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
Panel A. PEAD by country 
 Westerners-Belief in continuation ESEA-Belief in reversal 




Canada 1.716* 5.372*** China 3.672** -2.911** 
France -0.271 4.509*** Hong 
Kong 
1.618 6.619*** 
Germany -2.453***  4.582*** Japan 1.925*** 3.513*** 
UK -0.470 6.347*** Korea -5.223*** 4.084*** 
U.S. 5.165*** 13.239*** Thailand -2.173 15.657*** 
Bad 
news 
Canada -0.425 4.509*** China -2.060 -3.817*** 
France -3.291*** 3.621*** Hong 
Kong 
-1.190 3.266*** 
Germany -4.254*** 3.011*** Japan -0.702* 2.337*** 
UK -0.897 3.710*** Korea -9.746*** 4.827*** 
U.S. -2.237*** 11.966*** Thailand -7.208*** 13.099*** 
Panel B. Pool-average portfolio 
 Westerners-Belief in continuation ESEA-Belief in reversal 

















































Table A4. 14 Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift, Momentum and Sentiment 
for Western and ESEA Countries using Raw Returns 
This table reports post earnings announcement-drift (%) for winner stocks with good 
news and losers with bad news during optimistic and pessimistic states for each of 
the 10 countries (Panel A) and the pool-average portfolio (Panel B). The drift is 
calculated as the cumulative raw returns of stocks during +2 to +60 trading days 
following the earnings announcement. Earnings are measured as actual earnings 
per share minus the last median analyst consensus forecast before the earnings-
announcement dates, scaled by stock prices 10 days prior to the earnings 
announcement. In each year, stocks in each country are ranked on earnings 
surprises. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as stocks with “good” (“bad”) 
news. The definition of sentiment states of the announcement month is discussed 
in detail in Table 4.3. Momentum portfolios are defined in Table 3.2. Stocks with 
earnings announcement in month t+1 is identified and an event study is performed 
to examine the post earnings announcement drift. Returns on these portfolios are 
calculated as average returns of stocks in these portfolios. The t-statistics are 
calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. The asterisks refer to 
the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 West ESEA 





Canada 5.163*** 0.222 China 8.787*** -3.700*** 





-1.949** 2.242*** Japan 0.562 5.456*** 
UK 0.505 3.985*** Korea -4.061** 6.372*** 





Canada 1.758 12.100*** China 15.601*** -0.958 





-8.427*** 2.989*** Japan -0.154 6.186*** 
UK -1.543*** 4.269*** Korea -5.123*** 8.720*** 
U.S. -1.948*** 9..234*** Thailand -4.070*** 8.125*** 
 Western ESEA 















































5 Analyst Recommendations, Investor 
Sentiment and Institutional Herding 
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous two empirical chapter, we investigate the impact of cognitive 
dissonance on the above suspicious anomalies, momentum and post-
earnings-announcement-drift by examining the interaction between investor 
sentiment and cognitive dissonance. Given the key focus of this thesis on 
cognitive dissonance, we proceed to investigate the impact of cognitive 
dissonance on institutional herding by testing the joint effect of investor 
sentiment and analyst recommendations. The study is motivated by the fact 
that the two factors, investor sentiment and analyst recommendations, have 
been shown to be prominent in affecting institutional herding. We propose 
that institutional investors may experience cognitive bias (e.g. cognitive 
dissonance) when processing analyst information (e.g. analyst 
recommendations) and sentiment related indicators. In particular, cognitive 
dissonance may be evident when the two factors do not suggest similar price 
movements. 
 
A growing body of literature documents that institutional investors exhibit 
herding behaviour. Investors may herd if they face similar information sets or 
may herd if they ignore their own information but instead follow actions of 
others. It is important to understand why herding may take place since stock 
prices are largely affected by institutions’ behaviour. A number of studies 
have documented why herding might occur, including reputational reasons, 
information cascades, correlated information and specific characteristics (e.g. 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Froot et al., 1992). The evidence and causes of 
institutional herding are discussed in detail in section 2.5.  
 
If we are to have a better understanding of herding, it is beneficial to consider 
what external factors may influence the behaviour of institutions in this regard. 
Two factors that have attracted much attention in recent years have been 
investor sentiment and analyst recommendations. This study investigates 




recommendations are highly valuable to institutional investors, as 
documented in a number of studies (Merton, 1987; Brennan and Hughes, 
1991; Womack, 1996; Cowen et al., 2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2007). 
Institutional investors use both buy- and sell-side analyst information as 
important inputs to their investment decisions. A recent study by Brown et al. 
(2013) shows that mutual funds tend to follow analyst recommendation 
revisions and herd into stocks with upgrades and herd out of stocks with 
downgrades.  
 
In the previous chapter, we have examined the importance of investor 
sentiment in financial markets and in the context of investor trading 
behaviour.72 A number of studies suggest that institutional investors take into 
account the expected level and expected change of individual sentiment (e.g. 
Brow and Cliff, 2004, 2005; Schmeling, 2007), suggesting that institutional 
investors may herd to counteract individual sentiment (Lakonishok et al. 1992; 
Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; De Long et al., 1990; Lee et al., 1991). 
Accordingly, one may expect that institutional investors will herd in their buy 
(sell) decisions when individual sentiment is pessimistic (optimistic). Liao et 
al. (2011) find evidence consistent with the sentiment countering hypothesis 
and show that investor sentiment plays an important role in explaining mutual 
fund herding and show that mutual funds only tend to counteract the 
optimistic sentiment of individual investors.  
 
Previous empirical studies have highlighted the impact of analyst 
recommendations and individual sentiment separately on mutual fund 
herding. In this chapter, we examine how sentiment and analyst 
recommendations impact on institutional herding separately and, unlike 
previous studies how both factors interact in determining such behaviour. 
Two different measures of institutional herding have been examined in the 
literature based on micro data: within-period herding (e.g. Lakonishok et al., 
1992, hereafter LSV) and adjacent-period herding (see, e.g. Sias, 2004, 
hereafter Sias). 73  Since these two measures may allow us to capture 
different aspects of herding, we analyse both forms here. The LSV measure 
captures the tendency of investors to buy or sell in a particular stock within a 
period. In contrast, the Sias herding measure quantifies the extent to which 
                                               
72 We use investor/individual sentiment interchangeably throughout the chapter.  
73 In this chapter, we define within-period herding as institutional herding in the same quarter 




institutions follow each other’s trades over adjacent periods. In our setting, 
the LSV measure allow us to capture institutional herding behaviour arising 
from correlated trades, which are based on trading signals of analyst 
recommendations and/or investor sentiment, whereas the Sias measure 
captures how institutional investors follow each other’s trades in such 
situations. By using both LSV and Sias measures, we will be able to gain 
greater insight into the extent to which herding responses to analyst 
recommendations and investor sentiment are intentional or spurious. 
 
Using both LSV and Sias herding measures, we find that, consistent with the 
previous studies, institutional investors tend to herd in the direction of analyst 
recommendation revisions and herd more strongly for stocks with analyst 
consensus downgrades than with analyst consensus upgrades. The findings 
suggest that institutional investors believe that analyst downgrades are more 
informative and valuable than upgrades (Brown et al., 2013). We examine 
the extent to which institutional herding varies with the degree of individual 
sentiment. The evidence suggests that investor sentiment affects both within-
period and adjacent-period herding, but in different ways. In relation to within-
period herding, we propose that institutional herding may arise from 
correlated trading behaviour as a result of analysing individual sentiment or 
sentiment-related indicators (Liao et al., 2013). Using the LSV measure, we 
find that institutional investors will herd strongly to counter optimistic 
sentiment of individual investors, but there is no evidence of buy herding in 
the presence of pessimistic sentiment. This is consistent with stock markets 
being more irrational during optimistic periods (Yu and Yuan. 2012). Second, 
in relation to the adjacent-period herding, we hypothesise that institutional 
investors may herd as a result of following the trades of others under different 
sentiment states. When sentiment is pessimistic (optimistic), stock markets 
become more (less) volatile (Lee et al., 2002; Holmes et al., 2013). In the 
presence of pessimistic sentiment, institutional investors may forego their 
own information and rational analysis and follow the actions of others whom 
they may think have more reliable information. We expect that adjacent-
period herding arising from imitating the trades of others will be stronger in 
the presence of pessimistic sentiment than in the presence of optimistic 
sentiment.74 Results confirm the hypothesis.75   
                                               
74 Herding in the subsequent periods is referred to as adjacent-period herding throughout the 
chapter. 





We further examine the interaction between analyst recommendations and 
investor sentiment on institutional herding. Again, the LSV and Sias herding 
measures allow us to gain insights into intentional and spurious herding. First, 
we assume that institutional investors will analyse both analyst 
recommendations and sentiment-related indicators in making trading 
decisions. When the two factors reinforce each other, institutional investors 
would trade strongly in response to these factors. If institutions are trading in 
concert, it is expected that within-period herding will be stronger. However, 
herding will be lower if the two factors contradict each other.  
 
We find that within-period herding is the strongest for stocks with 
downgrades when sentiment is optimistic whereas the herding is lower for 
stocks with downgrades (upgrades) when sentiment is pessimistic 
(optimistic). Second, when the two factors produce conflicting trading signals, 
cognitive dissonance will be evident and institutional investors will become 
uncertain and following the trades of others might be a means of resolving 
this uncertainty. Therefore, since prior trades of other institutions can be only 
observed in the next period, adjacent-period herding is expected to be 
stronger when cognitive dissonance is prominent. Consistent with the 
arguments, we find that institutions herd strongly for upgrades (downgrades) 
in subsequent periods when sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic). Lastly, prior 
literature suggests that if institutional herding is caused by fads, reputational 
reasons or characteristic herding, institutional demand should be negatively 
correlated with subsequent returns. However, if institutional herding is driven 
by information-based herding, there should be no subsequent return 
reversals. We find a strong relation between institutional herding and returns 
in formation periods and weak evidence of subsequent return reversals, 
suggesting that information-based models primarily drive institutional herding 
by taking account of the interaction of analyst recommendations and 
sentiment.   
 
Previous empirical studies have highlighted that mutual funds’ behaviour, as 
well as mutual fund herding are influenced by analyst information and 
                                               
individual sentiment is pessimistic, stock markets tend to be rational (e.g. Antoniou et al., 
2015). As a result, institutional investors are less likely to counter the pessimistic sentiment of 
individual sentiment. We argue that institutional investors may feel more uncertain during 





individual sentiment. In this study, we extend these findings by evaluating 
how institutional investors behave in response to analyst information over 
different sentiment periods. Therefore, our study differs from other studies 
and contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, while previous 
studies have examined the impact of analyst recommendations and 
sentiment on mutual fund herding separately, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to investigate the individual and joint effects of the two 
factors on institutional herding. Second, we examine the effects of both 
factors on institutional herding over multi-periods using both LSV and Sias 
measures, which help us capture different aspects of the herding behaviour. 
Our results from using two herding measures allow us to gain insights into 
intentional and spurious herding. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews 
the literature and develops our hypotheses. Data and methodology are 
described in section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the main empirical results. 
Section 5.5 provides evidence from robustness tests. Section 6 concludes 
the chapter. 
5.2 Hypothesis Development 
A number of studies in the literature document that investors are influenced 
by other investors’ trading actions. The literature of institutional herding is 
discussed in detail in section 2.5. There are two primary micro-level herding 
measures in the literature for examining the level of herding for a group of 
investors. The LSV measure captures quarterly imbalances of net buyers in 
a particular stock within a period. Lakonishok et al. (1992) find weak evidence 
of pension fund managers’ herding and positive feedback trading. In contrast, 
the Sias herding measure quantifies the extent to which institutions follow the 
trades of others’ over adjacent periods. Using the same institutional data over 
the same time period, Sias finds strong evidence of institutional herding over 
adjacent periods. Other studies using the LSV or Sias measure are 




5.2.1 Analyst Recommendations and Institutional Herding  
 Analyst Recommendations and Within-Period Herding 
A number of studies document that analyst information is highly valuable to 
institutional investors, which may cause them to trade in concert, resulting in 
herding. Merton (1987) and Brennan and Hughes (1991) suggest that analyst 
research may be an important input in an investor’s decision to invest in a 
stock. Womack (1996) suggests that stock analyst recommendations have 
investment value to institutional investors and finds that the drift with buy 
recommendations is smaller and short-lived and the drift with sell 
recommendations is large and lasts up to six months. O’Brien and Bhushan 
(1990) suggest that research analysts act as information intermediaries to 
influence institutional ownership and Brown et al. (2013) suggest that it is 
costly for most small management companies to conduct comprehensive in-
house research, making them especially important on the sell side. Chen and 
Cheng (2006) show that the quarterly change in institutional holdings is 
positively correlated with consensus analyst recommendations and find that 
there are more buyer-initiated than seller-initiated trades around favourable 
recommendations and more seller-initiated than buyer-initiated trades 
around unfavourable recommendations. Costello and Hall (2011) confirm the 
results for individual mutual fund portfolios and find the change in fund 
holdings is positively correlated with analyst recommendation revisions. 
Franck and Kerl (2013) document that European mutual funds rely on sell-
side analyst forecasts and their holdings in stocks are positively correlated 
with analyst consensus forecast measures. A more recent study by Brown et 
al. (2013) finds that analyst recommendations are important drivers for 
mutual fund herding in the U.S. Specifically, mutual funds tend to herd into 
stocks with consensus upgrades and herd out of stocks with consensus 
downgrades. We expect that analyst recommendation revisions have a 
similar effect on institutional herding. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Analyst recommendation revisions have a significant impact 
on within-period herding and the level of herding is stronger for stocks with 




 Analyst Recommendations and Adjacent-Period Herding  
We now consider the relationship between analyst recommendation 
revisions and adjacent-period herding. When analyst information (e.g., 
analyst recommendation revisions) is released, institutional investors tend to 
follow and capitalise on analyst information. Since the investment value of 
analyst research is known to be short-lived, they must respond reasonably 
quickly to the release of a revision. We expect that institutions will herd in the 
same period as the release of analyst recommendation information. Herding 
in subsequent periods arising from following the trades of others would be 
relatively weak, since if institutions only trade based on such information, 
there is no needs for them to follow the trades of others. This leads to our 
second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Analyst recommendation revisions have no significant impact 
on adjacent-period herding.  
5.2.2 Investor Sentiment and Institutional Herding 
Investor sentiment may be another important factor that influences herding. 
Extensive evidence shows that individual investors are affected by sentiment, 
which affects their decision-making system and consequently, stock returns 
and market returns are influenced. Dreman (1979) and Friedman (1984) 
suggest that institutional herding can be driven by irrational psychological 
biases, causing prices to deviate away from fundamentals. Similarly, 
Schwarz (2002) suggests sentiment is a key factor in investors’ decision. 
Baddeley et al. (2010) suggest that herd behaviour is related to emotion. 
 
Institutional herding triggered by investor sentiment can be either spurious or 
intentional. We may expect that investigative herding may arise if institutional 
investors trade together on the basis of analysing the same sentiment-related 
indicators. We also expect that intentional herding may be intentional: if 
investors are uncertain on some occasions, they are likely to follow the trades 
of others. We consider each of these arguments in turn. 
 Investor Sentiment and Within-Period Herding 




Shleifer, 2000) that institutional investors take into account expected 
individual sentiment. Schmeling (2007) suggests that institutional investors 
tend to be optimistic (pessimistic) when individuals tend to be pessimistic 
(optimistic). Kaniel et al. (2005) suggest that both individual and institutional 
investors often take opposite positions of trades in which institutions and 
individuals are found to be informed and irrational investors, respectively 
(Bange, 2000; Charkravarty, 2001; Sias et al., 2006).  
 
Lakonishok et al. (1992, p. 26) argue that fund managers may herd if they all 
counter the same irrational moves in individual investor sentiment. Barberis 
and Shleifer (2003), De Long et al. (1990), Lee et al. (1991) also make similar 
statements. Liao et al. (2011) find strong evidence that mutual funds engage 
in countering individuals’ optimistic sentiment. They argue that such herding 
arises from institutional investors analysing the same sentiment-related 
indicators (investigative herding). Thus, one may argue that institutional 
investors tend to counteract individuals’ sentiment where they will engage in 
buying (selling) stocks when individual investors are pessimistic (optimistic). 
We refer to this as the sentiment countering hypothesis. In turn, if institutional 
investors are acting in concert to counter individuals’ sentiment, we expect 
stronger sell (buy) herding in the presence of optimistic (pessimistic) 
individual sentiment. Although this argument alone predicts symmetric 
herding across sentiment periods, institutional herding may be more 
pronounced in the presence of optimistic sentiment, since stock markets are 
more irrational during optimistic periods due to more irrational participants in 
the market (see, for example, Yu and Yuan, 2011). When sentiment is 
optimistic, noise/individual investors trade more aggressively and are more 
likely to buy stocks and underestimate risk (e.g. Karlsson et al, 2005). 
Sentiment traders have a greater impact on stock valuations during optimistic 
sentiment periods than during pessimistic sentiment periods. We expect that 
institutional investors will engage in herding out of stocks more strongly to 
counteract the optimistic sentiment of individuals. When individual sentiment 
is pessimistic, sentiment traders are less active in the stock market because 
individual investors are reluctant to take short sell positions (e.g. Barber and 
Odean, 2008). Hence, we expect strong sell herding during optimism 
sentiment of individuals. We also expect buy herding during pessimism but 
we are not sure of the intensity of buy herding during pessimism, which 




trades are less active during pessimism than optimism.  
 
We, therefore, state our third hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3: within-period herding will be stronger during periods of 
individual optimism than during periods of individual pessimism and this is 
primarily due to sell herding during optimistic periods.  
 Investor Sentiment and Adjacent-Period Herding  
Let us now consider the relationship between individual sentiment and 
adjacent-period herding in relation to intentional herding. Lee et al. (2002) 
find that market volatility increases (decreases) when investors become 
more pessimistic (optimistic). In a more volatile market, risk will be higher 
and imitating the trades of others might be a means of resolving uncertainty 
about the market environment (informational cascades) (Holmes et al., 2013). 
For this reason, it can be argued that when individual sentiment is low 
(pessimistic), institutional investors are more likely to imitate the actions of 
others whom they assume to have more reliable information and vice versa. 
Consequently, after observing prior trades of others in subsequent periods, 
they tend to follow the actions of others. Therefore, such herding might be 
more evident in subsequent periods (adjacent-period herding) when 
sentiment is pessimistic. Therefore, we have our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Adjacent-period herding will be higher following pessimistic 
periods than following optimistic periods.  
 
5.2.3 Interaction Effect of Analyst Recommendation and 
Investor Sentiment on Herding  
Since both analyst recommendations and individual sentiment have been 
shown to be important in influencing institutional herding, it is important to 
understand how analyst recommendations and individual sentiment interact 
in affecting institutional herding. The interaction may influence the level of 
institutional herding by way of investigative arguments and intentional 




 Interaction Effect on Within-Period Herding  
In the case of the investigative argument, it is assumed that institutional 
investors make trading decisions based on analyst recommendations and 
individual sentiment. If both factors (analyst recommendations and individual 
sentiment) impact investors’ trading decisions in the same direction, 
institutional investors would trade strongly in response to the reinforcing 
factors, resulting in stronger herding. In contrast, if the two factors do not 
suggest similar trading decisions, institutional herding will be dampened. 
Exhibit 5.1 presents the interaction of analyst recommendation revisions and 
individual sentiment on within-period herding. Panel A shows the direction of 
the trading signal of institutional investors based on analyst 
recommendations revisions or investor sentiment. For analyst 
recommendation revisions, institutional investors will be likely to follow the 
direction of analyst recommendation revisions, i.e. they tend to buy (sell) 
stocks with upgrades (downgrades) (H1). In relation to investor sentiment, 
institutional investors will be likely to counter individual optimistic sentiment 
and again it is not certain what the intensity of institutional trades will be when 
individual sentiment is pessimistic, i.e. they are more likely to engage in 
selling stocks when individual investors are optimistic (H3).  
 
As can be seen from Exhibit 5.1, we expect institutional herding will be most 
prominent for stocks with downgrades in the presence of optimistic sentiment, 
since in this case, there is no cognitive dissonance as both downgrades and 
individual optimism suggest institutions to sell. The interaction of the two 
factors on the direction of herding is unclear when analyst recommendation 
revisions and investor sentiment suggest different trading signals. Thus, 
herding will be lower for stocks with upgrades (downgrades) in the presence 
of optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment, since the two factors conflict with each 
other (cognitive dissonance will be evident). In addition, since we expect buy 
herding during pessimism is lower than sell herding during optimism, the 
interaction of individual pessimism and upgrades should be less strongly 
than that of individual optimism and downgrades on within-period herding. 
We, therefore, have our fifth hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Within-period herding will be the most pronounced for stocks 




lower for stocks with upgrades (downgrades) when individual sentiment is 
optimistic (pessimistic) than for stocks with downgrades during optimistic 
periods. 
 
Exhibit 5.1. Interaction effect of analyst recommendations and investor 
sentiment on within-period herding 
Panel A: Direction of within-period herding 
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Panel B. Interaction effect on within-period herding 
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 Interaction Effect on Adjacent-Period Herding  
We next consider the relationship between the interaction effect and 
adjacent-period herding. We hypothesise that the interaction may influence 
institutional herding by way of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance 
will be evident when the two factors (analyst recommendations and individual 
sentiment) do not impact their trading decisions in the same direction. In such 
scenarios, institutional investors become uncertain and respond slowly to the 
arrival of information. In turn, they are more likely to wait until the next period 
to follow the trades of others. This implies stronger herding which arises from 
imitating the trades of others in the subsequent periods. In contrast, if the two 
factors impact on investors’ trading decisions in the same direction, then 
there will be no cognitive dissonance experienced by institutional investors. 
We expect that they would respond strongly and quickly to the two reinforcing 
factors. As a result, institutional investors are unlikely to follow the trades of 
others in subsequent periods. Herding arising from following the trades of 
others will not be prominent in such cases. This is because investors will 
become more confident to take independent decisions and do not feel the 
need to follow the actions of other investors. Exhibit 5.2 summarises 
cognitive dissonance (CD) experienced by institutional investors for stocks 




the level of adjacent-period herding in each case (Panel B). In relation to 
analyst recommendation revisions, institutional investors will be likely to 
follow the direction of analyst recommendation revisions, i.e. they tend to buy 
(sell) stocks with upgrades (downgrades) (H1). In relation to investor 
sentiment, institutional investors will be likely to counter individual sentiment, 
i.e. they are more likely to engage in buying (selling) stocks when individual 
investors are pessimistic (optimistic) (H2) and sell herding during optimism 
is more strongly than buy herding during pessimism.  
 
As can be seen from Exhibit 5.2, cognitive dissonance will be evident for 
stocks with upgrades (downgrades) in the presence of optimistic (pessimistic) 
sentiment. We expect herding arising from following the trades of others in 
the subsequent period will be stronger in such cases. Panel A shows the CD 
experienced by institutional investors in each scenario. We propose that if 
the two factors conflict with each other, cognitive dissonance will be evident. 
Panel B shows adjacent-period herding in each scenario. When cognitive 
dissonance is evident, institutional investors become uncertain and respond 
slowly to the arrival of information. In turn, they are more likely to wait until 
the next period to follow the trades of others. This implies stronger herding 
arising from imitating the trades of others in the subsequent period when 
cognitive dissonance is evident. The notation of strong and weak represents 
strong and weak herding in that case, respectively. We, therefore, state our 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 6. Adjacent-period herding will be strong for stocks with 
upgrades (downgrades) when individual sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic) 
and the herding will be relatively weak for stocks with upgrades (downgrades) 
when individual sentiment is pessimistic (optimistic) 
Exhibit 5.2 Interaction effect of analyst recommendations and investor sentiment 
on adjacent-period herding 
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5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Stock Market and Stock Recommendation Data 
The stock recommendation data is obtained from Thomson Financial 
Institutional Brokers Estimate (I/B/E/S) U.S. The detail file and all common 
stocks (share codes 10 and 11) listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ are 
from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The sample period 
is from December 1993 to December 2014, for which analyst 
recommendation data is available from November 1993 from IBES. The 
ratings of stock recommendation range from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (sell) and are 
reversed in our sample so that higher ratings represent more favourable 
recommendations (e.g. 5 corresponds to strong buy and 1 corresponds to 
sell). We follow prior literature to apply several selection criteria on the 
recommendation data (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006; Loh and 
Stulz, 2011). The recommendation is assumed to be outstanding if the data 
satisfy the following criteria: 
 
(i) A rating should be outstanding in which it has been revised to 
“upgrade, downgrade, or no change” within 12 months and has not 
been stopped by the broker (in the I/B/E/S Stopped File) (e.g. 
Ljungquist, Malloy and Maston, 2009).76 
(ii) The observations where analysts are coded as anonymous by I/B/E/S 
are removed since it is unable to track their recommendation 
revisions. 
(iii) The observations of analyst initiations or re-initiations are deleted 
since it is unable to calculate analyst recommendation revisions for 
these observations. 
(iv) There should be at least one analyst issuing a recommendation for 
the stock.   
 
Our study focuses on recommendation revisions instead of recommendation 
levels since prior studies suggest that recommendation revisions are more 
informative than the levels (e.g. Boni and Womack, 2006; Jegadeesh and 
Kim, 2010). The recommendation revision is computed as the current 
                                               
76 To make sure that analyst recommendations are not stale, we only include latest analyst 




recommendation level minus the prior level by the same analyst. By doing 
so, recommendation revisions range between -4 and +4. For each firm, we 
first identify whether a particular recommendation revision by an analyst is 
upgrade or downgrade. Stock recommendation revision is classified as an 
upgrade (downgrade) if the recommendation revision is greater (less) than 
zero.  
 
To measure the consensus recommendation revision for a particular stock 
for a given period, we follow Jegadeesh et al. (2004). We first calculate the 
consensus recommendation level for the current and prior periods. The 
current consensus recommendation level is the mean of all outstanding 
recommendations for a given stock and only the most recent 
recommendation which is issued within the last 12 months for a given analyst 
is included and the consensus recommendation revision is the difference 
between the current and the prior recommendation levels. In other words, 
the consensus recommendation is the difference between the sum of 
recommendation levels from t-4 to t and that from t-5 to t-1. Panel C of Table 
5.1 summarises the number of consensus recommendations revisions based 
on the sign of recommendation revisions. Our sample contains 149,298 
consensus recommendation revisions in total. There are 35,875, 73,638 and 
39,785 stocks with consensus upgrades, no change and downgrades, 
respectively. It can be seen from Panel C that consensus recommendation 
“no change” constitutes almost half of the sample and consensus 
recommendations upgrades and downgrades constitute nearly one quarter 
of the sample each.   
5.3.2 Investor Sentiment 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) monthly investor sentiment index is 
employed as a proxy for investor sentiment.77,78 The index is constructed 
based on six proxies: trading volume, the divided premium, the closed-end 
fund discount, the number and first-day returns on IPOs and the equity share 
in new issues. To mitigate the effect of macroeconomic conditions from each 
of the variables, they regress each variable on six macroeconomic indicators: 
                                               
77 The data is obtained from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. 
78  We also use the Consumer Confidence index as an alternative measure of investor 





growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, nondurable and 
service consumptions, growth in employment and an NBER recession 
indicator. The residuals from this regression are used as the sentiment proxy. 
Since institutional ownership are based on quarterly holdings, we calculate 
the quarterly investor sentiment as the average of the monthly investor 
sentiment. Specifically, an equal weight is given to the prior month, to the 
month 2 and 3 months prior to the current month. We identify optimistic 
(pessimistic) sentiment periods as the quarterly investor sentiment in that 
quarter which belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series values. 
5.3.3 Institutional Ownership 
Each institutional investor’s quarterly holdings are obtained from Thomson-
Reuters institutional holding database, which is based on institutional 
investors’ 13(f) filings with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It is 
required by SEC that institutional investors with $100 million or more in 
assets under management file a Form 13F to report all equity positions 
greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value within 45 days of the 
end of the calendar quarter. The stock market and institutional ownership 
data span from September 1993 to December 2014. The institutional 
ownership of a stock is measured as the number of shares held by 
institutional investors scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the end 
of each quarter. We follow Sias (2004) and apply several selection criteria to 
institutional data. First, a manager must hold at least one stock at both the 
beginning and the end of the quarter. Second, a stock must be traded by at 
least one institutional investor during the quarter. Table 5.1 presents 
summary statistics for the institutional data used in the study. Panel A reports 
the total number of institutional investors (overall and by investor type). The 
first column presents the times-series average across all 84 quarters and the 
other columns report the results every five years. On average there are 2194 
institutions trading. As seen in panel A, the number of institutions increases 
steadily over the sample period from a low of 1,132 in 1993 to a high 3,305 
in 2014. Panel A also shows that independent advisors constitute a 
significant part of institutional investors and indicates that the number of 
institutions required to file 13F reports is primarily driven by a substantial 
increase in the number of independent advisors, which is consistent with 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Sias (2004). In addition, the number of 




Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the number of institutional investors, the 
number of stocks traded by institutional investors. For each quarter between 
December 1993 and December 2014 we calculate the number of institutions and the 
number of stocks traded by at least 1, 5, 10, 20 and 50 institutional investors and by 
different types of institutional investors. The table reports the time-series averages of 
these values for the whole sample period and every 20 quarters. The current 
consensus recommendation level is the mean of all outstanding recommendations 
for a given stock and only the most recent recommendation which is issued within the 
last 12 months for a given analyst is included and the consensus recommendation 




1993/Q4 1998/Q4 2003/Q4 2008/Q4 2014/Q4 




2,194 1,132 1,568 2,002 2,962 3,305 
No. of banks 189 217 184 172 188 183 
No. of insurance 
companies 
64 74 77 62 55 50 
No. of mutual 
funds 




1,632 698 1,156 1,309 2,318 2,677 
No. of 
Unclassified  
189 75 86 407 359 357 
Panel B. No. of stocks traded by institutions 
≥1 institution 6,756 3,131 5,673 7,266 8,445 9,267 
≥5 institutions 7,020 5,024 5,436 7,100 8,334 9,205 
≥10 institutions 6,626 4,320 5,046 6,762 8,069 8,933 
≥20 institutions 5,781 3,415 4,192 5,935 7,239 8,122 
≥50 institutions 4,093 2,131 2,498 4,120 5,446 6,270 
≥5 banks 5,761 2,657 4,376 6,090 7,413 8,267 
≥5 insurance 
companies 
4,361 2,431 2,810 4,586 5,631 6,348 
5 mutual funds 4,349 2,236 3,113 4,617 5,549 6,229 
≥5 independent 
advisors 
6,579 3,514 5,224 6,900 8,192 9,067 
≥ 5 unclassified 6,756 837 2,017 4,059 5,449 6,324 




Upgrade 35,875 24.03% 
No change 73,638 49.32% 
Downgrade 39,785 26.65% 
Total 149,298 100% 
 
over time whereas the number of other institution groups falls steadily over 
the sample period. Panel B reports the number of stocks with at least 1, 5, 




each type of the institutional traders. On average, there are 6765, 7020, 6626, 
5781 and 4093 stocks traded by at least one, five, ten and twenty institutional 
traders each quarter respectively, indicating that the number of traded stocks 
decreases steadily as the number of institutions increases. Panel B reveals 
that the number of stocks traded by institutional investors has increased 
dramatically over time in all groups of institutions. The figures are consistent 
with those in Sias (2004). 
5.3.4 Institutional Herding Measures 
There are two commonly used institutional herding measures. The first 
micro-level herding measure is the LSV model.79  According to the LSV 
metrics, herding is measured as the tendency of institutional investors to buy 
or sell a particular security relative to what they would do if they trade 
randomly over the same period of time. The LSV herding is measured as the 
percentage of net buyers (investors who increase their ownership in a stock 
during a given period) relative to the total number of investors who trade that 
stock minus an adjustment factor that decreases as the number of investors 
active in that stock increases. The LSV herding measure, HM, is measured 
as: 
𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡 = |𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡| − 𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡    (5.1) 
Where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the fraction of institution buying security k during quarter t. 𝑃𝑡 
is the cross-sectional mean average of the raw fraction of institutions buying 
across k securities during quarter t. The first term captures the extent to 
which the raw fraction of institutions buying in stock k deviates from the 
cross-section mean average of the raw fraction of buying. The second term 
is the expected value of the first term under a binomial distribution with the 
probability  𝑃𝑡 . This adjustment factor AFi,t ensures that the LSV herding 
measure will be zero if all institutional investors trade independently. 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) compute the level of herding as the pool-average 
across all stocks and all periods. The higher HM is, the stronger the herding. 
For instance, HM=4% suggests that out of every 100 trading transactions, 
four more investors trade on the same side of the market over the same 
period of time than would be expected if all traders traded independently. The 
last term in Equation (5.1), 𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is an adujustment factor for security i in 
                                               
79 The LSV model (1992) has been widely used in the herding literature. (e.g. Grinblatt et al., 




quarter t, which controls for random variation around expected percentage 
of buys, under the null hypothesis of random and independent trading by 
institutional investors. It is calculated for each security-quarter by assuming 
the number of institutions buying security i in quarter t and following a 
binomial distribution with probability 𝑃𝑡. 
 
To distinguish the direction of herding, herding on the buy and sell sides is 
analysed. The buy herding (𝐵𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡) and sell herding (𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡) are defined as 
follows (Wermers, 1999): 
𝐵𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡 if 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 > 0    (5.2) 
𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡 if 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 < 0    (5.3) 
Our second empirical measure of herding at the micro-level is constructed 
by Sias (2004) who examines institutional herding by computing the cross-
sectional correlation between institutional investors’ demand this quarter and 
last quarter.80 At the beginning and the end of each quarter, each institutional 
investor’s position is calculated for each security as a fraction of the security’s 
shares outstanding. We classify an institutional investor as a buyer if 
ownership of the investor in the security increases and a seller if their 
ownership decreases. 
 
To analyse institutional herding, we begin by estimating a cross-sectional 
regression across K securities: 
∆𝑘,𝑡= 𝛽𝑡∆𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑘,𝑡       (5.4)                   
Where ∆𝑘,𝑡 is the standardised fraction of institutions buying security k in the 
current quarter t, ∆𝑘,𝑡−1 is the standardised fraction of institutions buying 
security k in the last quarter t-1 and 𝜀𝑘,𝑡 is a zero mean error term. The 
coefficient 𝛽𝑡  is the cross-sectional correlation between institutional 
demand in the current quarter and institutional demand in the last quarter 
and it measures the extent to which institutional investors herd into the same 
security from the current quarter to the last quarter. The level of Sias herding 
is calculated as the time-series average of the coefficient β. The coefficient 
𝛽𝑡  consists of two components, institutional investors following their own 
trades and institutional investors following other institutional investors’ trades. 
Specifically,  
                                               
80 Sias’s (2004) model has been widely used in past studies (see, e.g. Choi and Sias 2009, 
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    (5.5) 
Where K is number of securities, D is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) 
if trader n is a buyer (seller) of security k in quarter t, Raw is the raw fraction 
of the number of institutions buying security k during quarter t, σ(Raw∆𝑘,𝑡)is 
its cross-sectional standard deviation across K securities, 𝑅𝑎𝑤∆𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the 
cross-sectional mean average of raw fraction of the number of institutions 
buying in quarter t, Nk,t is the number of institutional traders trading security 
k during quarter t, Dm,k,t-1 is a dummy variable if trader m (m≠n) is a buyer of 
security k during quarter t-1. All other lag variables are defined similarly. The 
level of Sias herding is calculated as the time-series average of coefficient β. 
 
Sias (2004) measures herding without distinguishing the direction of herding. 
Following a number of previous studies (e.g. Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 
1999; Wylie, 2005), we further analyse buy herding (following each other into 
securities) and sell herding (following each other out of securities) to examine 
whether institutions buy or sell stocks when herding, where in Eq. (4) buy 
herding is measured as institutions that bought the security k in the last 
quarter t-1 (𝑅𝑎𝑤𝑘,𝑡−1>0.5) and sell herding is measured as institutions that 
sold the security k in the last quarter t-1 (𝑅𝑎𝑤𝑘,𝑡−1<0.5). 
 
The key difference between the LSV and Sias herding measures is that while 
the former looks indirectly for cross-sectional temporal dependence within a 
period, the latter test directly whether institutional investors follow each 
other’s trades in the subsequent period. The two measures allow us to 
capture different aspects of herding since the LSV measure captures 
institutional herding based on the trading signal of individual sentiment and 
analyst recommendations within a period whereas the Sias measure 




interaction of the two factors. By using both measures, we will be able to gain 
better insights into the extent to which herding is intentional or spurious. 
5.4 Empirical Analysis 
This section reports the empirical evidence on how investor sentiment and 
analyst recommendation revisions interact in affecting institutional herding 
using the previously established LSV and Sias herding measures over the 
sample period. We first report institutional herding on stocks with analyst 
recommendations available, and then examine herding under analyst 
recommendation revisions and under different investor sentiment periods 
separately. Lastly, we investigate how both factors interact in influencing 
institutional herding. 
5.4.1 Institutional Herding Evidence 
 Evidence of Within-Period Herding 
Analysis begins by examining whether institutions herd in stocks with analyst 
recommendations available using the LSV herding measure. Table 5.2 
reports the average level of LSV herding as defined in equation (5.1) and 
Wermer’s (1999) buy- and sell-herding measure as defined in equation (5.2) 
and (5.3) for stocks traded by at least 1, 5 and 20 institutional investors. The 
results reported related to the pooled average of herding for all stocks over 
the sample period. The three respective mean levels of aggregate herding 
are 3.763%, 3.534%, and 3.099% for stocks traded by at least 1, 5 and 20 
institutional investors, with all being significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. The figures are consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (2013) and 
Wermers (1999) for mutual funds. It is interesting to notice that herding 
decreases monotonically as trading activity by institutional investors 
increases, suggesting that stocks traded by large numbers of institutions are 
generally large value stocks and show lower levels of herding (Wermers, 
1999). Moreover, sell herding is significantly stronger than buy herding, 
suggesting that institutions herd more strongly on the sell-side than the buy-





 Evidence of Adjacent-Period Herding 
In this sub-section, we examine whether institutions herd in stocks using the 
Sias herding measure as defined in equations (5.4) and (5.5). The results 
reported relate to the average coefficients over the 84 quarters regressions. 
Table 5.3 reports the average of the estimates of the coefficient β and its two 
components i.e. institutions following their own trades and following the 
trades of others. As can be seen from Panel A of Table 5.3, the β is estimated 
to be a significant 36.884%, 37.247%, and 35.915% for the cases in which 
there are at least 1, 5 and 20 active institutions, respectively. These figures  
 
are all more than twice as large as those of Sias (2004). This is not surprising 
since that our sample is restricted to stocks with analyst recommendations 
available. The results provide strong evidence that herding takes place for 
stocks with analyst recommendations during the sample period. The 
component that arises from institutions following the trades of others 
constitutes a significant portion of the β (accounting for almost 80% of the β), 
indicating that there is strong evidence of institutions following the trades of 
others and relatively little evidence of institutions following their own trades. 
 
We then partition the average of β and its two components into two parts, 
namely the Sias buy and sell herding as defined in section 5.5.4 where in Eq. 
(5.4) buy herding is measured as institutions that bought the security k in the 
last quarter t-1 (𝑅𝑎𝑤𝑘,𝑡−1>0.5) and sell herding is measured as institutions 
that sold the security k in the last quarter t-1 (𝑅𝑎𝑤𝑘,𝑡−1<0.5). The results for  
Table 5.2 Evidence of Within-Period Herding 
This table shows the mean level of LSV aggregate, buy and sell herding measures for 
stock quarters where there are at least 1, 5, 20 institutional investors during the 1993-
2014 period. The aggregate LSV herding measure HM, for each stock-quarter is 
defined as 𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡 = |𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡| − 𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is the fraction of number of buyers to 
the total number of traders during quarter t, 𝑃𝑡 is the cross-sectional mean average of 
fraction of buyers across k securities in quarter t and 𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡  is an adjustment factor 
ensures the measure will be zero if no herding occurs. The buy herding is measured 
as 𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡  conditional on 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 > 0  and the sell herding is measured as 𝐻𝑀𝑖𝑡 
conditional on 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 < 0.  Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 At least 1 institutions  At least 5 
institutions  
At least 20 institutions 
Aggregate 
Herding 
0.03763(81.13)*** 0.03534(71.31)*** 0.03099(69.87)*** 
Buy herding 0.02934(37.31)*** 0.02934(35.91)*** 0.02806(29.88)*** 
Sell Herding 0.04633(41.33)*** 0.04171(39.27)*** 0.03420(32.18)*** 





Table 5.3 Evidence of Adjacent-Period Herding 
This table reports the mean level of the Sias total, buy, and sell herding where there 
are at least 1, 5, 20 institutional investors during the 1993-2014 period. The Sias 
measure is the cross-sectional correlation in adjacent periods. The correlation is 
partitioned into two parts, cross-sectional correlation due to funds following their own 
trades and due to funds following the trades of others. The total correlation and two 
partitions are further divided into two parts, buy herding (institutions buy in quarter t-1) 
and sell herding (institutions sell in quarter t-1). Panel A presents the average 
correlation, the contribution of institutions following their own trades and the 
contribution of institutions following the trades of others. Panel B and C present the 
average correlation and two components for buy and sell herding, respectively. Panel 
D shows the difference in the average correlation and two components between buy- 
and sell-herding. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks 
refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 At least 1 
institutional 
investors 
At least 5 institutional 
investors 
At least 20 
institutional 
investors 
Panel A. Total cross-sectional correlation 
Average coefficient 0.36884(31.12)*** 0.37247(33.12)*** 0.35915(33.27)*** 
Institutions following 
their own trades 
0.07676(13.27)*** 0.06306(12.98)*** 0.05635(11.90)*** 
Institutions following 
the trades of others 
0.29208(25.34)*** 0.30941(25.68)*** 0.30280(27.13)*** 
Panel B. Contribution of Buy 
Average coefficient 0.19243(28.60)*** 0.19600(28.91)*** 0.19731(29.31)*** 
Institutions following 
their own trades 
0.04005(12.31)*** 0.03318(12.01)*** 0.03096(11.78)*** 
Institutions following 
the trades of others 
0.15238(20.54)*** 0.16282(22.35)*** 0.16635(22.98)*** 
Panel C. Contribution of Sell 
Average coefficient 0.17209(20.10)*** 0.17283(21.57)*** 0.16321(19.80)*** 
Institutions following 
their own trades 
0.03581(10.37)*** 0.02926(9.88)*** 0.02561(9.13)*** 
Institutions following 
the trades of others 
0.13628(18.34)*** 0.14357(19.56)*** 0.13760(17.21)*** 
Panel D. Buy-Sell 
Average coefficient 0.02035(1.53) 0.02318(1.99)** 0.03410(2.03)** 
Institutions following 
their own trades 
0.00423(2.12)** 0.00392(3.12)*** 0.00535(4.13)*** 
Institutions following 
the trades of others 
0.01612(1.51) 0.01926(3.77)*** 0.02875(3.98)*** 
 
the Sias buy- and sell-herding show a similar pattern to the aggregate 
adjacent-period herding. To illustrate, as can be seen from Panel B of Table 
5.3, the β of buy herding is estimated to be a significant 19.243%, 19.6%, 
and 19.731% for the cases in which there are at least 1, 5 and 20 active 
institutions, respectively. Similarly, the β of sell herding is estimated to be a 
significant 17.209%, 17.283%, and 16.321% for the cases in which there are 
at least 1, 5 and 20 active institutions, respectively. The component that 
arises from institutions following the trades of others contributes to a 
significant portion of the β, suggesting strong evidence of institutions 




is significantly stronger than sell herding when there are more than five 
institutions. The difference between buy- and sell-herding is statistically 
different from zero at the 5% level, suggesting institutions herd more strongly 
on the buy-side than the sell-side in the subsequent period. 
5.4.2 Analyst Recommendation Revisions and Institutional 
Herding 
In this section, we investigate whether analyst recommendation revisions 
affect institutional herding. Specifically, during each quarter, each stock is 
classified as an upgrade, no change or downgrade stock according to its 
level of consensus analyst recommendation revisions. We then compute the 
mean level of herding separately for stocks with upgrades, no change, and 
downgrades. 
 Analyst Recommendation Revision and Within-Period 
Herding 
We first examine the effect of analyst recommendation revisions on within-
period herding. Recall that H1 hypothesised that analyst recommendation 
revisions have a significant impact on within-period herding and the level of 
herding stronger for stocks with downgrades than for stocks with upgrades. 
Table 5.4 reports the mean level of LSV herding measures (aggregate, buy 
and sell) for stocks with upgrades, no change and downgrades as well as the 
difference in herding between upgrades and downgrades, respectively. The 
average level of sell herding is statistically higher than that of buy herding in 
all analyst recommendation revision groups, suggesting that institutional 
investors herd more strongly on the sell side, which is consistent with the 
findings of Brown et al. (2013). As can be seen from the first row of Table 5.4, 
the mean level of aggregate herding for upgrades and downgrades is 3.133% 
and 3.573%, respectively, with both being significant at the 1% level. The 
difference in aggregate herding between upgrades and downgrades is 0.44%, 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating institutions herd 
more strongly on downgrades, consistent with hypothesis 1.  
 
The mean level of buy herding for upgrades and downgrades is 2.773% and 
2.727%, respectively, indicating there is no meaningful difference in herding 




Table 5.4 Analyst Recommendations and Within-Period Herding 
This table presents the average levels of the LSV herding under different analyst 
recommendation revisions (upgrades and downgrades) and the difference between 
upgrades and downgrades. The LSV herding measures (aggregate, buy and sell) 
are defined in Table 5.2. The consensus recommendation revision is the difference 
between the current and the prior recommendation levels and the current consensus 
recommendation level is the mean of all outstanding recommendations for a given 
stock and only the most recent recommendation which is issued within last 12 
months for a given analyst is included. The consensus upgrades, downgrades and 
No Change are defined as the value of the consensus revision is higher than, less 
than and equal to zero, respectively. For brevity, we only report results for stocks 
with upgrades and downgrades. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%). 
 Upgrade Downgrade Up. - Down. 
Aggregate 
herding 
0.03133(69.03)*** 0.03573(57.87)*** -0.00440(-2.13)** 
Buy herding 0.02773(86.20)*** 0.02727(86.76)*** 0.00046(0.87) 
Sell herding 0.03517(70.38)*** 0.04362(90.75)*** -0.00845(-6.18)*** 
Buy. - sell. -0.00744(-7.98)*** -0.01635(-13.13)*** 0.00891(-8.91)*** 
 
level of sell herding for stocks with upgrades and downgrades is 3.517% and 
4.362%, respectively, indicating investors herd more strongly for downgrades 
on the sell-side. The evidence is consistent with the findings of Brown et al. 
(2013) and supports the view that investors herd more strongly to sell stocks 
with consensus downgrades. By and large, the difference in aggregate 
herding between upgrades and downgrade primarily arises from sell herding 
rather than from buy herding. 
 Analyst Recommendation Revisions and Adjacent-
Period Herding 
We next turn to consider the relation between analyst recommendation 
revisions and adjacent-period herding. It is hypothesised (H2) that analyst 
recommendation revisions have no significant impact on adjacent-period 
herding. Table 5.5 reports the results for adjacent-period herding (aggregate, 
buy and sell) for stocks with upgrades, downgrades, and no change as well 
as the difference in herding between upgrades and downgrades. As can be 
seen from table 5.5, the average estimates of the coefficient β and its two 
components are slightly higher for stocks with downgrades than stocks with 
upgrades but there is no meaningful difference between them. For example, 
as shown in Panel A, the coefficients β of aggregate herding for upgrades 
and downgrade is estimated to be a significant 36.847% and 37.541%, 
respectively. However, the difference in β between upgrades and 





This can happen for a few reasons. First, when analyst information arrives in 
period t-1, institutional investors tend to herd in response to such information 
reasonably quickly because the investment value of analyst research is 
short-lived (Brown et al., 2013). As a result, the Sias measure may not 
capture such herding in the subsequent period t. Second, investors feel no 
needs to follow the trades of others when analyst information releases. 
Therefore, there is no significant difference in the Sias herding between 
upgrades and downgrades. It can be seen from panel B that the β of buy 
herding for upgrades and downgrades is estimated to be a significant 19.369% 
and 17.759%, respectively. However, the difference in buy herding for 
upgrades and downgrades is insignificant. Panel B also reveals that the 
components arising from following their own trades and the trades of others 
for stocks with upgrades are slightly larger than those for stocks with 
downgrades but the differences are also insignificant. Similarly, in Panel C, 
the β and its two components of sell herding for stocks with upgrades are 
slightly smaller than those for stocks with downgrades but the differences are 
insignificant. Furthermore, we can observe from Panel C that for stocks with 
upgrades, the β and its two components for buy herding are significantly 
larger than those for sell herding whereas for stocks with downgrades, the β 
and its two components for sell herding are significantly larger than those for 
buy herding. The findings suggest that institutions herd more strongly for 
stocks with upgrades on the buy-side than the sell-side but they herd more 
strongly for those with downgrades on the sell-side than the buy-side. 
 
In sum, the findings of adjacent-period herding suggest that there is no 
significant difference in herding between upgrades and downgrades. The 
evidence reveals that analyst recommendation revisions have an 
insignificant effect on adjacent-period herding if institutions herd by following 
others’ trades. In addition, we find that buy (sell) herding is stronger than sell 
(buy) herding for stocks with upgrades (downgrades) in the subsequent 
period. To capture herding in response to analyst information within the same 
period, the LSV herding measure in the previous section is able to examine 
the relation between immediate institutional herding and analyst 
recommendation revisions. The results show that within-period herding 





Table 5.5 Analyst Recommendations and Adjacent-Period Herding 
This table presents the Sias herding levels under different analyst 
recommendation revisions (upgrades and downgrades). The Sias herding 
measures (aggregate, buy and sell) and their components are defined in Table 
5.3. The consensus recommendation revision is the difference between the 
current and the prior recommendation levels and the current consensus 
recommendation level is the mean of all outstanding recommendations for a given 
stock and only the most recent recommendation for a given analyst is included. 
The consensus upgrades, downgrades and No Change are defined as the value 
of the consensus revision is bigger, smaller and equal to zero, respectively. For 
brevity, we only report results for stocks with upgrades and downgrades. 
Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to 
different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 Upgrade Downgrade Up. – Down. 
Panel A. Total cross-sectional correlation 
Average coefficient 0.36847(29.78)*** 0.37541(30.41)*** -0.00694(-0.99) 
 
Institutions 
following their own 
trades 
0.06065(12.33)*** 0.05594(11.26)*** 0.00470(0.81) 
 
Institutions 
following the trades 
of others 
0.30783(22.90)*** 0.31947(23.11)*** -0.01164(-1.34) 
 
Panel B. Contribution of Buy 
Average coefficient 0.19396(25.71)*** 0.17759(22.71)*** 0.01637(1.38) 
Institutions 
following their own 
trades 
0.03192(7.81)*** 0.02646(6.29)*** 0.00546(1.34) 
 
Institutions 
following the trades 
of others 
0.16204(17.98)*** 0.15113(16.49)*** 0.01091(1.41) 
 
Panel C. Contribution of Sell 
Average coefficient 0.17441(17.53)*** 0.19831(24.29)*** -0.02390(-1.61) 
Institutions 
following their own 
trades 
0.02871(7.25)*** 0.02955(8.01)*** -0.00084(-0.34) 
Institutions 
following the trades 
of others 
0.14570(16.13)*** 0.16876(18.19)*** -0.02306(1-.63) 
Panel D. Buy-Sell 
Average coefficient 0.01955(2.13)** -0.02072(-2.31)** 0.04027(2.46)** 
Institutions 







following the trades 
of others 
0.01633(1.99)** 0.01763(1.96)** -0.0013(-0.34) 
 
 
stronger for stocks with downgrades than stocks with upgrades. It suggests 
that the effect of analyst recommendation revisions has a significant impact 
on within-period herding if institutions herd based on recommendation 
revisions, whereas recommendation revisions have no significant impact on 
adjacent-period herding if the herding is primarily driven by following the 




5.4.3 Investor Sentiment and Institutional Herding 
Previous empirical studies suggest that individual sentiment might influence 
institutional herding (Laknoishok et al., 1992; Barberris and Shleifer, 2003; 
De Long et al.; 1999; and Shleifer, 2000). Liao et al. (2011) examine the 
relationship between mutual fund herding and investor sentiment. They find 
strong evidence that mutual funds engage in sell herding in stocks with high 
individual sentiment, suggesting that rational investors tend to counteract 
optimistic sentiment of individual investors. In this section, we examine 
whether investor sentiment affects institutional herding using both herding 
measures.  
 Investor Sentiment and Within-Period Herding  
It is hypothesised (H3) that within-period herding will be stronger during 
periods of individual optimism than during periods of individual pessimism 
and this is primarily due to sell herding during optimism periods. We first 
employ Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) sentiment index to identify the sentiment 
quarter in the current quarter t as optimistic, mild or pessimistic. The 
sentiment in quarter t is estimated by the quarterly sentiment value in t-1 
which is calculated as the average of the monthly investor sentiment and 
optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment periods are defined as the value of the 
index in that quarter belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series value.  
 
Table 5.6 reports the mean level of the within-period herding (aggregate, buy 
and sell) in optimistic and pessimistic sentiment periods as well as the 
difference between the two sentiment periods. Generally, sell herding is 
significantly stronger than buy herding across both sentiment periods. The 
mean levels of aggregate herding in optimistic and pessimistic periods are 
4.171% and 3.546%, respectively, and the difference between the two 
sentiment periods is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, 
suggesting that institutional investors herd more strongly in optimistic periods. 
The average levels of buy herding following optimistic and pessimistic 
periods are 3.267% and 2.988%, respectively, with the difference between 
optimism and pessimism is significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, the 
difference in sell herding between optimistic and pessimistic sentiment is 
0.878%, which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, suggesting 





Table 5.6 Investor Sentiment and Within-Period Herding 
This table presents the average levels of the LSV herding under different investor 
sentiment periods (optimistic and pessimistic). The LSV herding measures 
(aggregate, buy and sell) are defined in Table 5.2. The Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
sentiment index is used to identify optimistic and pessimistic investor sentiment 
quarters. The quarterly investor sentiment index is calculated as the average of 
the monthly investor sentiment index over the quarter and optimistic (pessimistic) 
sentiment periods are defined as the value of the index in that quarter belongs to 
the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series value. Corresponding t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** 
(1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt. - Pess. 
Aggregate 
herding 
0.04171(89.34)*** 0.03546(86,22)*** 0.00625(8.22)*** 
Buy herding 0.03267(76.89)*** 0.02988(62.18)*** 0.00280(1.77)* 
Sell herding 0.05124(73.24)*** 0.04246(62.89)*** 0.00878(11.33)*** 
Buy. - sell. -0.01856(-17.13)*** -0.01258(-16.14)*** -0.00598(-10.33)*** 
 
sell herding rather than buy herding. In sum, the findings are consistent with 
hypothesis 3 and provide support to the findings of Liao et al. (2011) in which 
institutional investors tend to herd to counteract optimistic sentiment of 
individual investors. 
 Investor Sentiment and Adjacent-Period Herding  
Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) sentiment index is used to identify the sentiment 
quarter in the prior quarter t-1 as optimistic, mild or pessimistic. We partition 
the time-series estimates of β into three groups representing optimism, mild 
and pessimism and then take the time-series average of coefficient β in each 
sentiment group. Recall that H4 hypothesised adjacent-period herding will 
be higher following pessimistic periods than following pessimistic periods. 
Table 5.7 reports the Sias herding measures (aggregate, buy and sell) 
following optimistic and pessimistic quarters as well as the difference in all 
herding measures between the two sentiment periods. There is a marked 
difference in adjacent-period herding across sentiment periods.  
 
As can be seen from Panel A of Table 5.7, the average of the estimates of β 
following optimistic and pessimistic periods are 36.006% and 41.721%, 
respectively, and the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level. We observe from the last column of Panel that the components 
resulting from institutions following the trades of others following optimistic 
and pessimistic periods are 28.894% and 37.407%, respectively, and the 




Table 5.7 Investor Sentiment and Adjacent-Period Herding 
This table presents the Sias herding levels under different investor sentiment 
periods (optimistic and pessimistic). The Sias herding measures (aggregate, buy 
and sell) and their components are defined in Table 5.3. The Baker and Wurgler’s 
(2007) sentiment index is used to identify optimistic and pessimistic investor 
sentiment quarters. The quarterly investor sentiment index is calculated as the 
average of the monthly investor sentiment index over the quarter and optimistic 
(pessimistic) sentiment periods are defined as the value in that quarter belongs to 
the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series value. Corresponding t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), 
** (5%), * (10%). 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.- Pess. 
Panel A. Total cross-sectional correlation 
Average coefficient 0.36006(18.11)*** 0.41721(21.25)*** -0.05715(-2.43)** 
Institutions 
following their own 
trades 
0.07111(11.63)*** 0.04314(9.00)*** 0.02797(4.77)*** 
Institutions 
following the trades 
of others 
0.28894(15.67)*** 0.37407(16.32)*** -0.08513(-4.13)*** 
Panel B. Contribution of Buy 
Average coefficient 0.21510(15.26)*** 0.19972(19.12)*** 0.01538(1.46) 
Institutions 
following their own 
trades 
0.04248(9.64)*** 0.02065(6.89)*** 0.02183(6.13)*** 
Institutions 
following the trades 
of others 
0.17262(12.77)*** 0.17917(13.43)*** -0.00645(-1.01) 
Panel C. Contribution of Sell 
Average coefficient 0.13944(16.20)*** 0.20702(17.37)*** -0.06758(-6.23)*** 
Institutions 
following their own 
trades 
0.02754(7.13)*** 0.02140(6.12)*** 0.00614(4.13)** 
Institutions 
following the trades 
of others 
0.11190(14.22)*** 0.18562(16.11)*** -0.07371(-8.61)*** 
Panel D. Buy-Sell 
Average coefficient 0.07566(7.19)*** -0.00730(-1.24) 0.08296(7.43)*** 
Institutions 
following their own 
trades 
0.01494(4.13)*** -0.00075(-0.21) 0.01570(4.11)** 
Institutions 
following the trades 
of others 
0.06072(7.01)*** -0.00655(-1.11) 0.06726(6.01)*** 
 
at the 1% level. The results suggest that institutional investors herd more 
strongly following pessimistic periods than following optimistic periods, 
consistent with hypothesis 4. The evidence indicates that when sentiment is 
pessimistic, institutional investors become more uncertain about making 
trading decisions and tend to wait until the next quarter to follow the actions 
of other investors, whereas when sentiment is optimistic, investors do not 
feel the need to imitate the actions of others and make trading decisions 
independently as the sentiment countering hypothesis suggests that way. 




from funds following their own trades following optimistic and pessimistic 
periods are 7.111% and 4.314%, respectively, with the difference being a 
significant 2.797%, suggesting that institutions are more likely to herd by 
following their own trades following optimistic periods than following 
pessimistic periods.  
 
Panels B and C report adjacent-period buy- and sell-herding following 
optimistic and pessimistic periods, respectively. As can be seen from Panel 
B of Table 5.7, the average of β of buy herding following optimistic and 
pessimism periods are 21.510% and 19.972%, respectively, with the 
difference being insignificantly different from zero. The components resulting 
from institutions following the trades of others following optimistic and 
pessimistic periods are 17.262% and 17.917%, respectively, and again, the 
difference is insignificantly different from zero. However, the difference in 
components resulting from institutions following their own trades between the 
two sentiment periods is a significant 2.183%, suggesting institutions herd 
more strongly to buy by following their own trades following optimistic periods 
than following pessimistic periods. We observe from Panel C that, the 
average of β of sell herding following optimistic and pessimistic periods are 
13.944% and 20.702%, respectively, and the difference is estimated to be a 
significant 6.758%. It suggests that institutional investors herd more strongly 
on the sell side following pessimistic periods than following optimistic periods. 
The component resulting from institutions following their own trades is 
significantly higher following optimistic periods than that following pessimistic 
periods whereas the component resulting from institutions following the 
trades of others is significantly lower following optimistic periods than that 
following pessimistic periods. The evidence suggests that higher sell herding 
following pessimistic periods is primarily driven by institutions following the 
trades of others. 
 
In sum, we find strong evidence that adjacent-period herding is significantly 
stronger following pessimistic periods than following optimistic periods, 
which is consistent with H4 and the notion that institutional investors feel the 
need to follow the trades of others when the market is more volatile. We also 
find that adjacent-period sell herding is stronger following pessimistic periods 
than following optimistic periods but there is no significant difference in buy 




5.4.4 Analyst Recommendations, Investor Sentiment and 
Institutional Herding  
We now turn to the main part of the analysis to consider the interaction of 
analyst recommendation revisions and investor sentiment on within-period 
and adjacent-period herding. 
 Analyst Recommendations, Investor Sentiment and 
Within-Period Herding 
This section investigates how analyst recommendation revisions and 
investor sentiment interact in influencing within-period herding using the LSV 
measure. To examine the interaction, we double sort the data sample on 
consensus recommendation revisions and investor sentiment quarters. 
Specifically, during each quarter, we classify a stock as an upgrade, no 
change or downgrade stock based on the consensus analyst 
recommendation revisions and then categorise each quarter as optimistic, 
mild or pessimistic according to the quarterly value of sentiment. The level of 
within-period herding is calculated as the pool-average of estimates in that 
category. 
 
Table 5.8 shows the results for the LSV herding measures (aggregate, buy 
and sell) double sorted by analyst recommendation revisions and investor 
sentiment. Before discussing specific results, hypothesis 5 states that within-
period herding will be the most pronounced for stocks with downgrades 
(upgrades) in the presence of optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment and herding 
will be lower for upgrades (downgrades) when sentiment is optimistic 
(pessimistic). The results in Panel A provides clear support for this 
hypothesis except from the strong within-herding for stocks with upgrades 
during pessimistic periods. Panel A reveals that there is clear evidence that 
the average level of herding is higher during optimistic periods than during 
pessimistic periods across both recommendation revision groups, but the 
effect of consensus recommendation revisions on institutional herding is only 
prominent during optimistic periods. To illustrate, the average levels of 
herding for upgrades and downgrades during optimistic periods are 3.515% 
and 3.945%, respectively, with the difference being statistically significant at 




Table 5.8 Analyst Recommendations, Investor Sentiment and Within-
Period Herding 
This table reports the mean level of the LSV herding measures (aggregate, buy, 
and sell) double sorted by consensus analyst recommendation revisions and 
investor sentiment during the 1993-2014 period. The consensus recommendation 
revision is the difference between the current and the prior recommendation levels 
and the current consensus recommendation level is the mean of all outstanding 
recommendations for a given stock and only the most recent recommendation for 
a given analyst is included. The consensus upgrades and downgrades refer to 
when the value of the consensus revision is bigger, smaller and equal to zero, 
respectively. The LSV herding measures (aggregate, buy and sell) are defined in 
Table 5.2. The Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) sentiment index is used to identify 
optimistic, mild and pessimistic investor sentiment quarters. The quarterly investor 
sentiment is calculated as the average of the monthly investor sentiment proxy 
over the quarter and optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment periods are defined as 
when value in that quarter belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series 
value. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer 
to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 Upgrade Downgrade Up. - Down. 
Panel A. Aggregate Herding measure 
Optimistic 0.03515(71.22)*** 0.03945(75.22)*** -0.00429(-1.79)* 
Pessimistic 0.03023(60.37)*** 0.03232(62.33)*** -0.00209(-1.45) 
Opt.- Pess. 0.00493(8.15)*** 0.00713(9.13)*** -0.00220(-1.51) 
Panel B. Buy herding 
Optimistic 0.03190(60.37)*** 0.02987(57.89)*** 0.00203(1.03) 
Pessimistic 0.02927(52.34)*** 0.02729(49.23)*** 0.00198(1.21) 
Opt.- Pess. 0.00263(1.47) 0.00258(1.43) 0.00006(0.08) 
Panel C. Sell herding 
Optimistic 0.03908(77.21)*** 0.04744(81.34)*** -0.00836(-
9.22)*** 
Pessimistic 0.03149(61.34)*** 0.03796(77.23)*** -0.00646(-
7.38)*** 
Opt.- Pess. 0.00759(7.29)*** 0.00948(9.78)*** -0.00189(-1.61) 
Panel D. Buy - Sell herding 
Optimistic -0.00718(-8.01)*** -0.01757(-11.45)*** 0.01039(9.45)*** 
Pessimistic -0.00223(-1.48) -0.01067(-6.34)*** 0.00844(4.99)*** 
Opt.- Pess. -0.00495(-4.19)*** -0.00690(-3.89)*** 0.00195(1.48) 
 
stocks with downgrades in the presence of optimistic sentiment. In contrast, 
the average levels of herding for upgrades and downgrades in the presence 
of pessimistic sentiment are 3.023% and 3.232%, with the difference being 
insignificantly different from zero. 
 
The evidence suggests that institutional investors are more likely to follow 
analyst recommendation revisions-in particular downgrades during optimistic 
periods than during pessimistic periods. Furthermore, we observe from 
Panel A that herding is the strongest for stocks with downgrades when 
sentiment is optimistic, which is consistent with H5 and our cognitive 
argument in which if there is no cognitive dissonance experienced by 
investors (as both optimism and downgrades suggest them to sell as shown 
in Exhibit 5.1), they will react strongly to the two factors. Moreover, we find 




pessimistic periods. We also find that the average levels of herding for stocks 
with upgrades during optimistic periods and for stocks with downgrades 
during pessimistic periods are lower than that for stocks with downgrades 
during optimistic periods. The findings are consistent with our argument as 
shown in Exhibit 5.1: If cognitive dissonance is experienced (upgrades vs 
optimism and downgrades vs pessimism), herding will be lower.  
 
To investigate the impact of consensus recommendation revisions and 
investor sentiment further, we partition the aggregate herding into buy and 
sell herding as shown in Panels B and C, respectively. As can be seen from 
Panel B, there is no significant difference in buy herding between the two 
revision groups and the two sentiment periods. In contrast, as can be seen 
from Panel C, the pattern of sell herding results shows a marked difference 
across sentiment and recommendation revision groups. Specifically, the 
average level of sell herding is 4.744% for stocks with downgrades in the 
presence of optimistic sentiment, which is significantly higher compared to 
that for stocks with downgrades during pessimistic periods (3.796%) and that 
for stocks with upgrades during optimistic periods (3.908%). The evidence 
reveals that institutional investors herd most strongly to sell downgrade 
stocks during optimistic periods. This is due to both optimism and downgrade 
suggesting them to sell so they will react strongly to two reinforcing signals. 
The evidence reveals that the higher herding for stocks with downgrades 
during optimistic periods arises primarily from the sell side than the buy-side. 
 
In sum, the reported findings in Table 5.8 provide evidence consistent with 
our hypothesis 5 and suggest that institutional investors are most likely to 
herd for stocks with downgrades during pessimistic periods and such herding 
is primarily driven by sell herding.  
 Analyst Recommendations, Investor Sentiment and 
Adjacent-Period Herding  
In this section, we investigate how analyst recommendation revisions and 
investor sentiment interact in influencing adjacent-period herding. To 
examine such an interaction, we double sort the data sample on consensus 
recommendation revisions and investor sentiment. Specifically, during each 




consensus analyst recommendation revisions and then estimate the Sias 
herding coefficient and its two components for each of the revision groups in 
each quarter. We then categorise each quarter as optimistic, mild or 
pessimistic and calculate the time-series average of herding coefficients and 
their two components in different sentiment periods. 
 
Recall that H6 hypothesised that adjacent-period herding from following the 
trades of others will be stronger for upgrades (downgrades) when individual 
sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic). Table 5.9 shows the results for the Sias 
herding measures (aggregate, buy and sell) double sorted by analyst 
recommendation revisions and investor sentiment as shown in Panels A, B 
and C, respectively. The overall pattern of the results shows clear differences 
across recommendation revision and individual sentiment groups.  
 
As can be seen from Panel A, for stocks with upgrades, the coefficient β for 
aggregate herding is 37.136% following optimistic periods, which is slightly 
larger than that following pessimistic periods (36.593%), although the 
difference is insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, for stocks with 
downgrades, the average of coefficients β of aggregate herding for stocks 
with downgrades following optimistic and pessimistic periods are 36.784% 
and 41.981%, respectively, with the difference being a significant 5.196%, 
indicating institutional investors herd more strongly for downgrade stocks 
following pessimistic periods, consistent with hypothesis 6. The evidence in 
Panel A reveals that the relatively higher herding values for stocks with 
upgrades following optimism and for stocks with downgrades following 
pessimism are consistent with H6 and our cognitive dissonance argument: if 
cognitive dissonance is evident (upgrade vs optimism and downgrade vs 
pessimism), investors are more likely to wait to trade until the next period and 
follow the trades of others, resulting in stronger adjacent-period herding in 
those two cases. The relatively lower herding values for stocks with upgrades 
during optimistic periods and for stocks with downgrades during pessimistic 
periods are also consistent with H6 and our argument that if cognitive 
dissonance is experienced by institutional investors (upgrades vs optimism 
and downgrades vs pessimism), herding will be lower.  
 
We observe from the second row from Panel A that the coefficients β of buy 




21.742% and 17.630%, respectively, with the difference being significant at 
the 5% level, suggesting that institutions are more likely to herd to buy stocks 
with upgrades following optimistic periods than following pessimistic periods. 
However, for stocks with downgrades, there is no significant difference in buy 
herding between optimism and pessimism. Moreover, as can be seen from 
the third row from Panel A that the coefficients β of sell herding for stocks 
with upgrades following optimism and pessimism are 15.104% and 18.158%, 
with the difference being significantly different from zero at the 5% level, 
suggesting that institutions are more likely to herd to sell following pessimistic 
periods even for stocks with upgrades. Similarly, the coefficients β of sell 
herding for stocks with downgrades following optimism and pessimism are 
14.858% and 21.139%, with the difference being statistically significantly at 
the 1% level, suggesting that institutions are more likely to sell for stocks with 
downgrades following pessimism than following optimism. Moreover, buy 
herding is the strongest for stocks with upgrades in the presence of optimistic 
sentiment whereas as shown in the third row of Panel A, sell herding is the 
strongest for stocks with downgrades in the presence of pessimistic 
sentiment. The results reveal that when cognitive dissonance is evident in 
these cases (upgrades vs optimism and downgrades vs pessimism), 
institutional investors are more likely to herd in the direction of analyst 
recommendation revisions. The evidence suggests that when institutions 
experience cognitive dissonance between the two factors, analyst 
recommendation revisions appear to be dominant. 
 
Panels B and C of Table 5.9 allow us to examine whether adjacent-period 
herding in such cases is primarily driven by the portion of institutions 
following the trades of others. There is clear evidence that adjacent-period 
herding in each case is primarily driven by following the trades of others and 
the pattern of the component of following the trades of other as shown in 
Panel C is similar to that of aggregate adjacent-period herding as shown in 
Panel A but the results in Panel B shows a different pattern to those in Panel 
A. To illustrate, as shown in Panel B, for stocks with both upgrades and 
downgrades, aggregate herding is significantly stronger following optimism 
than following pessimism for both revision groups. The results in the second 
and third row of Panel B show that the component of aggregate herding 
resulting from institutions following their own trades is primarily driven by that 




all cases. The evidence suggests that institutions are more likely to herd to 
buy stocks by following their own trades following optimism regardless of 
analyst recommendation revisions. Furthermore, as can be seen from the 
first row of Panel C, there is an insignificant difference in herding from 
institutions following the trades of others between optimism and pessimism 
for stocks with upgrades whereas the portions resulting from institutions 
following the trades of others for downgrades following optimistic and 
pessimistic periods are 31.438% and 39.761%, respectively, and the 
difference is 8.324%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
evidence suggests that strong adjacent-period herding for stocks with 
downgrades following pessimistic periods as shown in Panel A is primarily 
driven by institutions following the trades of others for stocks. The results in 
the second row of Panel C reveal that for stocks with upgrades, there is no 
significant difference for buy herding between optimistic and pessimistic 
periods. In contrast, the results in the third row of Panel C suggest that 
institutions tend to herd to sell both upgrade and downgrade stocks following 
pessimism rather than following optimism. 
 
In sum, the results in Table 5.9 provide strong evidence that adjacent-period 
herding from following the trades of others is stronger for downgrades when 
individual sentiment is pessimistic, consistent with hypothesis 6. In addition, 
the results in Table 5.9 reveal that investors tend to imitate the trades of 
others to buy (sell) stocks with upgrades (downgrades) following optimistic 





Table 5.9 Analyst Recommendations, Investor Sentiment and Adjacent-Period Herding 
This table reports the average levels of the Sias aggregate, buy, and sell herding measure double sorted by investor sentiment and consensus analyst recommendation revisions during 
the 1993-2014 period. The Sias measure is the cross-sectional correlation in the current and previous quarters. The correlation is partitioned into two parts, cross-sectional correlation 
due to funds following their own trades and that due to funds following the trades of others. The total correlation and two partitions are further divided into two parts, buy herding 
(institutions buy in quarter t-1) and sell herding (institutions sell in quarter t-1). The Sias herding measures (aggregate, buy and sell) are discussed in detail in Table 5.3. The consensus 
recommendation revision is the difference between the current and the prior recommendation levels and the current consensus recommendation level based on the mean of all 
outstanding recommendations for a given stock, with only the most recent recommendation for a given analyst included. The consensus upgrade or downgrade refer to when the value 
of the consensus revision is bigger or smaller than zero, respectively. The Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) sentiment index is used to identify optimistic, mild and pessimistic investor 
sentiment quarters. The quarterly investor sentiment is calculated as the average of the monthly investor sentiment proxy over the quarter and optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment periods 
are defined when the value in that quarter belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series value. For brevity, the mild results are not reported. Corresponding t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt. – Pess. 
 Upgrade Downgrade Up. – Down. Upgrade Downgrade Up. – Down. Upgrade Downgrade Up. – Down. 
Panel A. Total correlation 
Aggregate herding 0.37136(21.34)*** 0.36784(19.88)*** 0.00352(1.33) 0.36593(20.81)*** 0.41981(22.89)*** -0.05388(-2.04)** 0.00543(-0.71) -0.05197(-
2.03)** 
0.05740(2.31)** 
Contribution of buy 0.21742(16.12)*** 0.21642(15.88)*** 0.00100(0.13) 0.17630(16.71)*** 0.20065(17.23)*** -0.02435(-1.66)* 0.04112(1.98)** 0.01577(1.03) 0.02535(1.67)* 





Buy- Sell 0.06638(3.12)*** 0.067842(3.34)*** -0.00146(-0.21) -0.00528(-0.51) -0.01074(-1.03) 0.00546(1.43) 0.07166(2.71)*** 0.07857(3.11)*** -0.00691(-0.49) 
Panel B. Institutions following their own trades 
Aggregate herding 0.05296(11.33)*** 0.05347(11.13)*** -0.00051(-0.13) 0.01936(6.18)*** 0.02219(7.17)*** -0.00283(-1.12) 0.03360(3.88)*** 0.03128(3.39)*** 0.00232(0.43) 
Contribution of buy 0.03101(8.31)*** 0.03146(8.38)*** -0.00045(-0.11) 0.00933(5.77)*** 0.01061(5.89)*** -0.00128(-0.78) 0.02168(3.17)*** 0.02085(2.81)*** 0.00083(0.09) 
Contribution of sell 0.02154(6.22)*** 0.02160(6.16)*** -0.00006(-0.06) 0.00961(4.21)*** 0.01118(5.91)*** -0.00157(-0.56) 0.01193(2.75)*** 0.01042(2.68)*** 0.00151(0.12) 
Buy- Sell 0.00947(3.18)*** 0.00986(2.67)*** -0.00039(-0.31) -0.00028(-0.09) -0.00057(-0.19) 0.00029(0.14) 0.00975(2.65)*** 0.01043(2.64)*** -0.00068(-0.07) 
Panel C. Institutions following the trades of others 
Aggregate herding 0.31839(16.21)*** 0.31438(15.10)*** 0.00401(0.65) 0.34657(17.11)*** 0.39761(18.99)*** -0.05104(-2.01)** -0.02818(-1.26) -0.08323(-
3.71)*** 
0.05505(2.14)** 
Contribution of buy 0.18641(12.41)*** 0.18496(12.98)*** 0.00145(0.21) 0.16698(11.08)*** 0.19004(13.07)*** -0.02306(-1.65)* 0.01943(1.38) -0.00508(-0.31) 0.02451(1.61) 









5.4.5 Regression Analysis 
In the previous section, portfolio analysis is performed in examining the 
interaction of the two factors on institutional herding. We next investigate the 
impact of the two factors and their interactions on institutional herding in a 
multivariate regression setting by taking account of other potential 
determinants of institutional herding. The goal of this analysis is to investigate 
the interaction of the two factors on institutional herding and to disentangle 
such effect from the impact of other variables. 
 Regression Analysis on Within-Period Herding 
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between within-period 
herding and the interaction of the two factors while controlling for various 
stock characteristics as in the following model: 
 
𝐻𝑀 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑏𝑢𝑦
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐶𝑈𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝛼10𝐶𝑈𝑀𝑡−2,𝑡−5   (5.6) 
 
𝐵𝐻𝑀 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑏𝑢𝑦
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐶𝑈𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝛼10𝐶𝑈𝑀𝑡−2,𝑡−5   (5.7) 
 
𝑆𝐻𝑀 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑏𝑢𝑦
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐶𝑈𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝛼10𝐶𝑈𝑀𝑡−2,𝑡−5   (5.8) 
 
Where HM is the aggregate LSV herding measure, BHM is the buy herding 
measure and SHM is the sell herding measure. The independent variable 
Sentt-1 is the Baker and Wurgler sentiment index in quarter t-1 and its 
coefficient is expected to be positive to be consistent with the argument that 
institutional investors counteract individual sentiment strongly when 
sentiment is optimistic. The second independent variable Revt is the 
consensus analyst recommendation revisions in quarter t and its coefficient 




stronger for stocks with downgrades than those with upgrades. The third 
independent variable Sentt-1* Revt is an interaction term and its coefficient is 
expected to be negative since herding is expected to be stronger for 
downgrades in the presence of optimistic sentiment. The fourth (fifth) 
independent variable Strongbuy (Strongsell) equals 1 if the recommendation 
revision equals 0 and the consensus recommendation is a strong buy (strong 
sell) in quarter t-1. We use time fixed effects to consider the dynamics of 
institutional herding. In order to control for potential serial correlation in the 
residuals, we cluster heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors by firm level.  
 
We follow several empirical studies to include the following potential 
variables that may influence institutional herding and subsume the power the 
interaction effect of the two factors (see, for example, Brown et al., 2013; 
Liao et al., 2011). As for control variables, SUE is the standardised 
unexpected earnings surprises, which is measured as the unexpected 
earnings for the most recent quarter relative to earnings four quarters prior, 
divided by its standard deviation over the prior six quarters. 81  We take 
account of SUE since institutions may herd in response to earnings 
information as opposed to analyst recommendation revisions or investor 
sentiment. MVt is defined as the market value for stock i in quarter t and its 
coefficient is expected to be negative since fund managers tend to herd more 
on small stocks (e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999). BMt is the 
logarithm of book to market ratio for stock i during quarter t-1 and its 
coefficient is expected to be positive since herding is expected to be stronger 
among growth stocks (e.g. Wermers, 1999). Cumi,t-1 and Cumi,t-2,t-5  are the 
prior quarter returns and the cumulative 12-month returns before the prior 
quarter, respectively. We include such two variables since the previous 
literature suggests that herding can be driven by momentum trading (e.g. 
Wermers, 1999).  
  
Table 5.10 presents the results for equations 5.1 to 5.3. Models 1 and 2 show 
the results for aggregate herding (5.1). In model 1, aggregate herding is only 
regressed on investor sentiment, analyst recommendation revisions and t  
                                               
81 We follow Brown et al., (2013) to calculate SUE which is measured as the unexpected 
earnings for the most recent quarter relative to earnings four quarters prior, divided by its 
standard deviation over the prior six quarters. Other studies (e.g. Truong, 2011) may use 
different methods to measure SUE which is calculated as the the unexpected earnings for the 






Table 5.10 Multivariate Regression of Determinants of Within-Period Herding 
This table reports regression results of the LSV herding measure on investor sentiment 
and analyst recommendation revisions. HM is the aggregate herding measure, BHM is 
the buy-herding measure and SHM is the sell-herding measure. Sent is the Baker and 
Wurgler sentiment measure. Rev is the prior-quarter consensus analyst 
recommendation revision. Sent*Rev is the interaction term between sentiment and 
revision. Strong_Buy (Strong_Sell) equals 1 if the analyst revision in the current quarter 
is 0 and the recommendation in the prior quarter is strong buy (sell). SUE is unexpected 
earnings for the most recent quarter relative to earnings four quarters before, scaled 
by the standard deviation of earnings over the prior six quarters. MVt-1 is the logged 
market value of a given stock in prior quarter and PBt-1 is the logged ratio of market 
value to book equity in the prior quarter. Cumt-1 is cumulative returns of a given stock 
in previous quarter. Cumt-2,t-5 is the one-year cumulative returns of a given stock before 
the previous quarter. All regressions include time fixed effects and standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. The number of observations and the R-squared are reported 
at the bottom of the table. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 HM BHM SHM 


















































       










































N 156,912 156,912 80,339 80,339 76,573 76,573 
R-squared 0.0153 0.1063 0.0053 0.1045 0.0233 0.1423 
 
heir interaction term. The results show that the estimated coefficient on Sent 
is significantly positive, indicating that institutions herd to counteract the 
sentiment of individual investors, which is consistent with H3. The estimated 
coefficient on Rev is significantly negative, which is consistent with the notion 
that institutions herd more strongly for stocks with downgrades (H1). 
However, the interaction is estimated to be insignificant, suggesting the two 
factors only affect within-period herding independently, which is inconsistent 




independent variables can be subsumed by the control variables. The results 
indicate that after controlling for other explanatory variables, sentiment 
remains significant at the 1% level, but analyst recommendation revisions 
become insignificant.  
 
In models 3 and 4 (5 and 6) of table 5.10, we further consider the effect of 
investor sentiment and analyst recommendation revisions on buy (sell) 
herding. Models 3/4 and 5/6 follow same format as model 1/2. The results 
for buy- and sell-herding indicate that Sent positively relates to both buy- and 
sell-herding but the effect of investor sentiment on sell herding (coefficient= 
0.0069 in model 5) is much more prominent than that on buy herding 
(coefficient=0.0023 in model 3), suggesting that the positive effect of investor 
sentiment on aggregate herding (HM) primarily comes from the sell herding 
rather than the buy herding. The findings indicate that institutional investors 
tend to sell stocks when individual sentiment is high. As shown in models 3 
and 5, Rev is significantly positive for buy herding whereas it is significantly 
negative for sell herding, suggesting that institutions herd in the same 
direction as analyst recommendation revisions. However, after controlling for 
other potential variables, Rev becomes insignificant in both buy- and sell 
herding regressions.  
 
Lastly, consistent with Wermers (1999), we find that there is a significant 
relationship between returns momentum and within-period herding. 
Specifically, as shown in Models 4 and 6, we find that the coefficients on both 
cumulative return variables are significantly positive (negative) for buy (sell) 
herding. The evidence suggests that higher stock returns imply stronger buy 
herding and weaker sell herding. Also, consistent with prior empirical 
evidence, we find that institutional herding is stronger on small and growth 
stocks as coefficients on MV and PB are significantly negative and positive, 
respectively. Moreover, we find that buy herding is weaker when analysts 
issue consecutive strong sell recommendations as shown in model 4, 
suggesting that market participants view the re-confirmation of strong sell 
recommendations as a negative signal for buying such stocks, which acts as 
a dampening effect on buy herding.  
 
In sum, the regression results of within-period herding provide strong support 




downgrades and they are more likely to herd during optimistic periods than 
pessimistic periods. However, the insignificant coefficient of the interaction 
term of the two factors suggests the two factors only affect within-period 
herding independently, which is inconsistent with H5. 
 Regression Analysis on Adjacent-Period Herding 
In this subsection, we follow the time-series regression analysis in Holmes 
et al. (2013). We regress quarterly beta (the correlation in institutional 
demands between two consecutive quarters) and its two components on 
investor sentiment, while controlling for other potential factors.82 To examine 
the interaction of investor sentiment and analyst recommendation revisions, 
we also run the regression for stocks with upgrades and downgrades, 
separately.   
𝛽𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏1Sent𝑡−1 + c ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑘,𝑡   (5.9) 
Where 𝛽𝑡 is the estimated quarterly beta and Sent𝑡−1 is investor sentiment 
in the previous quarter t-1. For control variables, we include quarterly stock 
market returns (MR) and quarterly market volatility (MVol) as potential factors 
in affecting institutional herding.  
 
Table 5.11 reports results regardless of analyst recommendation revisions 
(Panel A) and those for stocks with upgrades (Panel B) and for stocks with 
downgrades (Panel C). The dependent variable in the first column of results 
is 𝛽𝑡, in the second it is that component of 𝛽𝑡 resulting from following their 
own trades and in the final column it is the component of 𝛽𝑡  relating to 
institutions following the trades of others. Overall, the results of the 
regression analysis provide strong support for our hypotheses. Specifically, 
as shown in Panel A, the coefficient on Sent is -0.002, which is significant at 
the 1% level, confirming the earlier finding (Table 5.5) that adjacent-period 
herding is stronger when sentiment is low. The coefficient is estimated to be 
0.001 and -0.003 for the component following their own trades (the trades of 
others), respectively, with both being significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that the negative effect of investor sentiment on aggregate adjacent-period  
                                               
82 Analyst recommendation revisions are panel data which vary across stocks and over time 
and the sentiment index is time-series data. The independent and control variables of the 
regression analysis on adjacent-period herding are different from those for within-period 
herding since the regression of within-period herding is panel data analysis (both panel data 
(analyst recommendation revisions) and time-series data (investor sentiment) can be included 
in the regression), whereas the regression of adjacent-period herding is time-series and only 




Table 5.11 Multivariate Regression of Determinants of Adjacent-Period 
Herding 
This table reports results for the regressions of the quarterly values of beta and 
the two component parts of beta (‘institutions following their own trades’ and 
‘institutions following the trades of others’) on the following factors: Sentt-1 is the 
Baker and Wurgler sentiment index in t-1. MRt is quarterly stock market returns 
and Stdt is quarterly market volatility. Panel A presents results for total herding. 
Panels B and C present results for stocks with upgrades and downgrades, 
respectively. The number of observations and the R-squared are reported at the 
bottom of each panel. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 Regressand:beta Regressand: 
Beta-component 
‘institutions 






trades of others’ 

























N 84 84 84 
R-squared 0.2411 0.3786 0.4982 

























N 84 84 84 
R-squared 0.0717 0.0531 0.1166 

























N 84 84 84 
R-squared 0.1281 0.4218 0.4058 
 
herding primarily comes from the component for institutions following the 
trades of others and institutional investors tend to follow their own trades 
when sentiment is high. The findings are consistent with the results in Table 
5.5 and hypothesis 4.  
 




significant in all regressions except for the component following their own 
trades. The evidence suggests that adjacent-period herding is stronger when 
market returns are lower, which comes mainly from the institutions following 
the trades of others and institutions are more likely to follow their own trades 
when market returns are higher. We also find that market standard deviation 
is positively related to adjacent-period herding again in all regressions except 
for the component following their own trades, suggesting that institutions tend 
to herd by following the trades of others when market risk is high. The 
significantly negative coefficient of market standard deviation on the 
component that institutions following their own trades suggests that 
institutions are more likely to follow their own trades when market standard 
deviation is lower.   
 
In Panels B and C of Table 5.11, we further consider the effect of investor 
sentiment on adjacent-period herding for stocks with upgrades and 
downgrades, respectively. The coefficient of sent for the component of 𝛽𝑡 
for stocks with upgrades and downgrades is -0.0010 (significant at the 10% 
level) and -0.0027 (significant at the 5% level), suggesting that the effect of 
investor sentiment on adjacent-period herding is much more prominent for 
stocks with downgrades than for those with upgrades. Institutional investors 
herd more strongly for stocks with downgrades when sentiment is low, which 
is consistent with the previous results in Table 5.9 and H6 in which adjacent-
period herding from following the trades of others will be strongest for stocks 
with downgrades when sentiment is pessimistic, and the herding will be lower 
in the other three cases. Notably, the effect of investor sentiment on stocks 
with both upgrades and downgrades is primarily driven by institutions 
following the trades of others. Moreover, we find a similar pattern of results 
for market returns and volatility as in Panel A. Adjacent-period herding from 
following the trades of others will be stronger for upgrades (downgrades) 
when individual sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic). 
 
Overall, the findings in Table 5.11 show general support for our hypotheses 
and provide clear evidence that sentiment and analyst recommendations 
affect adjacent-period herding. The findings in Table 5.10 provide clear 
evidence for H1 and H3 in which both analyst recommendation revisions and 
individual sentiment have significant impact on institutional herding, but the 




suggests the two factors influence within-period herding independently. 
5.5 Robustness tests 
5.5.1 Herding and Subsequent Returns 
Prior research has shown herding arising from different reasons will have a 
stabilising or destabilising effect on stock prices (e.g., Chakravarty, 2001; 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Sias et al., 2002; Wermers, 1999). Assuming 
institutional herding impacts prices, previous empirical studies suggest that 
if institutional herding is driven by fads, reputational herding, or characteristic 
herding, subsequent returns should be inversely related to institutional 
demand (e.g., Chakravarty, 2001; Froot and Teo, 2004; Sias et al, 2006). If 
herding is driven by information-based herding, we expect to observe no 
subsequent return reversals. In our setting, since the two herding measures 
capture different aspects of herding, we may observe different patterns of 
subsequent stock returns using different herding measures (e.g., Choi and 
Sias, 2010; Sias, 2004; Wermers, 1999).     
 
We begin by classifying stocks into each category based on the level of 
herding in different consensus analyst recommendation revision and investor 
sentiment groups. We form a portfolio in each group and then calculate the 
equally weighted average of subsequent stock returns. Columns 1 to 6 and 
7 to 12 in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 report the average quarterly returns for 
herding under optimistic and pessimistic states, respectively. In each 
sentiment group, the results for subsequent stock returns under consensus 
upgrades and downgrades are presented. The first two columns in each 
category of recommendation revisions in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 report the 
average quarterly raw returns for buy- and sell-herding portfolios over the 
indicated period. The third column presents their difference and associated 
significance level.  
 Within-Period Herding and Subsequent Returns 
The results reveal evidence consistent with the hypothesis that herding is 
driven by the interaction of analyst recommendation revisions and investor 
sentiment impacts prices. We first consider the results during optimistic 




Table 5.12, stocks most purchased by institutions outperform those most sold 
for upgrades by 8.99%, significant at the 1% level. In the subsequent quarter 
immediately following formation, buy-herding stocks outperform sell-herding 
stocks by 0.784%, which is significant at the 1% level. When examining the 
long-run returns during quarters 1 to 4, we find that institutional herding for 
stocks with upgrades does not lead to return reversals during quarters 1 to 
4. Specifically, in the four quarters immediately following the herding period 
(Quarter 1 to 4), buy-herding stocks underperform sell-herding stocks by an 
insignificant 0.9%. Similarly, under analyst downgrades, we can observe 
from the sixth column of Table 5.12 that buy-herding stocks outperform sell-
herding stocks by 10.18% and 8.78% in the first two formation and 
subsequent quarters during optimism, respectively, with both figures being 
significant at the 1% level. The findings suggest strong contemporaneous 
and subsequent returns following institutional herding. However, in the 
quarters between 1 and 4 and between 5 and 8, buy-herding stocks 
underperformed sell-herding stocks by 1.54%, and 1.76% respectively, with 
both being significant at the 5% level. The results show that institutional 
herding for stocks with downgrades in the presence of optimistic sentiment 
leads to strong return reversals during quarters 1 to 8, which is primarily 
driven by the sell herding as shown in the fifth column of Table 5.12. The 
evidence suggests within-period herding for stocks with downgrades during 
optimistic periods is driven by fads, reputational herding, or characteristic 
herding because of strong subsequent return reversals. Overall, we find a 
strong positive relationship between institutional herding and stock returns 
for stocks with upgrades and a strong negative relationship for stocks with 
downgrades during optimism. The evidence reveals that within-period 
herding for stocks with upgrades during optimism is driven by information-
based herding and the herding is driven by fads, reputational herding, or 
characteristic herding for stocks with downgrade during optimistic periods. 
 
We next consider the results under pessimistic states. As far as the results 
under pessimistic states are concerned as shown in the ninth and last 
columns Table 5.12, buy-herding stocks significantly outperform sell-herding 
stocks in the first two formation quarters under both analyst revisions. In the 
four quarters immediately following formation, returns to the difference 
portfolio (buy minus sell) are insignificantly different from zero for both 




quarter 5 to 8 and 9 to 12. In sum, although the results in the formation 
periods reveal a strong positive relation between institutional herding and 
stock returns during quarter t-1 to t+4, we find no evidence of subsequent 
return reversal, suggesting that herding is driven by information-based 
herding for both revision groups during pessimism. 
 
In sum, the results in table 5.12 show evidence consistent with information-
based herding models i.e. informational cascades and investigative herding. 
Since evidence of subsequent return reversals is weak, reputational herding 
and fads can sometimes play a role in institutional herding for stocks with 





Table 5.12 Within-Period Herding and Subsequent Returns 
The table reports the average quarterly raw returns for buy- and sell-herding stocks double sorted by investor sentiment and consensus analyst recommendation 
revisions during the 1993-2014 period. The portfolio in each group is formed and returns for the portfolio is calculated as the equally weighted of subsequent stock 
returns. The consensus recommendation revision is the difference between the current and the prior recommendation levels and the current consensus 
recommendation level is the mean of all outstanding recommendations for a given stock with only the most recent recommendation for a given analyst included. 
The consensus upgrade, downgrade and No Change are defined as when the value of the consensus revision is bigger, smaller and equal to zero, respectively. 
The LSV herding measures (buy and sell) are defined in Table 5.2. The Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) sentiment index is used to identify optimistic, mild and 
pessimistic investor sentiment quarters. The quarterly investor sentiment is calculated as the average of the monthly investor sentiment proxy over the quarter 
and optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment periods are defined as where the value in that quarter belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series value. 
Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
 Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
 Buy Sell Buy-Sell Buy Sell Buy-Sell Buy Sell Buy-Sell Buy Sell Buy-Sell 
Quarters 








































































































































 Adjacent-Period Herding and Subsequent Returns 
Table 5.13 presents the average quarterly return for each analyst 
recommendation revision and investor sentiment category. Consistent with 
previous studies, we find a strong positive relationship between institutional 
herding and both current and prior-quarter returns. Specifically, in the 
presence of optimistic sentiment, as shown in the third and sixth columns of 
Table 5.13, stocks purchased by institutions outperform those sold by 5.01% 
and 6.76% in the two formation quarters under analyst upgrades and 
downgrades, respectively. In the next quarter immediately following the 
formation, buy-herding stocks continue to outperform the sell-herding stocks 
by 11.32% and 13.63% following upgrades and downgrades. During quarter 
t+5 to t+12, however, the average quarterly return is insignificantly different 
from zero, suggesting there is no evidence of return reversals at longer 
horizons. The results suggest that adjacent-period herding for both upgrade 
and downgrade stocks during optimism is driven by information-based 
herding. 
 
Under pessimistic states, despite there being no evidence of a relationship 
between institutional herding and prior-quarter returns, we find a similar 
pattern of the average quarterly return in the formation and subsequent 
periods to that when sentiment is optimistic. Specifically, as shown in the 
ninth and last columns, in the two formation quarters, the average quarterly 
return to the difference portfolio is insignificantly different from zero under 
both revision groups. In the first quarter immediately following formation, buy-
herding stocks outperform the sell-herding stocks by 9.28% and 8.84% 
following upgrades and downgrades respectively. In the quarters from 1 to 
12, the average quarterly return to the difference portfolio is insignificantly 
different from zero. Overall, although the results in the first three rows of 
Table 5.13 reveal a strong positive relationship between institutional herding 
and stock returns during t-1 to t+1, we find only weak evidence of a 
subsequent return reversal, suggesting that information-based herding 
models (informational cascades and investigative herding) play a major role 
in adjacent-period herding by taking account of the interaction between 





Table 5.13 Adjacent-Period Herding and Subsequent Returns 
The table reports the average quarterly raw returns for buy- and sell-herding stocks double sorted by investor sentiment and consensus analyst recommendation 
revisions during the 1993-2014 period. The portfolio in each group is formed and returns for the portfolio is calculated as the equally weighted of subsequent stock 
returns. The consensus recommendation revision is the difference between the current and the prior recommendation levels and the current consensus 
recommendation level is the mean of all outstanding recommendations for a given stock, with only the most recent recommendation for a given analyst included. 
The consensus upgrade, downgrade and No Change are defined as where the value of the consensus revision is bigger, smaller and equal to zero, respectively. 
The Sias herding measures (buy and sell) are defined in Table 5.3. The Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) sentiment index is used to identify optimistic, mild and pessimistic 
investor sentiment quarters. The quarterly investor sentiment is calculated as the average of the monthly investor sentiment proxy over the quarter and optimistic 
(pessimistic) sentiment periods are defined as the value in that quarter belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series value. Corresponding t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 Optimistic Pessimistic 
 Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
 Buy Sell Buy-Sell Buy Sell Buy-Sell Buy Sell Buy-Sell Buy Sell Buy-Sell 
Quarters t-





































































































































In sum, we find that both within-period and adjacent-period herding is 
primarily driven by information-based herding including investigative herding 
and informational cascades. As discussed earlier in this Chapter, the LSV 
measure captures the correlated trades between institutional investors within 
a period based on the two factors (investigative herding), whereas the Sias 
measure captures how institutional investors follow each other’s’ trades in 
the subsequent period (intentional herding). Thus, both the LSV and Sias 
measures allow us to capture aspects of investigative herding and intentional 
herding and provide better insights into distinguishing between investigative 
herding and intentional herding. Since the results of stocks’ subsequent 
returns suggest information-based herding plays a major role in both within- 
and adjacent-period herding, we conclude that in our setting, within-period 
(adjacent-period) herding measured by the LSV (Sias) model is primarily 
driven by investigative herding (informational cascades). 
5.5.2 An Alternative Sentiment Measure 
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results for institutional 
herding to an alternative index for investor sentiment. The consumer 
confidence index is employed as a measure of sentiment, which has been 
widely used in the literature (e.g., Fisher and Statman, 2003; Lemmon and 
Portniaguina, 2006; McLean and Zhao, 2009; Antoniou et al., 2013). The 
index is constructed by the Conference Board, and is measured outside of 
financial markets. This survey started on a bimonthly series in 1967 and 
changed to a monthly basis in 1977, with data being collected from 5000 
random selected households in the U.S. Five questions are asked by the 
survey to participants about their expectations for the economy. 83  The 
consumer confidence index is formed by taking the average of scores on the 
5 questions. In order to mitigate the effects of macroeconomic conditions 
from the consumer confidence index, we regress the index on 6 
macroeconomic indicators: growth in industrial production, real growth in 
durable, nondurable and service consumptions, growth in employment and 
an NBER recession indicator. The residuals from this regression are used as 
                                               
83 There are five questions in the survey as follows: 1) How would you rate present general 
business conditions in your area? 2) What would you say about available jobs in your area 
right now? 3) Six months from now, do you think that the business conditions in your area will 
be better, same or worse? 4) Six months from now, do you think there will be more, same, or 
fewer jobs available in year area? 5) Would you guess your total family income to be higher, 




the sentiment proxy.84  
 An Alternative Sentiment Measure and Within-Period 
Herding 
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 reports results equivalent to Tables 5.6- and 5.8 for 
within-period herding results for optimistic and pessimistic periods, using the 
consumer confidence index in place of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
sentiment measure. All other calculations remain the same as those in the 
previous tables.  
 
The evidence in Tables 5.14 and 5.15 confirms our general findings between 
institutional herding and sentiment using the LSV measure. We first consider 
the results in Table 5.14. In contrast with the results in Table 5.6, the 
difference in buy herding between optimism and pessimism is significant at 
the 5% level. Consistent with the previous results, the average levels of 
aggregate and sell herding are much stronger during optimistic periods than 
during pessimistic periods. Specifically, the average levels of aggregate 
herding under optimistic and pessimistic states are 4.2% and 3.682% 
respectively, within the difference between optimism and pessimism being 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The average levels of sell herding 
under optimism and pessimism are 4.146% and 4.657% respectively, with 
the difference being significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The 
results suggest that institutional investors herd more strongly to sell stocks 
during optimistic states than during pessimistic states. It also observed from 
the last row of Table 5.13 that the difference in sell herding is statistically 
higher than that in buy herding. The results are overall consistent with the 
findings in Table 5.6 and confirm our H3.  
 
Table 5.15 reports the interaction of analyst recommendation revisions and 
investor sentiment on institutional herding using the consumer confidence 
index as an alternative measure for investor sentiment. As can be seen from 
Panel A of Table 5.15, in contrast to the previous results using the Baker and 
Wurgler sentiment measure, the difference in herding between upgrades and 
downgrades during pessimistic sentiment is significant at the 1% level. 
Consistent with the previous results, within-period herding is stronger for  
                                               




Table 5.14 Alternative Investor Sentiment Measure and Within-Period 
Herding 
This table presents the LSV herding levels under different investor sentiment 
periods (optimistic, mild and pessimistic). The LSV herding measures (aggregate, 
buy and sell) are defined in Table 5.2. The consumer confidence index is used to 
identify optimistic, mild and pessimistic investor sentiment quarters. The quarterly 
investor sentiment is calculated as the average of the monthly investor sentiment 
proxy over the quarter and optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment periods are defined 
as where the value in that quarter belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of the time-
series value. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses and asterisks 
refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.- Pess. 
Aggregate 
herding 
0.04200(78.21)*** 0.03682(74.13)*** 0.00518(3.13)*** 
Buy herding 0.03230(33.12)*** 0.02815(29.80)*** 0.00415(2.43)** 
Sell herding 0.05214(38.13)*** 0.04657(36.13)*** 0.00556(3.51)*** 
Buy. - sell. -0.01984(-7.22)*** -0.01842(-7.41)*** -0.00142(-1.66)* 
 
stocks with downgrades than for stocks with upgrades during optimistic 
periods and the herding is stronger for stocks with both upgrades and 
downgrades during optimism than pessimism (H3). Notably, herding is the 
strongest for stocks with downgrades in the presence of optimistic sentiment, 
suggesting institutions are most likely to herd when both analyst 
recommendation revisions and investor sentiment suggest “sell” trading 
decisions. The results are consistent with previous results in Table 5.8 and 
H5. 
 
The results of buy and sell herding in Panels B and C of Table 5.15 allow us 
to further investigate the interaction of within-period herding. In contrast to 
the previous results shown in Panel B of Table 5.8, the effect of investor 
sentiment on buy herding is prominent across both revision groups, with the 
difference in buy herding between optimistic and pessimistic states being 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Consistent with the previous 
results, as shown in Panel C, sell herding is stronger during optimism than 
during pessimism across both revision groups and is stronger for stocks with 
downgrades than those with upgrades across both sentiment periods. The 
results in Panel C also reveal that institutions herd most strongly to sell 
downgrade stocks during optimism, consistent with previous results and the 
cognitive dissonance argument. 
 
In sum, the evidence using the alternative sentiment generally supports our 





Table 5.15 Analyst Recommendations, the Alternative Investor Sentiment and 
Within-Period Herding 
This table reports mean values of the LSV herding measures (aggregate, buy, and 
sell) sorted by market/individual sentiment and consensus analyst recommendation 
revisions during the 1993-2014 period. The LSV herding measures (aggregate, buy 
and sell) are defined in Table 5.2. The optimistic and pessimistic sentiment periods 
are classified based on the level of sentiment. The Consumer confidence index is 
used to identify optimistic, mild and pessimistic investor sentiment quarters. The 
consensus upgrade or downgrade is defined as the value of the consensus revision 
is bigger or smaller than zero, respectively. For brevity, the mild results are not 
reported but available upon requests. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%) 
 Upgrade Downgrade Up. - Down. 
Panel A. Aggregate Herding measure 
Optimistic 0.03469(61.38)*** 0.04037(68.23)*** -0.00568(-
2.71)*** 
Pessimistic 0.02959(47.23)*** 0.03514(52.31)*** -0.00555(-
2.12)** 
Opt.- Pess. 0.00510(3.11)*** 0.00522(3.19)*** -0.00013(-0.34) 
Panel B. Buy herding 
Optimistic 0.03046(51.98)*** 0.03001(49.33)*** 0.00046(0.31) 
Pessimistic 0.02704(47.31)*** 0.02582(33.75)*** 0.00122(0.19) 
Opt.- Pess. 0.00342(1.65)* 0.00418(1.71)* -0.00076(-0.07) 
Panel C. Sell herding 
Optimistic 0.03942(60.26)*** 0.04959(63.12)*** -0.01017(-
7.31)*** 
Pessimistic 0.03251(48.31)*** 0.04449(57.31)*** -0.01198(-
6.41)*** 
Opt.- Pess. 0.00691(3.98)*** 0.00509(2.91)*** 0.00181(0.83) 
Panel D. Buy - Sell herding 
Optimistic -0.00895(-7.05)*** -0.01958(-9.22)*** 0.01063(7.31)*** 
Pessimistic -0.00547(-3.11)*** -0.01867(-6.81)*** 0.01320(6.21)*** 
Opt.- Pess. -0.00349(-1.61) -0.00091(-0.14) -0.00258(-0.91) 
 An Alternative Sentiment Measure and Adjacent-Period 
Herding 
Tables 5.16 and 5.17 report results equivalent to Tables 5.7 and 5.9 for 
adjacent-period herding results for optimistic and pessimistic periods, using 
the consumer confidence index in place of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
sentiment measure. All other calculations remain the same as those in the 
previous tables. Table 5.16 presents the results for adjacent herding under 
different sentiment periods using the consumer confidence index as a proxy 
for investor sentiment. As can be seen from Panel A of Table 5.16, the 
average levels of herding following optimistic and pessimistic periods are 
38.855% and 38.116%, respectively, with both being significant at the 1% 
level. In contrast to our previous findings, the difference in herding between 
optimism and pessimism is insignificantly different from zero. However, the 




Table 5.16 An Alternative Investor Sentiment Measure and Adjacent-Period 
Herding 
This table presents the Sias herding levels during different investor sentiment periods 
(optimistic and pessimistic). The Sias herding measures (aggregate, buy and sell) and 
their components are defined in Table 5.3. The consumer confidence index is used as 
a proxy for investor sentiment. The quarterly investor sentiment index is calculated as 
the average of the monthly investor sentiment proxy over the quarter and optimistic 
(pessimistic) sentiment periods are defined as the value in that quarter that belongs to 
the top (bottom) 30% of the time-series value. Corresponding t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses and asterisks refer to different significance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%) 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt.- Pess. 
Panel A. Total cross-sectional correlation 
Average coefficient 0.38855(17.32)*** 0.38116(16.99)*** 0.00739(0.71) 
Institutions following 
their own trades 
0.08240(10.21)*** 0.03259(5.12)*** 0.04981(5.23)*** 
Institutions following the 
trades of others 
0.30615(14.37)*** 0.34857(15.12)*** -0.04242(-4.34)*** 
Panel B. Contribution of Buy 
Average coefficient 0.22556(15.31)*** 0.18230(12.18)*** 0.04326(4.19)*** 
Institutions following 
their own trades 
0.04783(7.88)*** 0.01558(5.12)*** 0.03225(5.99)*** 
Institutions following the 
trades of others 
0.17773(11.67)*** 0.16672(12.01)*** 0.01101(1.14) 
Panel C. Contribution of Sell 
Average coefficient 0.15720(14.78)*** 0.18897(16.31)*** -0.03177(-4.16)*** 
Institutions following 
their own trades 
0.03334(7.11)*** 0.01616(5.19)*** 0.01718(3.13)*** 
Institutions following the 
trades of others 
0.12386(12.89)*** 0.17281(14.61)*** -0.04895(-4.98)*** 
Panel D. Buy-Sell 
Average coefficient 0.06836(6.88)*** -0.00667(-0.69) 0.07503(7.14)*** 
Institutions following 
their own trades 
0.01450(1.98)** -0.00057(-0.17) 0.01507(2.03)** 
Institutions following the 
trades of others 
0.053863.86()*** -0.00610(-0.67) 0.05996(4.76)*** 
 
and pessimistic sentiment are 30.615% and 34.857%, respectively, with the 
difference being significantly negative, consistent with the previous results. It 
suggests that institutional investors are more likely to follow others’ trades in 
the subsequent period when sentiment is pessimistic, consistent with H4. 
Again, consistent with the previous results, institutions are more likely to 
follow their own trades following optimistic sentiment. Specifically, as shown 
in the second row of Panel A, the portion resulting from funds following their 
own trades during optimistic (pessimistic) periods is a significant 8.24% 
(3.259%), with the difference between optimism and pessimism being 
statistically significant at the 1% level.   
 




sentiment periods, respectively. Consistent with the previous results, buy 
(sell) herding is much greater during optimistic (pessimistic) periods than 
during pessimistic (optimism) periods. To illustrate, as shown in Panel B, buy 
herding is estimated to be a significant 22.556% under optimistic states, 
compared to a significant 18.23% under pessimistic states, with the 
difference being significantly different from zero. The portion resulting from 
institutions following their own trades (institutions following the trades of 
others) is a significant 4.783% (17.733%) under optimistic states. The 
evidence suggests that institutional investors are more likely to herd to buy 
by following their own trades during optimistic states than under pessimistic 
states. In contrast, we observe from Panel C that sell herding is estimated to 
be a significant 15.720% and 18.897% for optimistic and pessimistic states, 
respectively, with the difference between the two sentiment states being 
significant at the 1% level. The portion resulting from following the trades of 
others during optimistic and pessimistic periods is a significant 12.386% and 
17.281%, respectively. The evidence suggests that institutions tend to herd 
to sell stocks by following the trades of others during pessimistic periods. 
Overall, the results in Table 5.16 are consistent with the findings in previous 
tables and H4. 
 
We next consider the interaction of analyst recommendation revisions and 
investor sentiment on adjacent-period herding using the consumer 
confidence index as a measure of investor sentiment. The overall pattern in 
Table 5.17 shows a marked difference across sub-samples. In contrast to the 
previous results in Table 5.9, as shown in the first row of Panel A of Table 
5.17, following optimistic sentiment, aggregate herding for stocks with 
upgrades is slightly smaller than that for stocks with downgrades, but the 
difference in herding between upgrades and downgrades is insignificantly 
different from zero. Consistent with the previous results, following pessimistic 
periods, herding for stocks with downgrades is significantly higher than that 
for stocks with upgrades, suggesting that institutions herd more strongly for 
stocks with downgrades than upgrades following pessimistic periods. The 
evidence supports H6.  
 
In each panel of Table 5.17, the herding coefficient is partitioned into two 
parts, buy- and sell- herding. Consistent with the previous results, as shown 




upgrades in the presence of optimistic sentiment whereas as shown in the 
third row of Panel A, sell herding is the strongest for stocks with downgrades 
following pessimistic sentiment. To illustrate, following optimistic periods, buy 
herding which is estimated to be a significant 24.268% for stocks with 
upgrades following optimism is higher than the other three cases 
(combination of revisions and sentiment): 23.43% for stocks with downgrade 
following pessimism, 18.818% for upgrades following pessimism and 19.532% 
for downgrades following pessimism. In contrast, following pessimistic 
periods, sell herding is estimated to be a significant 22.504% for stocks with 
downgrades, which is significantly higher than that in the other three cases 
(combination of the two factors). Overall, the results generally provide 
support to H6. 
 
Panels B and C of Table 5.17 show the results of the herding coefficient 
resulting from institutions following their own trades and the trades of others, 
respectively. Consistent with the previous results in Table 5.9, as shown in 
Panel B, aggregate, buy and sell herding are significantly stronger following 
optimism than following pessimism, suggesting institutions are more likely to 
follow their own trades during optimism. Specifically, following optimism, 
aggregate herding resulting from funds following their own trades is a 
significant 5.4% (5.241%) for stocks with upgrades (downgrades) whereas 
following pessimistic sentiment, aggregate herding from following their own 
trades is a significant 1.815% (1.572%) for stocks with upgrades 
(downgrades), with the difference in the herding between optimism and 
pessimism in each of revision groups being significant at the 1% level.  
 
Again, consistent with the previous results, in Panel C, there is clear 
evidence that adjacent-period herding in each case is primarily driven by 
institutions following the trades of others. We observe from the first row of 
Panel C that there is an insignificant difference in aggregate herding from 
following the trades of others for stocks with upgrades between optimism and 
pessimism, whereas there is a significant difference in the herding for stocks 
with downgrades between optimism and pessimism. This suggests that 
institutions are more likely to follow the trades of others for stocks with 
downgrades following pessimism than optimism. Furthermore, the results in 
the second and third rows of Panel C show a similar pattern to those in Panel 




optimism (for stocks with downgrades during pessimism) in any 
combinations of individual sentiment and analyst recommendation revisions. 
The evidence suggests that institutions are   more likely to herd by following 
the trades of others in the direction of analyst recommendation revisions 
when they experience cognitive dissonance, which is consistent with the 
cognitive dissonance argument. 
 
Overall, the results in Tables 5.16 and 5.17 using the alternative sentiment 
measure are qualitatively similar to those using the Baker and Wurgler 
sentiment measure, suggesting that the interaction of sentiment and analyst 
revisions affect institutional herding by way of cognitive dissonance 




Table 5.17Analyst Recommendations, the Alternative Investor Sentiment Measure and Adjacent-Period Herding 
This table reports the mean values of the Sias aggregate, buy, and sell herding sorted by institutional sentiment and consensus analyst recommendation revisions 
during the 1993-2014 period. The Sias measure is the cross-sectional correlation in the current and previous quarters. The correlation is partitioned into two parts, 
cross-sectional correlation due to funds following their own trades and that due to funds following the trades of others. The total correlation and two partitions are further 
divided into two parts, buy herding (institutions buy in quarter t-1) and sell herding (institutions sell in quarter t-1). The Consumer confidence index is used to identify 
optimistic, mild and pessimistic investor sentiment quarters. The consensus upgrades or downgrades are defined as the value of the consensus revision is bigger or 
smaller than zero, respectively. The asterisks refer to the level of significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Opt. – Pess. 
 Upgrade Downgrade Up. – Down. Upgrade Downgrade Up. – Down. Upgrade Downgrade Up. – Down. 


















































































































































































































































5.6 Conclusion  
This study investigates the interaction of investor sentiment and analyst 
recommendation revisions on institutional herding. We employ both LSV and 
Sias herding measures to capture different aspects of institutional herd 
behaviour. Consistent with Brown et al. (2013), we find that institutional 
investors will herd in the direction of analyst recommendations revisions and 
herd more strongly for stocks with consensus downgrades than those with 
consensus upgrades. We also find that using the LSV measure, institutional 
investors tend to herd strongly in the presence of optimistic sentiment, 
consistent with the sentiment countering hypothesis (Liao et al., 2013) and 
sell herding plays a major role in such herding. However, using the Sias 
measure, we find that adjacent period herding is stronger following 
pessimistic sentiment than following optimistic sentiment and such herding 
is primarily due to following the trades of others, suggesting that institutional 
investors are more likely to follow the trades of others following such 
sentiment periods.  
 
The interaction of investor sentiment and analyst recommendations on 
institutional herding is examined and we propose that cognitive dissonance 
may be a key driver in affecting such herding behaviour. Interestingly, in the 
presence of cognitive dissonance, we find within-period herding is weaker 
and the herding is the strongest for stocks with downgrades during optimistic 
periods, whereas adjacent-period herding is much more prominent. This may 
be because when investors experience cognitive dissonance, they are more 
likely to trade with delay to resolve such uncertainty, and hence they are more 
likely to follow the trades of others. Lastly, the results of subsequent stock 
returns following institutional herding show that there is only weak evidence 
of return reversals, suggesting that information-based herding plays a key 
role in driving institutional herding by considering the interaction of analyst 
recommendations and investor sentiment. The LSV and Sias herding 
measures allow us to capture both aspects of institutional herding due to 
investigative herding or informational cascades. We also examine the effect 
of using an to the alternative sentiment measure which is the consumer 
confidence index. The results are qualitatively similar to those using Baker 







6.1 Summary and Key Findings 
In past decades, numerous anomalies and puzzles have been raised by 
empirical studies of financial markets, which contradict the efficient market 
hypothesis (Fama, 1970) and traditional finance theories find it difficult to 
explain such phenomena. Investor sentiment, which has attracted much 
attention in recent years, provides a theoretical foundation of how investors 
form their beliefs and make trading decisions in financial markets. This thesis 
investigates the effect of investor sentiment with other factors in explaining 
three phenomena, momentum, PEAD and institutional herding by way of 
cognitive dissonance. 
 
The objective of this thesis is twofold. First, momentum and PEAD were 
identified by Fama (1998) as the candidates for being “above-suspicion” 
anomalies. Extensive research over the time since this statement has 
confirmed this view, and to date no satisfactory explanation for these 
anomalies has been provided. However, there is a mixed picture that has 
emerged globally, with western markets showing clear evidence in relation to 
the two anomalies, but markets in the east generally being characterised by 
insignificant momentum profits and findings in relation to PEAD being 
inconclusive worldwide. We propose that cognitive dissonance may be a 
major driver of the two anomalies and is arisen in different scenarios by 
interacting between investor sentiment and culture which is proxied by 
Hofstede’s individualism. Using the consumer confidence index as a proxy 
for investor sentiment, the impact of investor sentiment on momentum and 
PEAD in different cultures is investigated by way of cognitive dissonance. 
Empirical findings show that the effect of sentiment on momentum profits is 
much more prominent in countries with a high individualistic culture than 
those with a low individualistic culture.  
 
In addition to examining momentum (PEAD) in 40 (34) countries we focus 
our analysis of the two anomalies on the five largest markets in each of the 
West and East, given the psychological arguments and evidence about 




and Stein (1999) model by incorporating investor sentiment and culture and 
propose that cognitive dissonance is a key driver of the anomalies: 
differences in cultures cause this phenomenon to arise in different sentiment 
periods and to differing degrees in the east and west. Specifically, we 
recognise that westerners have a strong tendency to believe in continuation, 
while those from the east tend to believe in reversal. Results suggest that 
cultural differences relating to individualism impact on the level and extent of 
the two anomalies, while cultural biases concerning continuation and 
reversal drive the differences in relation to the two anomalies across western 
and ESEA markets. As a result, cognitive dissonance will be more 
pronounced in western than in ESEA countries, thus resulting in stronger 
momentum and PEAD effects in the west. Overall, the results support our 
arguments, suggesting that the interaction of sentiment and culture provides 
a better understanding of differences in the extent of the anomalies across 
countries.  
 
Our results have survived a number of robustness tests including using the 
risk-adjusted returns, the alternative individualism index, the alternative 
sentiment index, the different measure of earnings surprises and the different 
cut-offs for investor sentiment. The first two empirical chapters contribute to 
the literature in several aspects. First, it is the first study to examine the 
interaction between investor sentiment and culture on momentum profits and 
post-earnings-announcement drift by way of cognitive dissonance. We 
address the effect of investor sentiment on the two anomalies in different 
cultures since the proneness of investors to sentiment is different in different 
cultures. Second, our analysis may offer industry professionals insights into 
ways to optimize their investment process. For example, our findings suggest 
that popular trading strategies, e.g. momentum tend to more profitable only 
during optimistic sentiment in high individualism countries and western 
countries. Third, our work contributes to the cognitive dissonance literature 
that aims at understanding the importance of cognitive dissonance in 
financial markets. Previous studies have linked cognitive dissonance to 
disposition effect (Chang et al., 2016), mutual fund flows (Goetzmann and 
Peles), spot market volatility (Darrat et al., 2002), euro-dollar exchange rate 
(Prast and Vor, 2005), information flows (Argentesi and Lutkepohl, 2009) and 
herding in financial markets (Kindlegerger, 2000). We add to this literature by 




between investor sentiment and culture in a large international sample. 
 
Second, the thesis investigates the interaction between investor sentiment 
and analyst recommendations on institutional herd behaviour. The 
investigation is conducted by using two micro-level herding measures, LSV 
and Sias. The LSV measure allows us to capture institutional herd behaviour 
based on trading signals of analyst recommendations and/or investor 
sentiment within a period, whereas the Sias measure captures how 
institutional investors follow each others’ trades in the subsequent period. 
Using the LSV measure, we find that institutional investors will herd in the 
direction of analyst recommendation revisions and herd more strongly for 
stocks with analyst consensus downgrades than with analyst consensus 
upgrades. The findings suggest that institutional investors believe that 
analyst downgrades are more informative and valuable than upgrades, 
consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (2013). The extent to which 
institutional herding varies with the degree of individual sentiment is 
examined and the evidence suggests that investor sentiment affects both 
within-period and adjacent-period herding, but in different ways.  
 
Using the LSV measure, we find that institutional investors will herd strongly 
to counter optimistic sentiment of noise traders, but no evidence of buy 
herding in the presence of pessimistic sentiment, consistent with the findings 
of Liao et al. (2013). Using the Sias measure, we find that adjacent-period 
herding is stronger in the presence of pessimistic sentiment than in the 
presence of optimistic sentiment. The herding resulting from following the 
trades of others contribute almost 90% of total herding, suggesting that 
institutions are likely to follow the trades of others to resolve their uncertainty 
during pessimistic periods. The interaction of investor sentiment and analyst 
recommendations on institutional herding is also examined. It is proposed 
that institutional investors may experience cognitive dissonance when 
analyst recommendation revisions conflict with the sentiment related 
indicators. In particular, cognitive dissonance may be evident when two 
factors don’t suggest similar price movements. In turn, institutional investors 
may herd strongly (weakly) to the arrival of information in the absence 
(presence) of cognitive dissonance, resulting in stronger (weaker) within-
period herding. On the other hand, when cognitive dissonance is evident, to 




institutional investors are more likely to follow the trades of others in the 
subsequent period, resulting in stronger adjacent-period herding. Thus, we 
find that cognitive dissonance is a key driver for institutional herding by 
considering the two prominent factors that influence investor trading 
behaviour and institutional herding.  
 
The study reveals that cognitive dissonance is a key driver in affecting 
institutional herding by taking account of the two prominent factors that 
influence institutional herding. Institutions behave differently within the same 
period and in the subsequent period due to cognitive dissonance. Both LSV 
and Sias herding measures are employed in our study to capture different 
aspects of institutional herd behaviour, allowing us to gain greater insights 
into intentional and spurious herding. Our findings add to several streams of 
the literature. First The study provides the first examination of analyst 
recommendation revisions and investor sentiment on institutional herding. It 
provides insights into how institutions respond to analyst information by 
considering the role of investor sentiment. We examine this issue by using 
two different herding measures, LSV model and Sias model to capture 
herding in the same period and in the subsequent period. Two herding 
measures allow us a better understanding of spurious and intentional herding. 
Second, the study contributes to the cognitive dissonance literature by 
showing that cognitive dissonance is one of the important biases in affecting 
intuitional herding.  
6.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The first limitation of the thesis perhaps involves the measure of investor 
sentiment for each of the international markets in the first two chapters. The 
consumer confidence index is used in the study as a proxy for investor 
sentiment. Although the consumer confidence index has been widely used 
in many studies in the literature, they are obtained from different sources and 
some of them are not seasonally adjusted. We also construct an alternative 
sentiment proxy by following Baker et al. (2012) for ten western and ESEA 
countries but trading data used for the construction are not available for all 
40 countries and the frequency of the index is yearly. The limitations of 
investor sentiment proxies provide one area of future research: to identify 
proper sentiment indicators which are more consistent across countries and 





The second limitation of the thesis relates to the measurement of cognitive 
dissonance. In the first two empirical chapters, we propose that cognitive 
dissonance may be a major driver for momentum and PEAD, but we cannot 
directly examine the intensity of cognitive dissonance. In particular, private 
(public) news may contradict sentiment states of investors, resulting in the 
news slowly incorporating into stock prices. If cognitive dissonance is more 
evident, it is expected that news will diffuse more slowly and vice versa. It 
would be interesting to develop a measure of cognitive dissonance to allow 
consideration of the discrepancy between investor sentiment and new 
information.  
 
The third limitation of the first two empirical chapters to the openness of the 
stock market. According to Eun et al. (2015), trade or capital market 
openness alleviates the effect of domestic culture on stock market. Trade 
openness exposes people to different ideas and values and could potentially 
mitigate the effect of their own culture effect on their behaviours. Capital 
market openness allows foreign investors to invest in domestic stock markets, 
alleviating the influence of domestic culture on stock price behaviour. Thus, 
it is interesting to examine the effect of the two factors in relation to our 
findings since based on these arguments, we expect a weaker influence of 
cognitive dissonance or the cultural effect in more open to international trade 
and more integrated with the global stock market.   
 
The fourth limitation relates to the third empirical chapter in relation to the 
type of herding. We show that both within- and adjacent-period herding are 
informational based herding since it is observed that stock return reversals 
are relatively weak following institutional herding. To distinguish such herding 
due to informational cascades or correlated information, further examinations 
should be conducted.  
 
The fifth limitation also relates to the third empirical chapter in relation to the 
consensus recommendation revisions. Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) find that 
average recommendation revision does not produce an economically 
meaningful price reaction on non-firm news (e.g. earnings announcements) 
dates. They suggest that analyst average recommendation revisions are 
uninformative. Chan et al. (2005) provide evidence that there is no difference 




and on recommendation days. Loh and Stulz (2010) suggest that previous 
studies focus on average effects, they do not discuss subsets of 
recommendations that are influential. They find that consistent with previous 
studies, a large number of recommendations are uninformative. However, 
instead focusing on average effect of recommendation revisions, they focus 
on influential recommendation changes which has significant impact on 
stock-price and find that 12% of the recommendation changes are influential. 
They suggest that those influential recommendation change are more likely 
to come from analysts with larger leader follower ratios and more accurate 
forecasts. In addition, recommendations that are away from consensus and 
issued with earnings forecasts at the same period tend to be more influential. 
Therefore, due to the majority of the recommendation revisions has no 
significant investment value, it seems that consensus analyst 
recommendation revisions or average recommendation revisions are less 
likely to have significant impact on prices or significant value for investors 
when making trading decisions based the consensus recommendation 
revisions.  It is interesting to replicate our research by replacing consensus 
recommendation revisions by individual’s influential recommendation 
revision by following Loh and Stulz (2010). 
 
Furthermore, the first two empirical chapters focus on the interaction of 
investor sentiment and culture. The literature on investor sentiment shows 
that professionals (institutional investors) are not likely to be affected by 
sentiment, whereas amateurs (individual investors) are more likely to be 
affected by sentiment (see e.g. Lee et al., 1991). Investors are not born as 
professionals; it is more appropriate to argue that experience is a major factor 
that influences people’s proneness to sentiment. A number of studies 
document that younger managers behave more like inexperienced investors 
(Smith et al. 1988) and younger mutual fund manager exhibit trend-chasing 
behaviour to buy overpriced stocks compared to older fund managers 
(Greenwood and Nagel, 2009). Other studies document that experience has 
an influence on investment decisions (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) and 
reduces herd behaviour (Beckmann et al., 2008). Therefore, more 
experienced investors may exhibit less proneness to sentiment. It would be 
interesting to empirically examine the effect of experience on investors: less 
experienced investors are expected to have more impact on financial 
markets during extreme sentiment states. 
 
In the third empirical chapter, we investigate the effect of investor sentiment 




to extend our findings to examine different types of institutional investors, 
such as mutual funds and independent advisors, since Sias (2004) suggests 
that mutual funds and independent advisors are most likely to experience 
changes in net flows in relation to their reputation. Previous literature of 
herding focus on pension funds (Lakonishok et al., 1992) or mutual funds 
(Grinblatt., 1995). Sias (2004) mentions that different types of managers face 
different environments (e.g. regulatory requirements and holding periods). 
This may affects these institutional investors herd only within classifications. 
Sias (2004) also proposes that if institutional herding is primarily driven by 
reputational reasons, they should be more likely to follow similar classified 
institutions than differently classified institutions. Therefore, greater herd 
behaviour due to reputational reasons should be found among mutual funds 
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